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ABSTRACT
Electronic trading platforms have transformed the financial market landscape,
supporting automation of trading and dissemination of information. With high vol-
umes of data streaming at high velocity, market participants use algorithms to assist
almost every aspect of their decision-making: they learn market state, identify op-
portunities to trade, and express increasingly diverse and nuanced preferences. This
growing automation motivates a reconsideration of market designs to support the new
competence and prevent potential risks.
This dissertation focuses on the design of (1) manipulation-resistant markets that
facilitate learning genuine market supply and demand, and (2) expressive markets
that facilitate delivering preferences in greater detail and flexibility. Advances towards
each may contribute to efficient resource allocation and information aggregation.
Manipulation-Resistant Markets. Spoofing refers to the practice of submitting
spurious orders to deceive others about supply and demand. To understand its effects,
this dissertation develops an agent-based model of manipulating prices in limit-order
markets. Empirical game-theoretic analysis on agent behavior in simulated markets
with and without manipulation shows that spoofing hurts market surplus and de-
creases the proportion of learning traders who exploit order book information. That
learning behavior typically persists in strategic equilibrium even in the presence of
manipulation, indicating a consistently spoofable market.
Built on this model, a cloaking mechanism is designed to deter spoofing via strate-
gically concealing part of the order book. Simulated results demonstrate that the
benefit of cloaking in mitigating manipulation outweighs its efficiency cost due to
information loss. This dissertation explores variations of the learning-based trading
strategy that reasonably compromise effectiveness in non-manipulated markets for
robustness against manipulation.
Regulators who deploy detection algorithms to catch manipulation face the chal-
lenge that an adversary may obfuscate strategy to evade. This dissertation proposes
an adversarial learning framework to proactively reason about how a manipulator
xiv
might mask behavior. Evasion is represented by a generative model, trained by aug-
menting manipulation order streams with examples of normal trading. The framework
generates adapted manipulation order streams that mimic benign trading patterns
and appear qualitatively different from prescribed manipulation strategies.
Expressive Markets. Financial options are contracts that specify the right to
buy or sell an underlying asset at a strike price in the future. Standard exchanges
offer options of predetermined strike values and trade them independently, even for
those written on the same asset. This dissertation proposes a mechanism to match
orders on options related to the same asset, supporting trade of any custom strike.
Combinatorial financial options—contracts that define future trades of any linear
combination of underlying assets—are further introduced to enable the expression
of demand based on predicted correlations among assets. Optimal clearing of such
markets is coNP-hard, and a heuristic algorithm is proposed to find optimal matches
through iterative constraint generation.
Prediction markets that support betting on ranges (e.g., on the price of S&P 500)
offer predetermined intervals at a fixed resolution, limiting the ability to elicit fine-
grained information. The logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) used in this setting
presents two limitations that prevent its scaling to large outcome spaces: (1) oper-
ations run in time linear in the number of outcomes, and (2) loss suffered by the
market can grow unbounded. By embedding the modularity properties of LMSR into
a binary tree, this dissertation shows that operations can be expedited to logarithmic
time. A constant worst-case loss can also be achieved by designing a liquidity scheme




Financial markets were heretofore perceived as places where people gather to trade
assets.1 The design of mechanism or auction rules underlying a market plays a key
role that directs the decision-making of participants, the aggregation of information,
and the allocation of resources. Over the past few decades, markets have become to
operate almost entirely electronically, supporting automation of trading and conse-
quential scaling of volume and speed across geography and asset classes. With data
streaming on a short timescale, often below the limits of human response time, au-
tonomous agents directed by algorithms operate on behalf of human traders. Such
increasing automation has transformed the financial market landscape from a human
decision ecosystem to an algorithmic one, motivating a reconsideration of market
designs that can support the new competence and prevent potential risks.
Whereas exactly how agents trade is proprietary and unknown, the incorporation
of algorithmic assistance in almost every aspect of a decision loop is evident. Fig-
ure 1.1 illustrates three main aspects involved: (1) assessing market states, (2) iden-
tifying opportunities to trade, and (3) expressing demands and preferences. The first
and last involve direct interactions with a market, and the second can be affected
by these interactions. This dissertation focuses on the design of market mechanisms
and algorithms to better facilitate (1) and (3), with the ultimate goal of ensuring the
efficient resource allocation and information aggregation.
Figure 1.1: The decision-making process of an agent in the market.
1As chronicled in Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt by Lewis (2014).
1
With the assistance of algorithms, market participants have the unprecedented
ability to gather and exploit information from a plethora of sources, from news arti-
cles to order book information disclosed by many financial exchanges. Learning and
assessing market states helps to make informed trades and may contribute to improved
market efficiency. However, the prevalent use of automated learning techniques intro-
duces new possibilities for manipulation, and a distortion to one source of information
can lead to a cascading effect in the greater marketplace. One common type of ma-
nipulative practices is order-based manipulation, applied through a series of direct
trading actions in a market. Rather than expressing true trading intent, spurious or-
ders are submitted—often also aided by algorithms—to maneuver the market state:
they feign a strong buy or sell interest to deceive investors who learn from others’
bidding activities. As algorithms respond to information much faster than humans,
the market can reflect misled beliefs in milliseconds, with prices moving toward the
crafted direction that benefits the manipulator. This dissertation combines methods
from agent-based modeling, game-theoretic analysis, and adversarial learning to ex-
amine the mechanics behind such manipulation and propose manipulation-resistant
designs.
With the assistance of algorithms, market participants become more capable
of computing and identifying complex but well-defined investment objectives (e.g.,
achieving a particular return, hedging exposure risks, or speculating the movement
of a portfolio of assets). This competence is accompanied with the need of custom fi-
nancial instruments, as well as a higher level of expressiveness in the mechanism—the
ability to provide agents the means to express more diverse demands and nuanced
preferences. Most current markets, however, fail to tailor to such individualized
needs, offering standardized contracts with predetermined characteristics. This keeps
the mechanism and its operations clean and simple, but puts burdens on investors
who have to craft trades across available markets and bear the risk of execution
failure. Increasing expressiveness may in fact benefit a mechanism: the market is
able to incorporate information of greater detail to optimize outcome, improving eco-
nomic efficiency, and obtain high-quality information aggregation. The second part
of this dissertation investigates expressive designs for financial options markets and
prediction markets, analyzing computational complexity of increased expressiveness
and proposing algorithms to facilitate computationally efficient operations.
In sections below, I provide more background on the two identified problems, and
outline the computational approaches this dissertation adopts.
2
1.1 Designing Manipulation-Resistant Markets
Market manipulation is defined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as “intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by
controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities, or intentional interference
with the free forces of supply and demand”. Though it has long been present, the
practice has evolved in its forms to exploit automated trading and the dissemination
of market information offered by many trading platforms (Lin 2015).
On July 22, 2013, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed
charges against Michael Coscia for manipulating a broad spectrum of commodities
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Patterson and Trindle 2013). Coscia utilized
a computer algorithm that quickly placed and canceled orders to mislead the market
about demand and supply for these contracts. The trial evidence suggested that such
practice allowed Coscia to buy low and sell high in a market artificially distorted by
his actions, purportedly earning him $1.4 million. Figure 1.2 illustrates an episode of
the alleged spoofing activity conducted over the course of 0.6 seconds.
The case of Coscia was the first prosecuted under the Dodd-Frank Act passed
in 2010, but not the only one occurring in today’s marketplace. A recent lawsuit
claimed evidence of thousands of manipulation episodes in the U.S. Treasury futures
observed during 2013 and 2014 (Hope 2015b). Since 2016, the SEC has brought legal
action over a hundred cases of manipulation (U.S. SEC 2017, 2018, 2019), and new
allegations have been emerging on a regular basis.
Despite regulatory enforcement efforts, manipulation is hard to eliminate due to
(1) the difficulty of determining the manipulation intent behind placement of orders,
and (2) the adversarial nature of a manipulator who adapts to evade regulation and
detection. This calls for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics be-
tween a manipulator and other market participants—as well as the dynamics between
a manipulator and a regulator—to design deterrent measures, ensuring the general
efficiency and integrity of a marketplace.
1.1.1 Dynamics between a Manipulator and Market Participants
Prior work that investigates order-based market manipulation has primarily re-
lied on examination of historical trading data (Lee, Eom, and Park 2013; Wang
2019). Researchers conduct empirical analysis to characterize manipulation patterns
and market conditions where manipulation is more likely to occur and be effective.
Grounding on historical data, pure data-driven approaches can provide insights to ob-
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A sequence of limit orders
submitted by Coscia over the
course of 0.6 seconds. A series
of large out-of-the money ma-
nipulation sell orders (red tri-
angles) are first placed to drive
the price down and make the
buy order accepted (the filled
blue triangle). These sell or-
ders are immediately replaced
with large buy ones (blue trian-
gles) to push the price up and
profit from the sale at a higher
price (the filled red triangle).
Figure 1.2: Example of alleged spoofing. Source: UK Financial Conduct Authority
Final Notice 2013.
servational questions, delivering findings that may better reflect the real world situa-
tion. However, they present fundamental limitations when concerning counterfactual
questions (e.g., what would change if a certain action is not taken), and answers to
such questions can be highly relevant to identifying manipulation and understanding
its impact.
Analytic models can be an useful approach to analyze the mechanics behind mar-
ket manipulation. Allen and Gale (1992) develop a model of transaction-based manip-
ulation, and compute equilibrium based off of this model where the existence of noise
traders makes it possible to manipulate prices. Fishman and Hagerty (1995) propose
a one-period equilibrium model of information-based manipulation where uninformed
insiders can make a profit by pretending they are informed and disclosing their trades.
Both models rely on highly simplified context and assumptions (e.g., limited num-
ber of trading stages, probabilistic information disclosure) to derive equilibrium and
demonstrate the theoretical possibility of manipulation. In our case, however, the
manipulation practice of interest relies on complex features, such as frequent entries
into the market and propagation of order book information between the market and
agents. These features are essential to the problem at hand and may not be removed
or easily stylized for tractability.
This dissertation adopts a computational approach that lies somewhere in be-
tween of the two approaches discussed: it combines agent-based modeling (ABM)
and empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) (Wellman 2006) to study the effect
of manipulation on trading behavior and market performance in equilibrium. ABM
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takes a simulation approach to reproduce phenomena of interest through the dy-
namic interactions of agents. It enables the designer to incorporate any desired level
of complexity into the model, and provides the means to acquire counterfactual in-
formation. By simulating different scenarios and conducting controlled experiments,
one can evaluate how a certain factor affects agent and system behavior. Despite the
merits and flexibility, ABM presents a challenge that may affect its practicability:
simulated data can vary as one adopts different design choices (e.g., environment,
prescribed strategies, agent composition), and thus analysis conducted upon it may
or may not accurately reflect situation in reality.
This dissertation alleviates this issue by exploring a wide range of environments
and employing EGTA in each to focus on the most relevant strategic context. From
the agent-based model, EGTA induces a normal-form game defined by heuristic strat-
egy space and simulated agent utilities, and solves for Nash equilibria (or other game-
theoretic solution concepts) to determine agent behavior. By such, rather than pre-
scriptively assigning strategies to agents and exploring all possible combinations, a
designer is directed to a strategically stable setting where agents are making the best
choices among their available strategies, given an environment and others’ choices.
Combining ABM and EGTA, Chapter 2 develops the first computational model
that reproduces spoofing in a dynamic limit-order mechanism, and demonstrates the
effectiveness of manipulating against approximate-equilibrium traders. The model
offers a constructive basis to quantify the effect of manipulation practices and evaluate
any preventive or deterrent proposals under strategic settings. Chapter 2 proceeds to
explore variations of trading strategies that may exploit market information in less
vulnerable ways, and proposes a mechanism to disincentive manipulation via strategic
disclosure of the order book.
1.1.2 Dynamics between a Manipulator and a Regulator
Deterrent mechanisms intend to render manipulative strategies uneconomical; a
more direct approach is to detect any manipulation activity. The automated and
high-frequency nature of many manipulation practices has led efforts to automate
detection. Nasdaq announced an AI-based surveillance system trained with histori-
cal data and spotted patterns of market-abuse techniques to detect suspect equities
trading episodes (Rundle 2019). Despite recent advances in pattern recognition al-
gorithms, developing high-fidelity detection systems faces the all-time challenge that
an adversary may obfuscate its strategies to escape detection (e.g., manipulating in a
way that appears as normal trading activity). This causes regulators to play a costly
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game of cat-and-mouse with manipulators who constantly innovate to evade.
Such a contest resembles the workings of generative adversarial nets (GANs)
(Goodfellow et al. 2014): the generative model—analogous to the manipulator—
learns to fool a discriminative model—the detector, by producing novel candidates
that the discriminator believes are part of the true data distribution (e.g., normal
trading patterns). Building on this connection, the dissertation proposes an adver-
sarial learning framework to proactively reason about how a manipulator might mask
its behavior to evade detection. The framework differs from a vanilla GAN model in
two main aspects. First, it takes prescribed spoofing traces as inputs as opposed to
randomized inputs in GANs. Second, it attempts to resemble a target distribution
while preserving a comparable manipulation effect, whereas resemblance is the only
objective in GANs. Ultimately, the generated “unseen” manipulative examples can
serve to train more robust detection algorithms.
Biggio, Fumera, and Roli (2014) identify four stages in the scheme of proactive
security: (1) model adversary, (2) simulate attack, (3) evaluate attack’s impact, and
(4) develop countermeasures, if the attack has relevant impact. The proposed adver-
sarial framework combines a variant of GAN and the developed agent-based model
of manipulation to perform the four steps iteratively. Evasion (or the adversary)
is modeled by a generator that learns to adapt original manipulation activities to
resemble trading patterns of a normal trader. The agent-based simulator performs
(2) and (3), and the generative and discriminative model respectively conducts (1)
and (4). Whereas such an adversarial framework cannot capture all changing as-
pects of an adversary, it is generally believed that proactive reasoning delays each
step of the reactive arms race, forcing the adversary to exert greater efforts to find
vulnerabilities (Biggio, Fumera, and Roli 2014).
1.2 Designing Expressive Markets
The second part of this dissertation studies mechanisms and algorithms to improve
the expressiveness of financial markets. By giving participants greater flexibility to
express preferences and beliefs, a market mechanism can incorporate more inputs to
optimize for outcome, increase economic efficiency, and obtain high-quality informa-
tion aggregation. However, a higher-level of expressiveness may come at the cost of a
more intricate mechanism that is computationally expensive.2 This dissertation inves-
2Several works have formally described and quantified tradeoffs of this form (Benisch, Sadeh, and
Sandholm 2008; Golovin 2007).
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tigates the use of optimization methods and computationally-efficient data structures
to facilitate and expedite key operations required by an expressive market.
Take financial options markets as an example. An option is a contract that spec-
ifies the contract holder the right to buy or sell of an underlying asset at some agreed
strike price in the future. On standard exchanges, markets for options written on a
specific underlying asset feature a selective set of predetermined strike prices. For ex-
ample, as of this writing, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) offers around
forty distinct strike prices, ranging from $100 to $320 at intervals of $5 or $10, for
MSFT options expiring on September 17, 2021. While one can engineer custom con-
tracts (e.g., a MSFT call option with strike price $202) by simultaneously purchasing
multiple available options at appropriate proportions, it requires monitoring several
markets to ensure that a bundle can be constructed at a desired price. Often, execu-
tion risk and transaction costs prevent traders from carrying out such strategies. As
a result, the exchange may fail to aggregate supply and demand requests of greater
detail, leading to a loss of economic efficiency.
For the set of offered strikes, standard exchanges operate separate markets, having
each independently aggregate and match orders of a designated strike price, despite
the interconnectedness and their common dependency on the underlying asset. Such
independent market design fails to match options with different strike prices, and
may introduce arbitrage opportunities. Moreover, investments get diluted across
independent markets even when participants are interested in the same underlying
asset. This can cause the problem of thin markets, where few trades happen and
bid-ask spreads become wide. Empirical evidence has shown that even for some of
the most actively traded options, liquidity can vary much across option types and
strikes (Cao and Wei 2010).
Besides financial options market, prediction markets that facilitate trading the
outcome of events share a similar limitation due to their predetermined designs. For
instance, markets that elicit predictions of an outcome variable, such as the time
FDA will approve a vaccine or the threshold S&P 500 will hit by the end of the year,
often restrain the outcome space to some pre-defined intervals at a certain resolution
(e.g., quarters of a year, or ranges of every thousand dollars). Such prescriptive
design, by clustering betting interest, attenuates the thin market problem. However,
it prevents agents with expert knowledge from expressing more accurate information
(e.g., the month, date, or even time of a vaccine release). The popular logarithmic
market scoring rule (LMSR) (Hanson 2003) has been used in this setting to subsidize
trading and aggregate information at different granularity levels in a single market.
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However, it suffers two limitations that prevent its scaling to markets with large
outcome spaces. First, the worst-case loss of an LMSR market can grow unbounded
if agents select outcomes with prior probability approaching zero (Gao, Chen, and
Pennock 2009). Second, standard implementations of LMSR operations run in time
linear in the number of outcomes or distinct future values agents define, which can
be arbitrarily many in a continuous outcome space.
To address issues identified above, this dissertation proposes mechanisms and al-
gorithms to improve market expressiveness. In many cases, computational techniques
can help to exploit certain payoff properties or outcome structures present in a mar-
ket to enjoy a desired level of expressiveness without compromising computational
efficiency. Chapter 4 presents a mechanism that utilizes a linear program to consol-
idate and match orders on standard options related to the same underlying asset,
while providing traders the flexibility to specify any custom strike value. Market
operations, including match and price quotes, require time polynomial in the number
of orders. Chapter 5 proposes a balanced-binary tree data structure that success-
fully decomposes LMSR calculations along the tree nodes, thus expediting market
operations exponentially faster than previous designs.
This dissertation also demonstrates the case when a higher level of expressive-
ness renders a market computationally intractable. Chapter 4 generalizes standard
options to combinatorial financial options, which specify the right to buy or sell any
defined linear combination of underlying assets at some agreed strike price. Such
contracts provide investors the means to speculate relative movements among stocks,
thus enabling the elicitation of future correlations among underlying assets. This
increased expressiveness of the mechanism, however, comes at the cost of higher com-
putational complexity: optimal clearing of such a market is coNP-hard. Chapter 4
demonstrates that with a proposed heuristic algorithm, the computational hardness
may be surmountable in practice.
1.3 Dissertation Overview
This introductory chapter has provided a broad perspective on the two categories
of problems the dissertation aims to address and a brief description of the employed
methodology and computational techniques. The remainder of this dissertation pro-
vides the details.
Chapter 2 presents the computational agent-based model of spoofing (Section 2.3),
proposes deterrent mechanisms (Section 2.6), and explores trading strategies to im-
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prove learning robustness against manipulation (Section 2.7). Section 2.4 details the
EGTA methodology, which is adopted in all three studies to provide strategic anal-
ysis. Some of the material in this chapter has appeared in published work (Wang,
Hoang, and Wellman 2020; Wang, Vorobeychik, and Wellman 2018; Wang and Well-
man 2017).
Chapter 3 describes the adversarial learning framework developed to reason about
evading any manipulation detection. It uses the built agent-based market simulator
in Chapter 2 to generate spoofing and non-manipulative order streams (served as
training data) and to evaluate the manipulation effect of adapted outputs. Part of
the material from this chapter has appeared in published work (Wang and Wellman
2020).
Chapter 4 studies expressive designs for financial options markets. Section 4.4
specifies the mechanism that improves matching standard options. Section 4.5 defines
combinatorial financial options, and investigates matching mechanisms and computa-
tional complexity for such a market. Material from this chapter is under submission
(Wang et al. 2020).
Chapter 5 presents two efficient designs of prediction markets that recover a com-
plete and fully general probability distribution of a random variable. Section 5.3
details the balanced tree construction that embeds LMSR calculations and expedites
market operations. Section 5.4 describes a different binary tree structure, augmented
with a liquidity scheme to enable a constant loss bound. Some of the material in this
chapter is in paper to appear at the 20th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (Dud́ık, Wang, Pennock, and Rothschild 2020).
Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of contribution and a discussion of limita-
tions and future directions.
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CHAPTER 2
Spoofing the Limit Order Book: A Strategic
Agent-Based Analysis
This chapter presents an agent-based model of manipulating prices in financial
markets through spoofing ; it is a form of order-based manipulation that operates by
submitting spurious orders to mislead traders who learn from the order book. Built
around the limit-order mechanism, the model captures a complex market environ-
ment with combined private and common values, the latter represented by noisy
observations upon a dynamic fundamental time series. In this model, we consider
background agents following two types of trading strategies: the non-spoofable zero
intelligence (ZI) that ignores the order book and the manipulable heuristic belief
learning (HBL) that exploits the order book to predict price outcomes. We conduct
empirical game-theoretic analysis upon simulated agent payoffs across parametrically
different environments, and measure the effect of spoofing on market performance in
approximate strategic equilibria.
We demonstrate that HBL traders can improve price discovery and social welfare,
but their existence in equilibrium renders a market vulnerable to manipulation: simple
spoofing strategies can effectively mislead traders, distort prices, and reduce total
surplus. Based on this model, the chapter further proposes to mitigate spoofing from
two aspects: (1) mechanism design to disincentivize manipulation and (2) trading
strategy variations to improve the robustness of learning from market information. We
evaluate the proposed approaches, taking into account potential strategic responses
of agents, and characterize the conditions under which these approaches may deter
manipulation and benefit market welfare. The model proposed here provides a way
to quantify the effect of spoofing on trading behavior and market efficiency, and thus
can help to evaluate the effectiveness of various market designs and trading strategies
in mitigating an important form of market manipulation.
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2.1 Introduction
On April 21, 2015, nearly five years after the “Flash Crash”,1 the U.S. Department
of Justice charged Navinder Singh Sarao with 22 criminal counts, including fraud
and spoofing. Prior to the Flash Crash, Sarao allegedly used an algorithm to place
orders amounting to about $200 million seemingly betting that the market would
fall, and later replaced or modified those orders 19,000 times before cancellation.
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) concluded that Sarao’s
manipulative practice was responsible for significant order imbalances. Though recent
analysis has cast doubt on the causal role of Sarao on the Flash Crash (Aldrich,
Grundfest, and Laughlin 2017), many agree that such manipulation could increase the
vulnerability of markets and exacerbate market fluctuations. An illustrative execution
trace of a similar spoofing strategy has been presented and discussed in Chapter 1
Figure 1.2, demonstrating how quickly and effectively such manipulation behavior
can affect the market and profit from the spoofed belief.
Specifically, spoofing operates through a series of direct trading actions in a mar-
ket. Traders interact with the market by submitting orders to buy or sell. Orders
that do not transact immediately rest in the order book, a repository for outstanding
orders to trade. At any given time, the order book for a particular security reflects the
market’s expressed supply and demand. A spoofer (or manipulator) submits large
spurious buy or sell orders with the intent to cancel them before execution. The
orders are spurious in that instead of expressing genuine trading intent, they feign
a strong buy or sell interest in the market, thus corrupting the order book’s signal
on supply and demand. Such orders can be viewed as targeted attacks (Huang et al.
2011), designed to mislead others who learn from the order book to believe that prices
may soon rise or fall and subsequently alter their trading behavior in a way that will
directly move the price. To profit on its feint, the manipulator can submit a real order
on the opposite side of the market and as soon as the real order transacts, cancel all
the spoof orders.
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was
signed into U.S. law, outlawing spoofing as a deceptive practice. In describing its
concern about spoofing, the CFTC notes that “many market participants, relying on
the information contained in the order book, consider the total relative number of bid
and ask offers in the order book when making trading decisions”. In fact, spoofing
1The Flash Crash was a sudden trillion-dollar dip in U.S. stock markets on May 6, 2010, during
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Figure 2.1: An agent-based model of spoofing in a CDA market with a single security
traded.
can be effective only to the extent that traders actually use order book information
to make trading decisions. In ideal markets without manipulation, traders may ex-
tract useful information from the order book, making more informed decisions over
those that neglect such information. A manipulator exploits such learning process,
minimizing its own risk in the process. Spoof orders are typically placed at price
levels just outside the current best quotes to mislead other investors, and withdrawn
with high probability before any market movement could trigger a trade (Hope 2015a;
Montgomery 2016).
This chapter reproduces spoofing in a computational model, as a first step toward
developing more robust measures to characterize and prevent spoofing. We adopt
an agent-based modeling approach to simulate the interactions among players with
different strategies. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of our proposed agent-based market
model. The model implements a continuous double auction (CDA) market with a
single security traded. The CDA is a two-sided mechanism adopted by most financial
and commodity markets (Friedman 1993). Traders can submit limit orders at any
time, and whenever an incoming order matches an existing one they trade at the
incumbent order’s limit price.
The market is populated with multiple background traders and in selected treat-
ments, one manipulator who executes the spoofing strategy. Background traders are
further divided to follow two types of trading strategies: zero intelligence (ZI) that
ignores the order book and heuristic belief learning (HBL) that learns from the order
book to predict price outcomes. Upon each arrival to trade, a background trader
receives a noisy observation of the security’s fundamental value. Based on a series of
fundamental observations and its private value, a ZI agent computes the limit-order
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price by shading a random offset from its valuation, and thus is non-manipulable. An
HBL agent, on the other hand, is susceptible to spoofing: it considers information
about orders recently submitted to the market, estimates the probability that orders
at various prices would be transacted, and chooses the optimal price to maximize
expected surplus. The manipulator in our model executes a spoofing strategy similar
to that illustrated in Figure 1.2. The spoofer injects and maintains large spurious
buy orders at one tick behind the best bid, designed to manipulate the market by
misleading others about the level of demand.
We conduct extensive simulation over hundreds of strategy profiles across paramet-
rically different market environments with and without manipulation. The simulation
data is used to estimate normal-form game models, from which we derive empirical
equilibria, where every agent chooses its best response to both the market environ-
ment and others’ behavior. Our goal is to (1) reproduce spoofing and understand its
impact on market performance (Section 2.5) and (2) propose and evaluate variations
of market designs (Section 2.6) and learning-based trading strategies (Section 2.7) in
mitigating manipulation.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Agent-Based Modeling of Financial Markets
Agent-based modeling (ABM) takes a simulation approach to study complex do-
mains with dynamically interacting decision makers. ABM has been frequently ap-
plied to modeling and understanding phenomena in financial markets (Lebaron 2006),
for example to study the Flash Crash (Paddrik et al. 2012) or to replicate the volatility
persistence and leptokurtosis characteristic of financial time series (LeBaron, Arthur,
and Palmer 1999). A common goal of agent-based finance studies is to reproduce
stylized facts of financial market behavior (Palit, Phelps, and Ng 2012), and to sup-
port causal reasoning about market environments and mechanisms. Researchers have
also use ABM to investigate the effects of particular trading practices, such as market
making (Wah, Wright, and Wellman 2017) and latency arbitrage (Wah and Wellman
2016). ABM advocates argue that simulation is particularly well-suited to study
financial markets (Bookstaber 2012), as analytic models in this domain typically re-
quire extreme stylization for tractability, and pure data-driven approaches cannot
answer questions about changing market and agent designs.
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2.2.2 Autonomous Bidding Strategies
There is a substantial literature on autonomous bidding strategies in CDA markets
(Wellman 2011). The basic zero intelligence (ZI) strategy (Gode and Sunder 1993)
submits offers at random offsets from valuation. Despite its simplicity, ZI has been
shown surprisingly effective for modeling some cases (Farmer, Patelli, and Zovko
2005). In this study, we adopt an extended and parameterized version of ZI to
represent trading strategies that ignore order book information.
Researchers have also extended ZI with adaptive features that exploit observations
to tune themselves to market conditions.2 For example, the zero intelligence plus
(ZIP) strategy outperforms ZI by adjusting an agent-specific profit margin based
on successful and failed trades (Cliff 1997, 2009). Vytelingum, Cliff, and Jennings
(2008) introduce another level of strategic adaptation, allowing the agent to control
its behavior with respect to short and long time scales.
Gjerstad proposed a more direct approach to learning from market observations,
termed GD in its original version (Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1998) and named heuristic
belief learning (HBL) in a subsequent generalized form (Gjerstad 2007). The HBL
model estimates a heuristic belief function based on market observations over a specific
memory length. Variants of HBL (or GD) have featured prominently in the trading
agent literature. For example, Tesauro and Das (2001) adapt the strategy to markets
that support persistent orders. Tesauro and Bredin (2002) show how to extend beyond
myopic decision making by using dynamic programming to optimize the price and
timing of bids.
We adopt HBL as our representative class of agent strategies that exploit order
book information. HBL can be applied with relatively few tunable strategic param-
eters, compared to other adaptive strategies in the literature. We extend HBL to a
more complex market environment that supports persistent orders, combined private
and fundamental values, noisy observations, stochastic arrivals, and the ability to
trade multiple units with buy or sell flexibility. The extended HBL strategy consid-
ers the full cycle of an order, including the times an order is submitted, accepted,
canceled, or rejected.
2To some extent, the adaptive functions of these strategies are implicitly achieved by the game-
theoretic equilibration process which we employ to determine the parametric configurations of the
(non-adaptive) trading strategies (Wright and Wellman 2018).
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2.2.3 Spoofing in Financial Markets
The literature on spoofing and its impact on financial markets is fairly limited.
Some empirical research based on historical financial market data has been conducted
to understand spoofing. Lee, Eom, and Park (2013) empirically examined spoofing
by analyzing a custom data set, which provides the complete intraday order and
trade data associated with identified individual accounts in the Korea Exchange.
They found investors strategically spoof the stock market by placing orders with
little chance to transact to add imbalance to the order book. They also discov-
ered that spoofing usually targets stocks with high return volatility but low market
capitalization and managerial transparency. Wang investigated spoofing on the in-
dex futures market in Taiwan, identifying strategy characteristics, profitability, and
real-time impact (Wang 2019). Mart́ınez-Miranda, McBurney, and Howard (2016)
implemented spoofing behavior within a reinforcement learning framework to model
conditions where such behavior is effective. Tao, Day, Ling, and Drapeau (2020)
presented a micro-structural study of spoofing in a static setting, providing condi-
tions under which a market is more likely to admit spoofing behavior as a function
of the characteristics of the market. Beyond traditional financial markets, Chen et
al. (2007) studied the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with au-
tomated market makers in prediction markets, and examined circumstances when
traders can benefit by either hiding or lying about information.
To our knowledge, we provide the first computational model of spoofing a dynamic
financial market, and demonstrate the effectiveness of spoofing against approximate-
equilibrium traders in this proposed model. Our model provides a way to quantify
the effect of spoofing on trading behavior and efficiency, and thus a first step in the
design of methods to deter or mitigate market manipulation.
2.3 Market Model
We present the general structure of the agent-based financial market environment
in which we model spoofing. Our model comprises agents trading a single security
through a continuous double auction (CDA), the mechanism adopted by most finan-
cial markets today. We first describe the market mechanism in Section 2.3.1. Our
model is designed to capture key features of market microstructure (e.g., fundamen-
tal shocks and observation noise), supporting a configurable simulator to understand
the effect of spoofing under different market conditions. The market is populated
with multiple background traders who represent investors in the market, and in se-
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lected treatments, a spoofer who seeks trading profit through manipulative action.
We specify the valuation model of background traders in Section 2.3.2 and the two
families of background-trader strategies in Section 2.3.3. In Section 2.3.4, we discuss
the behavior of the spoofing agent.
2.3.1 Market Mechanism
The market employs a CDA mechanism with a single security traded. Prices are
fine-grained and take discrete values at integer multiples of the tick size. Time is
also fine-grained and discrete, with trading over a finite horizon T . Agents in the
model submit limit orders, which specify the maximum (minimum) price at which
they would be willing to buy (sell) together with the number of units to trade. Orders
are immediately matched as they arrive: if at any time, one agent’s maximum price
to buy a unit is greater than or equal to another agent’s minimum price to sell a unit,
a transaction will occur and the agents trade at the price of the incumbent order.
The CDA market maintains a limit order book of outstanding orders, and provides
information about the book to traders with zero delay. The buy side of the order
book starts with BIDt, the highest-price buy order at time t, and extends to lower
prices. Similarly, the sell side starts with ASKt, the lowest-price sell order at time
t, and extends to higher prices. On order cancellation or transaction, the market
removes the corresponding orders and updates the order book. Agents may use order
book information at their own discretion. In Section 2.6, we investigate how changes
made in such order book disclosure may help to mitigate spoofing.
2.3.2 Valuation Model
Each background trader has an individual valuation for the security, which is com-
prised of a private value and a common value component. The common component is
represented as a fundamental value, rt, which changes throughout the trading period
according to a mean-reverting stochastic process:
rt = max{0, κr̄ + (1− κ)rt−1 + ut}; r0 = r̄. (2.1)
Here rt denotes the fundamental value of the security at time t ∈ [0, T ], and the pa-
rameter κ ∈ [0, 1] specifies the degree to which the value reverts back to a fundamental
mean r̄. A process with κ = 0 corresponds to a martingale Gaussian fundamental,
whereas κ = 1 specifies a process of i.i.d. Gaussian draws around the fundamental
mean. A mean-reverting time series of this sort has been empirically observed in
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financial markets such as foreign exchange and commodity markets (Chakraborty
and Kearns 2011). The perturbation ut captures a systematic random shock upon
the fundamental at time t, and is normally distributed as ut ∼ N(0, σ2s), where σ2s
represents an environment-specific shock variance. The shock variance governs fluc-
tuations in the fundamental time series, and consequently affects the predictability
of future price outcomes.
Our time-varying fundamental induces adverse selection, a situation where out-
standing orders reflect outdated information and thus can be at a disadvantage at
the current time. If the fundamental shifts significantly, subsequent agents are more
likely to transact with orders on the side opposite to the direction of fundamental
change. That is, a positive price shock will tend to trigger transactions with stale
sell orders, and a negative shock with stale buys. An agent’s exposure to adverse
selection in a market is jointly controlled by the fundamental shock variance σ2s , the
degree of mean reversion κ, and the arrival rate of that agent.
The entries of a background trader follow a Poisson process with an arrival rate
λa. Upon each entry, the trader observes an agent-and-time-specific noisy fundamen-
tal ot = rt + nt, where the observation noise nt is drawn from nt ∼ N(0, σ2n). Just as
in real financial markets, investors will never know the true value of the underlying
security, such noisy observations represent each trader’s assessment of the security’s
fundamental value at that time. Given its incomplete information about the funda-
mental, the agent can potentially benefit by considering market information, which is
influenced by and therefore reflects the aggregate observations of other agents. When
it arrives, the trader withdraws its previous order (if untransacted) and submits a
new single-unit limit order, either to buy or sell as instructed with equal probability.
The private value of a background trader i represents its individual preferences
on holding a long or short position of the security:
Θi = (θ
−qmax+1




i , . . . , θ
qmax
i ).
The vector has a length of 2qmax, where qmax is the maximum number of units a trader
can be long or short at any time. Element θqi in the vector specifies the incremental
private benefit foregone by selling one unit of the security given a current net position
of q. Alternatively, θq+1i can be understood as the marginal private gain from buying
an additional unit given current net position q. To capture the diminishing marginal
utility, that is θq
′ ≤ θq for all q′ ≥ q, we generate Θi from a set of 2qmax values drawn




respective value in the sorted list.
Agent i’s incremental surplus for a trade can be calculated based on its position q
before the trade, the value of the fundamental at the end of the trading horizon rT ,
and the transaction price p:
incremental surplus =
rT − p+ θ
q+1
i if buying 1 unit,
p− rT − θqi if selling 1 unit.
An agent’s total surplus is the sum of the agent’s incremental surplus over all trans-
actions. Alternatively, we can also calculate an agent’s total surplus by adding its net
cash from trading to the final valuation of holdings. Specifically, the market’s final











i for short position H < 0.
We define background-trader surplus as the sum of all background agents’ surpluses
at the end of the trading period T .
2.3.3 Background Trading Agents
Recall that background traders represent investors with actual preferences for
holding long or short positions in the underlying security. The limit-order price
submitted by a background trader is jointly decided by its valuation and trading
strategy, which we describe in detail below.
2.3.3.1 Estimating the Final Fundamental
As holdings of the security are evaluated at the end of a trading period (i.e.,
rT ×H), a background trader estimates the final fundamental value based on a series
of its noisy observations. We assume the market environment parameters (mean
reversion, shock variance, etc.) are common knowledge for background agents.
Given a new noisy observation ot, an agent estimates the current fundamental by
updating its posterior mean r̃t and variance σ̃
2
t in a Bayesian manner. Let t
′ denote
the agent’s preceding arrival time. We first update the previous posteriors, r̃t′ and
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σ̃2t′ , by mean reversion for the interval since preceding arrival, denoted δ = t− t′:

























Based on the posterior estimate of r̃t, the trader computes r̂t, its estimate at time t





r̄ + (1− κ)T−tr̃t. (2.2)
2.3.3.2 Zero Intelligence (ZI) as a Background Trading Strategy
We consider parameterized trading strategies in the zero intelligence (ZI) family
(Gode and Sunder 1993). Background traders who choose to adopt ZI strategies com-
pute limit-order prices solely based on fundamental observations and private values.
Specifically, the ZI agent shades its bid from its valuation by a random offset, which
is uniformly drawn from [Rmin, Rmax]. Specifically, a ZI trader i arriving at time t
with position q generates a limit price
pi(t) ∼
U [r̂t + θ
q+1
i −Rmax, r̂t + θ
q+1
i −Rmin] if buying,
U [r̂t − θqi +Rmin, r̂t − θ
q
i +Rmax] if selling.
(2.3)
Our version of ZI further considers the market’s current best quotes, and can
choose to immediately trade to get a certain fraction of its requested surplus. This
option is governed by a strategic threshold parameter η ∈ [0, 1]: if the agent could
achieve a fraction η of its requested surplus at the current price quote, it would simply
take that quote rather than submitting a new limit order. Setting η to 1 is equivalent
to the strategy without a threshold.
2.3.3.3 Heuristic Belief Learning (HBL) as a Background Trading
Strategy
The second background trading strategy family we consider is heuristic belief
learning (HBL). Background traders who choose to adopt HBL go beyond their own
observations and private values by also considering order book information. We make
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a set of changes to adapt the strategy to our dynamic market environment, supporting
multiple-unit trading with a flexible buy or sell role.
The strategy is centered on the belief function that a background trader forms on
the basis of its observed market data. The agent uses the belief function to estimate
the probability that orders at various prices would be accepted in the market, and
then chooses a limit price that maximizes its expected surplus at current valuation
estimates.
Specifically, an HBL agent constructs its belief function based on a dataset D
that records accepted and rejected buy and sell orders during the last L trades. The
strategic parameter L represents the agent’s memory length, which controls the size of
D. Upon an arrival at time t, the HBL agent builds a belief function ft(P ), designed
to represent the probability that an order at price P will result in a transaction.
Specifically, the belief function is defined for any encountered price P as the following:
ft(P | D) =

TBLt(P | D) + ALt(P | D)
TBLt(P | D) + ALt(P | D) + RBGt(P | D)
if buying,
TAGt(P | D) + BGt(P | D)
TAGt(P | D) + BGt(P | D) + RALt(P | D)
if selling.
(2.4)
Here, T and R specify transacted and rejected orders respectively; A and B represent
asks and bids ; L and G describe orders with prices less than or equal to and greater
than or equal to price P respectively. For example, TBLt(P | D) is the number
of transacted bids found in the memory with price less than or equal to P up to
time t. An HBL agent updates its dataset D whenever the market receives new order
submissions, transactions, or cancellations, and computes the statistics in Eq. (2.4)
upon each arrival.
Since our market model supports persistent orders and cancellations, the classifi-
cation of an order as rejected is non-obvious and remains to be defined. To address
this, we associate orders with a grace period τgp and an alive period τal. We define
the grace period as the average time interval per arrival, that is τgp = 1/λa, and the
alive period τal of an order as the time interval from submission to transaction or
withdrawal if it is inactive, or to the current time if active. An order is considered as
rejected only if its alive period τal is longer than τgp, otherwise it is partially rejected
by a fraction of τal/τgp. As the belief function Eq. (2.4) is defined only at encountered
prices, we further extend it over the full price domain by cubic spline interpolation.
To speed the computation, we pick knot points and interpolate only between those
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points.
After formulating the belief function, an agent i with the arrival time t and current
holdings q searches for the optimal price P ∗i (t) that maximizes its expected surplus:
P∗i (t) =
arg maxP (r̂t + θ
q+1
i − P )ft(P | D) if buying,
arg maxP (P − θqi − r̂t)ft(P | D) if selling.
(2.5)
Under the special cases when there are fewer than L transactions at the beginning
of a trading period or when one side of the order book is empty, HBL agents behave the
same as ZI agents until enough information is gathered to form the belief function.
As those cases are rare, the specific ZI strategy that HBL agents adopt does not
materially affect the overall performance. In Section 2.7, we explore variations of the
HBL strategy to improve its learning robustness in the face of market manipulation.
2.3.4 The Spoofing Agent
The spoofing agent seeks profits only through manipulating prices. Unlike back-
ground traders, the spoofer has no private value for the security. We design a simple
spoofing strategy which maintains a large volume of buy orders at one tick behind
the best bid. Specifically, upon arrival at Tsp ∈ [0, T ], the spoofing agent submits a
buy order at price BIDTsp − 1 with volume Qsp  1. Whenever there is an update
on the best bid, the spoofer cancels its original spoof order and submits a new one at
price BIDt−1 with the same volume. Since in our model, background traders submit
only single-unit orders, they cannot transact with the spoof order, which is always
shielded by the order at a higher price BIDTsp . If that higher-price order gets exe-
cuted, the spoofer will immediately cancel and replace its spoof orders before another
background trader arrives. Here, we assume in effect that the spoofing agent can
react infinitely fast, in which case its spoof orders are guaranteed never to transact.
By continuously feigning buy interest in the market, this spoofing strategy specif-
ically aims to raise market beliefs. To profit from such manipulation practice, a
spoofing agent may first buy some shares of the security, manipulate the market to
push prices up, and later sell those previously bought shares at higher prices. Other
spoofing strategies such as adding sell pressure or alternating between buy and sell
pressure can be extended from the basic version.
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2.4 Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis
To reproduce spoofing and understand its effect, we employ a computational ap-
proach that combines agent-based modeling, simulation, and equilibrium computa-
tion. The point of identifying equilibria of the agent-based model is to focus on the
most relevant strategic contexts, where agents are making the best choices among
their available strategies, given others’ choices. To derive Nash equilibria, we employ
empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), a methodology that finds approximate
equilibria in games defined by heuristic strategy space and simulated payoff data
(Wellman 2016). We conduct systematic EGTA studies over a range of parametrically
defined market environments, based on the market model described in Section 2.3.
We model the market as a game with players in two roles : N background traders,
treated symmetrically, and a single spoofer. In most of our games, the spoofing
agent, when present, implements a fixed policy so is not considered a strategic player.
Symmetry of the background traders means that each has the same set of available
strategies (from the ZI and/or HBL families) to choose from, and their payoffs depend
on their own strategy and the number of players choosing each of the other strategies
(i.e., it does not matter which other-agent plays which other-strategy). For each game,
we evaluate a wide variety of strategy profiles (i.e., agent-strategy assignments), and
for each profile, we conduct thousands of simulation runs to account for stochastic
effects such as the market fundamental series, agent arrival patterns, and private
valuations. Given background trader symmetry, the payoff of a specific strategy in
a profile can be taken as the average payoff over all agents playing that strategy
in the profile. From the payoff data accumulated from these simulated samples of
explored strategy profiles, we induce an empirical game model, and from that derive
an approximate Nash equilibrium.
EGTA employs an iterative process: find candidate equilibria in subgames (i.e.,
games over strategy subsets), confirm or refute candidate solutions by examining de-
viations, and incrementally extend subgames, until termination criteria are satisfied.
We use the EGTAOnline infrastructure (Cassell and Wellman 2013) to conduct and
manage experiments. Below, we describe two key components of the EGTA process
we follow: profile search (Section 2.4.1) and game reduction (Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Profile Search
We apply EGTA iteratively to guide the profile search over the strategy space.
Exploration starts with singleton subgames, and incrementally considers each strat-
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egy outside the subgame strategy set. Specifically, the singleton subgames are profiles
where the same strategy is adopted by all background agents. Starting from this base,
we extend evaluation to neighboring profiles with single-agent deviations. Following
such a procedure, we systematically explore profiles and incorporate their payoff es-
timates into the partial payoff matrix corresponding to the empirical game model.
A subgames are completed (all profiles explored for strategy subsets), we com-
pute their equilibria, and consider these as candidate solutions of the full game. We
attempt to refute these candidates by evaluating deviations outside the subgame
strategy set, constructing a new subgame when a beneficial deviation is found. If
we examine all deviations without refuting, the candidate is confirmed. We continue
to refine the empirical subgame with additional strategies and corresponding simula-
tions until at least one equilibrium is confirmed and all non-confirmed candidates are
refuted (up to a threshold support size).
The procedure aims to confirm or refute promising equilibrium candidates found
throughout our exploration of the strategy space. Since it is often not computationally
feasible to search the entire profile space, additional distinct equilibria (e.g., equilibria
of large support sizes) are possible. In addition, equilibria identified in empirical
games must generally be viewed as provisional, as they are subject to refutation by
strategies outside the restricted set considered in the analysis.
2.4.2 Game Reduction
As the game size (i.e., number of possible strategy profiles) grows exponentially in
the number of players and strategies, it is computationally prohibitive to directly ana-
lyze games with more than a moderate number of players. We therefore apply aggrega-
tion methods to approximate a many-player game by a game with fewer players. The
specific technique we employ, called deviation-preserving reduction (DPR) (Wieden-
beck and Wellman 2012), defines reduced-game payoffs in terms of payoffs in the full
game as follows. Consider an N -player symmetric game, which we want to reduce
to a k-player game. The payoff for playing strategy s1 in the reduced game, with
other agents playing strategies (s2, . . . , sk), is given by the payoff of playing s1 in the
full N -player game when the other N − 1 agents are evenly divided among the k − 1
strategies s2, . . . , sk. To facilitate DPR, we choose values for N and k to ensure that
the required aggregations come out as integers. For example, in one of the market
environment, we reduce games with 28 background traders to games with four back-
ground traders. With one background player deviating to a new strategy, we can
reduce the remaining 27 players to three. For games that vary smoothly with the
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number of other players choosing any particular strategy, we can expect DPR to pro-
duce reasonable approximations of the original many-player games with exponential
reduction in simulation.
2.5 Spoofing the Limit Order Book
This section reproduces spoofing in the agent-based market model, and studies its
effect on background trading behavior and market outcomes. We start in Section 2.5.1
by exploring a range of market environments that can affect the effectiveness of both
learning and spoofing. Section 2.5.2 addresses agents’ choices among ZI and HBL
strategies in markets without spoofing. This is an important step, as spoofing can
be effective only if some fraction of background traders choose to learn from the
order book information. Section 2.5.3 investigates games with spoofing. We first
illustrate that a market populated with HBL traders is susceptible to spoofing: a
simple spoofing strategy can cause a rise in market prices and a redistribution of
surplus between ZI and HBL traders. We finally re-equilibrate the game with spoofing
to investigate the impact of spoofing on HBL adoption and market surplus. Details
of the HBL adoption rates and market surpluses of all found equilibria in games with
and without spoofing are provided in Appendix A.1.
2.5.1 Market Environments
Based on the defined market model, we conduct preliminary explorations over
a range of market settings, and include the most salient and meaningful ones for
our study. We consider nine market environments that differ in fundamental shock,
σ2s ∈ {105, 5 × 105, 106}, and in observation noise, σ2n ∈ {103, 106, 109}. Recall that
shock variance controls fluctuations in the fundamental time series, and observation
variance governs the quality of information agents get about the true fundamen-
tal. The nine environments cover representative market conditions that can affect an
agent’s ability and need to learn from market information. For example, when the
market shock is high, prices fluctuate more and market history may become less pre-
dictive; when observation noise is high, agents can glean only limited information from
their own observations and may gain more from the market’s aggregated order book
information. We label the low, medium, and high shock variances as {LS ,MS ,HS}
and noisy observation variances as {LN ,MN ,HN } respectively. For instance, the
label LSLN refers to a market with low shock, σ2s = 10




Strategy ZI1 ZI2 ZI3 ZI4 ZI5 ZI6 ZI7 HBL1 HBL2 HBL3 HBL4
L – – – – – – – 2 3 5 8
Rmin 0 0 0 0 0 250 250 – – – –
Rmax 250 500 1000 1000 2000 500 500 – – – –
η 1 1 0.8 1 0.8 0.8 1 – – – –
Table 2.1: Background trading strategies included in EGTA.
The global fundamental time series is generated according to Eq. (2.1) with fun-
damental mean r̄ = 105, mean reversion κ = 0.05, and a specified shock variance σ2s .
The minimum tick size is fixed at one. Each trading period lasts T = 10, 000 time
steps. For each environment, we consider markets populated with N ∈ {28, 65} back-
ground traders and in selected treatments, a spoofer. Background traders arrive at
the market according to a Poisson distribution with a rate λa = 0.005 and upon each
arrival, the trader observes a noisy fundamental ot = rt + nt, where nt ∼ N(0, σ2n).
The maximum number of units background traders can hold at any time is qmax = 10.
Private values are drawn from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and a variance
of σ2PV = 5 × 106. The spoofing agent starts to manipulate at time Tsp = 1000 by
submitting a large buy order at price BIDTsp − 1 with volume Qsp = 200, and later
maintains spoofing orders at price BIDt − 1 throughout the trading period.
To provide a benchmark for market surplus, we calculate the social optimum—the
expected total possible gains from trade, which depends solely on the trader popu-
lation size and valuation distribution. From 20,000 samples of the joint valuations,
we estimate mean social optima of 18,389 and 43,526 for markets with 28 and 65
background traders respectively. We further calculate the average order book depth
(on either buy or sell side) in markets without spoofing. Throughout the trading
horizon, the N = 28 market has a relatively thin order book with an average depth
of 12 per side, whereas the N = 65 market has a thicker one with an average depth
of 30.
The background trading strategy set (see Table 2.1) includes seven versions of ZI
and four versions of HBL. Agents are allowed to choose from this restricted set of
strategies. We have also explored ZI strategies with larger shading ranges and HBL
strategies with longer memory lengths, but they fail to appear in equilibrium in games
where they were explored.
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2.5.2 Games without Spoofing
Since spoofing targets the order book and can be effective only to the extent
traders exploit order book information, we investigate whether background agents
adopt the HBL strategy in markets without spoofing. Applying EGTA to the eleven
background strategies in Table 2.1, we found at least one equilibrium for each market
environment.
Figure 2.5 (blue circles) depicts the proportion of background traders who choose
trading strategies in the HBL family. In most non-spoofing environments, HBL is
adopted with positive probability, suggesting that investors generally have incentives
to make bidding decisions based on order book information. We find that HBL is
robust and widely preferred in markets with more traders, low fundamental shocks,
and high observation noise. Intuitively, a larger population size implies a thick order
book with more learnable aggregated data; low shocks in fundamental time series
increase the predictability of future price outcomes; and high observation noise limits
what an agent can glean about the true fundamental from its own information. This
is further confirmed in the two exceptions where all agents choose ZI: HSLN and
HSMN with N = 28, the environments with fewer traders, high fundamental shocks,
and at most medium observation noise.
We further quantify how learning from market information may benefit overall
market performance. We conduct EGTA in games where background traders are
restricted to strategies in the ZI family (ZI1–ZI7 in Table 2.1). This is tantamount to
disallowing learning from order book information. We compare equilibrium outcomes
for each environment, with and without HBL available to background traders, on
two measures: surplus (Figure 2.2) and price discovery (Figure 2.3). Recall that
we define background-trader surplus as the sum of all background agents’ surpluses
at time T , the end of trading. Price discovery is defined as the root-mean-squared
deviation (RMSD) of the transaction price from the estimate of the true fundamental
in Eq. (2.2) over the trading period. It reflects how well transactions reveal the true
value of the security. Lower RMSD means better price discovery. We calculate the
two measures by averaging the outcomes of 20,000 simulations of games with strategy
profiles sampled according to each equilibrium mixture.
Overall, background traders achieve higher surplus (Figure 2.2) and better price
discovery (Figure 2.3) when the market provides order book information and enables
the HBL strategy option. When HBL exists in the equilibrium, we find transactions
reveal fundamental estimates well, especially in markets with lower shock and obser-
vation variances (i.e., LSLN, LSMN, MSLN, MSMN ). We also notice small exceptions
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in scenarios with high observation variance and more background traders (environ-
ments LSHN and HSHN with 65 players) where ZI-only equilibria exhibit higher
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(b) N = 65
Figure 2.2: Comparisons of background-trader surplus for equilibria in each environ-
ment, with and without the HBL strategies available to background traders. Blue
circles represent equilibrium outcomes when agents can choose both HBL and ZI
strategies; orange triangles represent equilibrium outcomes when agents are restricted
to ZI strategies. Overlapped markers are outcomes from the same equilibrium mix-
ture, despite the availability of HBL. The market generally achieves higher surplus
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(b) N = 65
Figure 2.3: Comparisons of price discovery for equilibrium in each environment, with
and without the HBL strategies available to background traders. Blue circles repre-
sent equilibrium outcomes when agents can choose both HBL and ZI strategies; orange
triangles represent equilibrium outcomes when agents are restricted to ZI strategies.
Overlapped markers are outcomes where the equilibrium mixture is ZI only, despite
the availability of HBL. The market generally achieves better price discovery when
HBL is available.
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2.5.3 Games with Spoofing
2.5.3.1 Comparing across Fixed Strategy Profiles
We examine the effectiveness of our designed spoofing strategy (Section 2.3.4) by
playing a spoofer against each HBL-and-ZI equilibrium found in Section 2.5.2. As
ZI agents are oblivious to spoofing, we ignore the ZI-only equilibria in this analysis.
We perform controlled comparisons on these games with and without spoofing. In
the paired instances, background agents play identical strategies, and are guaranteed
to arrive at the same time, receive identical private values, and observe the same
fundamental values. Therefore, any change in behavior is an effect of spoof orders
on HBL traders. For every setting, we simulate 20,000 paired instances, evaluate
transaction price differences (Figure 2.4), and compare surplus attained by HBL and
ZI traders. Transaction price difference at a specific time is defined as the most recent
transaction price in the run with spoofing minus that of the paired instance without
spoofing. Similarly, surplus difference of HBL or ZI is the aggregated surplus obtained
in an environment with spoofing minus that of the corresponding environment without
spoofing.
Figure 2.4 shows positive changes in transaction prices across all environments,
subsequent to the arrival of a spoofing agent at Tsp = 1000. This suggests that
HBL traders are tricked by the spoof buy orders: they believe the underlying security
should be worth more, and therefore submit or accept limit orders at higher prices.
Though ZI agents do not change their bidding behavior directly, they may transact
at higher prices due to the increased bids of HBL traders.
Several other interesting findings are revealed by the transaction-price difference
series. First, the average price rise caused by spoofing the market with 28 back-
ground traders is higher than for N = 65. This indicates that a market with fewer
background traders can be more susceptible to spoofing, due to the limited pricing
information a thin market could aggregate. Second, for markets populated with more
HBLs than ZIs in the equilibrium mixture, the transaction price differences tend to
increase throughout the trading period. This amplification can be explained by HBLs
consistently submitting orders at higher prices and confirming each other’s spoofed
belief. However, for markets with more ZIs, the spoofing effect diminishes as ZIs
who do not change their limit-order pricing can partly correct the HBLs’ illusions.
Third, we notice that differences in transaction prices first increase, and then tend
to stabilize or decrease over time. As time approaches the end of the trading period,
spoofing wears off in the face of accumulated observations and mean reversion.
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(a) N = 28 (b) N = 65
Figure 2.4: Transaction price differences throughout the trading horizon with and
without a spoofer against each HBL-and-ZI equilibrium found in non-spoofing games
(Section 2.5.2). Multiple curves for the same environment represent different equilib-
ria. The designed spoofing tactic clearly raises market prices when HBL are present.
The effect attenuates over time, generally more quickly in the thicker market envi-
ronments.
We further compare background-trader payoffs attained in environments with and
without spoofing. We find a redistribution of surplus between HBL and ZI agents:
HBL aggregated surplus decreases, while that for ZI increases compared to the non-
spoofing baselines. Specifically, across 28-trader market environments, HBL traders
suffer an average surplus decrease of 184 across all equilibrium profiles, whereas the
ZI traders have an average surplus gain of 19. For the 65-trader markets, the average
surplus decrease for HBL traders is 238, and the average increase for ZI is 40. This
suggests that the ZI agents benefit from the HBL agents’ spoofed beliefs. Since the
decreases in HBL surplus are consistently larger than the increases for ZI, the overall
market surplus decreases. We leave further discussion of spoofing’s impact on market
surplus to Section 2.5.3.2, where background traders can choose other strategies to
adjust to the presence of spoofing.
To examine the potential to profit from a successful price manipulation, we extend
the spoofing agent with an exploitation strategy : buying, (optionally) spoofing to raise
the price, and then selling. The exploiting spoofer starts by buying when there is a
limit sell order with price less than the fundamental mean in the market. It then
optionally runs the spoofing trick, or alternatively waits, for 1000 time steps. Finally,
the agent sells the previously bought unit (if any) when it finds a limit buy order with
price more than fundamental mean. Note that even without spoofing, this single-unit
exploitation strategy is profitable in expectation due to the mean reversion captured
by the fundamental process, and the reliable arrivals of background traders with
private preferences.
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In controlled experiments, we find that exploitation profits are consistently in-
creased when the spoof action is also deployed. Across 28-trader market environ-
ments, the exploiter makes an average profit of 206.1 and 201.8 with and without
spoofing, and the increases in profit range from 1.2 to 11.5. For the 65-trader mar-
ket, the average profits of this exploitation strategy with and without spoofing are
50.5 and 46.3 respectively, with the increases in profit varying from 1.7 to 9.4 across
environments.3
2.5.3.2 Re-Equilibrating Games with Spoofing
To understand how spoofing changes background-trading behavior, we conduct
EGTA again to identify Nash equilibria, allowing background traders to choose any
strategy in Table 2.1, in games with spoofing. As indicated in Figure 2.5 (orange
triangles), after re-equilibrating games with spoofing, HBL is generally adopted by
a smaller fraction of traders, but still persists in equilibrium in most market envi-
ronments. HBL’s existence after re-equilibration indicates a consistently spoofable
market: the designed spoofing tactic fails to eliminate HBL agents and in turn, the
persistence of HBL may incentivize a spoofer to continue effectively manipulating the
market.
We characterize the effect of spoofing on market surplus. Figure 2.6 compares the
total surplus achieved by background traders in equilibrium with and without spoof-
ing. Given the presence of HBL traders, spoofing generally decreases total surplus (as
in Figure 2.6, most filled orange triangles are below the filled blue circles). However,
spoofing has ambiguous effect in the thicker market with large observation variance
(environments LSHN and HSHN with 65 background agents). This may be because
noise and spoofing simultaneously hurt the prediction accuracy of the HBL agents and
therefore shift agents to other competitive ZI strategies with higher payoffs. Finally,
we find the welfare effects of HBL strategies persist regardless of spoofing’s presence:
markets populated with HBL agents in equilibrium achieve higher total surplus than
those markets without HBL (as in Figure 2.6, the hollow markers are below the filled
markers).
3Statistical tests show all increases in profit are significantly larger than zero. Regardless of
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Figure 2.5: HBL adoption rates at equilibria in games with and without spoofing.
Each blue (orange) marker specifies the HBL proportion at one equilibrium found in
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Figure 2.6: Background-trader surplus achieved at equilibria in games with and with-
out spoofing. Each blue (orange) marker specifies the surplus at one equilibrium
found in a specific game environment without (with) spoofing. Surplus achieved at
equilibria combining HBL and ZI and equilibria with pure ZI are indicated by markers
with and without fills respectively.
2.5.4 Discussion
Our agent-based model of spoofing aims to capture the essential logic of manipu-
lation through influencing belief about market demand. In our model, the order book
reflects aggregate information about the market fundamental, and learning traders
can use this to advantage in their bidding strategies. The presence of such learning
traders benefits price discovery and social welfare, but also renders the market vulner-
able to manipulation. As we demonstrate, simple spoofing strategies can effectively
mislead learning traders, thereby distorting prices and reducing surplus compared
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to the non-spoofing baseline. Moreover, the persistence of learning traders in equi-
librium with manipulation suggests that the elimination of spoofing requires active
measures.
We acknowledge several factors that can limit the accuracy of our equilibrium
analysis in individual game instances; these include sampling error, reduced-game
approximation, and restricted strategy coverage. Despite such limitations (inherent
in any complex modeling effort), we believe the model offers a constructive basis to
evaluate manipulation practices and any preventive or deterrent proposals to mitigate
manipulation under strategic settings. In the rest of the chapter, we build on this
model and conduct comprehensive analysis to investigate the following questions:
• Are there more robust ways for exchanges to disclose order book information
(Section 2.6)?
• Are there strategies by which individual traders can adopt to exploit market
information but in less vulnerable ways (Section 2.7)?
2.6 A Cloaking Mechanism to Mitigate Spoofing
Despite regulatory enforcement and detection efforts, an individual spoofing episode
is hard to catch in high-volume, high-velocity data streams. Legal definitions cannot
be easily translated to computer programs to direct detection, and the lack of datasets
with labeled manipulation cases makes training a reliable detector infeasible with su-
pervised machine learning techniques. Based on its definition, to determine that a
pattern of activity constitutes spoofing requires establishing the manipulation intent
behind submission and cancellation of placed orders. However, this is not easy, as
order cancellation is in itself common and legitimate: according to one study, 95% of
NASDAQ limit orders are canceled, with a median order lifetime less than one second
(Hautsch and Huang 2012). Given difficulties in robustly detecting manipulation, we
study systematic approaches to deter spoofing, by rendering manipulative practices
difficult or uneconomical.
Along these lines, Prewit (2012) and Biais and Woolley (2012) advocated the
imposition of cancellation fees to disincentivize manipulative strategies that rely on
frequent cancellations of orders. Others argue that cancellation fees could discourage
the beneficial activity of liquidity providers, and in the event of a market crash, such
a policy may lengthen the recovery process (Leal and Napoletano 2019).
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We propose here a cloaking mechanism to deter spoofing via the selective disclo-
sure of order book information. The mechanism extends the traditional CDA market
with a cloaking parameter K, which specifies the number of price levels to hide sym-
metrically from inside of the limit order book. The idea is to make it more difficult
for the spoofer who relies on the instant order book information to post misleading
bids, while not unduly degrading the general usefulness of market information. We
focus on deterministic cloaking (i.e., a constant K throughout the trading period),
as a stochastic mechanism may raise issues regarding verification of faithful market
operations.
We extend our agent-based model of spoofing to support order book cloaking,
and conduct simulations to evaluate and find the optimal cloaking parameter under
strategic settings, where both the learning traders and the spoofer adapts to the new
mechanism. Section 2.6.1 formally defines the cloaking mechanism, and describes
how we modify the background trading and spoofing strategies accordingly. In Sec-
tion 2.6.2, we present an EGTA study conducted to understand agents’ strategic
responses to the proposed mechanism. Section 2.6.3 reports results from performing
empirical mechanism design (Vorobeychik, Kiekintveld, and Wellman 2006) to set
cloaking parameters that maximize efficiency. Finally, in Section 2.6.4, we explore
and evaluate sophisticated spoofing strategies that use probing to reveal cloaked in-
formation. Details of all found equilibria in markets with and without cloaking and
games with and without spoofing are provided in Appendix A.2.
2.6.1 A Cloaking Market Mechanism
The cloaking mechanism maintains a full limit order book just as the regular
CDA market, but discloses only a selective part of the book to traders. Let BIDkt
denote the kth-highest buy price in the book at time t, and ASKkt the kth-lowest
sell price. In a standard order book, at any given time t, the buy side of the book
starts with the best bid, BID1t , and extends to lower values; the sell side starts with
the best ask, ASK1t , and extends to higher ones. The cloaking mechanism works by
symmetrically hiding a deterministic number of price levels K from inside of the order
book. Thus, the disclosed order book in a K-level cloaking mechanism starts with
BIDK+1t and ASK
K+1
t , and extends to lower and higher values respectively. Upon
order submissions, cancellations, and transactions, the market updates the full order
book and then cloaks the K inside levels. Therefore, an order hidden in the past can
be revealed later due to the arrival of new orders at more competitive prices, or it
can be hidden throughout its lifetime due to a cancellation. The market discloses all
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the transaction information at zero delay.
Example 2.1 (A K-level Cloaking Mechanism). When K = 0, the market acts as
a standard CDA, disclosing the full limit order book with zero delay. When K = 1,
the mechanism conceals orders at the best quotes, that is BID1t and ASK
1
t . When
K =∞, the market does not reveal any part of the book, and thus disallows learning
from order book information.
Cloaking operates to deter spoofing in two ways. First, it mitigates the effect of
spoof orders, pushing them further from the inside of the book. Second, it increases
the spoofer’s transaction risks, as it cannot as easily monitor the quantity of orders
ahead of the spoof. On the other hand, the information hiding also affects the non-
manipulative traders, for instance in our model it may degrade the HBL traders’
learning capability. To quantify this tradeoff, we start by exploring a range of cloaking
parameters, K ∈ {0, 1, 2, 4}, which control the amount of information being concealed
at any given time. We compare trading behavior and outcomes in markets with
cloaking to that of a standard CDA. Among the nine market environments defined
in Section 2.5.1, we consider three representatives that are increasingly challenging
for the learning traders: LSHN with {σ2s = 105, σ2n = 109}, MSMN with {σ2s =
5 × 105, σ2n = 106}, and HSLN with {σ2s = 106, σ2n = 103}. Together with the four
cloaking parameters, this gives us a total of 12 market settings, or 24 games with and
without spoofing.
The market is populated with 64 background traders and one exploitation agent.
Therefore, when adopting DPR to approximate this many-player game, we use sim-
ulation data from the (64, 1)-agent environments to estimate reduced (4, 1)-player
games, where four players are used to aggregate and represent the background traders.
In each game, we consider background trading strategies and spoofing practice similar
to those of Section 2.3, but slightly modified to adapt to order book cloaking. Below,
we describe changes made to each strategy.
2.6.1.1 Zero Intelligence
Recall that our ZI strategy uses a threshold parameter η ∈ [0, 1] to immediately
transact with an existing order to grasp a portion of desired surplus. That is, if the
agent could achieve a fraction η of its requested surplus at the market best quotes, it
would simply take that quote rather than posting a limit order for a future transaction.
Under a cloaking mechanism, however, ZI may take into account only the current
visible best quotes that are less competitive compared to the hidden quotes. To
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adjust to cloaking, we explore a range of more aggressive (smaller) η values to ensure
that ZI traders may still transact with incumbent orders to lock a certain fraction
of surplus. Besides the seven ZI strategies in Table 2.1, we further include three ZI
strategies with η = 0.4 (Table 2.2), which are competitive enough to appear in at
least one equilibrium of our explored environments.
2.6.1.2 Heuristic Belief Learning
We modify HBL to consider only the revealed order book information under the
corresponding cloaking markets. Orders at competitive price levels will be missed
in the belief function (Eq. 2.4) if they are hidden throughout order lifetime; or they
may be considered with delay if later exposed at visible levels. This reduction in bid
information would naturally be expected to degrade HBL’s learning effectiveness and
thus its trading performance.
2.6.1.3 Spoofing Strategy
We extend the original spoofing strategy (Section 2.3.4) to cloaking markets. The
strategy includes three stages. At the beginning of a trading period [0, Tspoof], the
agent buys by accepting any sell order at price lower than the fundamental mean r̄.
In a cloaking market, this can be achieved by placing a one-unit limit buy order at
price r̄ and immediately withdrawing it if does not transact with an existing order.
During the second stage [Tspoof, Tsell], the agent submits spoof buy orders at a tick
behind the first visible bid BIDK+1Tspoof − 1 with volume Qsp  1. Whenever there is
an update on the first visible bid, the spoofer replaces its original spoof with new
orders at price BIDK+1t − 1. This spoofing strategy aims to boost price, in the hope
that the units purchased in stage one can be later sold at higher prices. In controlled
experiments, when the agent is not manipulating, it waits until the selling stage.
During the last stage [Tsell, T ], the agent starts to sell the units it previously bought
by accepting any buy orders at a price higher than r̄. Inverse to the first stage,
this operates by placing one-unit limit sell orders at price r̄, followed by immediate
cancellation if not filled. The agent who also manipulates continues to spoof until all
the bought units are sold or the trading period ends. The pure exploitation strategy
can be considered as a baseline for the spoofing strategy, allowing us to quantify how
much more the agent may profit from spoofing the market.
We refer to the agent who employs the above strategy, whether places spoof orders
or not, as an exploitation agent or exploiter. An exploiter who also spoofs is referred
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Strategy ZI8 ZI9 ZI10
Rmin 0 0 250
Rmax 1000 2000 500
η 0.4 0.4 0.4
Table 2.2: Additional background trading strategies included in EGTA for cloaking
mechanisms.
to as a spoofing agent or spoofer. Note that the spoofing strategy considered here
does not face any execution risk on its spoof orders, under the assumption it can
immediately respond to quote changes. A more sophisticated strategy could probe
the market to reveal the cloaked bids, and then spoof at a visible price higher than
BIDK+1t − 1. We leave discussion of such probing strategies to Section 2.6.4.
2.6.2 Tradeoff Faced by Cloaking Mechanisms
We start by separately investigating the impact of cloaking on background traders
and on the spoofer. Our first set of games cover the range of cloaking environ-
ments without spoofing (i.e., markets populated with background traders and the
non-manipulative exploiter).
Figure 2.7 displays the HBL adoption rate (i.e., total probability over HBL strate-
gies) at equilibrium across cloaking mechanisms, K ∈ {0, 1, 2, 4}. We find that the
competitiveness of HBL generally persists when the mechanism hides one or two price
levels, but at higher cloaking levels the HBL fraction can drastically decrease. The
information loss caused by cloaking weakens HBL’s ability to make predictions. The
effect is strongest in environments with high fundamental shocks (e.g., HSLN ), as pre-
vious hidden orders can become uninformative or even misleading by the time they
are revealed. Given the decreasing HBL prevalence and effectiveness, background-
trader surplus achieved at equilibrium also decreases, as we see in Figure 2.9(b) (blue
diamonds).
Next, we examine whether cloaking can effectively mitigate manipulation. We
perform controlled experiments by letting the exploitation agent also execute the
spoofing strategy against each found equilibrium, and compare the impact of spoofing
under the cloaking mechanism to the standard fully revealed order book (K = 0).
For every equilibrium, we simulate at least 10,000 paired instances, and evaluate their
differences on transaction price and agents’ payoffs.
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Figure 2.7: HBL adoption rate in equilibrium across different cloaking markets with-
out spoofing.
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(b) Cloaking reduces spoofing profits.
Figure 2.8: The impact of cloaking on spoofing effectiveness. Cloaking mitigates price
rise and the decrease in background surplus caused by spoofing.
ish price distortion caused by spoofing across environments. Recall that we measure
price distortion as the transaction price series in a market with spoofing minus that of
its paired market without spoofing. Figure 2.8(a) demonstrates the case in a specific
environment MSMN : without cloaking (K = 0), transaction prices significantly rise
subsequent to the execution of spoofing at Tsp = 1000, as HBL traders are tricked
by the spoof buy orders; in cloaked markets, this price rise is effectively mitigated.
Figure 2.8(b) further illustrates the surplus change in background traders and the
exploiter when it also spoofs. We find the exploiter can robustly profit from manip-
ulating the learning agents in the no-cloaking case. In contrast, partially hiding the
order book can significantly reduce spoofing profits, and prevent background traders
from losing much. These findings indicate the cloaking mechanism may deter or even
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(b) Background-trader surplus in equilib-
rium.
Figure 2.9: Equilibrium outcomes in games with and without cloaking. Each marker
represents one equilibrium of the environment.
2.6.3 Finding the Optimal Cloaking
Given the tradeoff between preserving order book informativeness and mitigating
manipulation, the question becomes: under what circumstances do the deterrence
benefits of cloaking exceed its efficiency costs? To answer this, we re-equilibrate
games allowing the exploiter to strategically choose whether to spoof, with back-
ground traders able to execute any strategy in Tables 2.1 or 2.2. This allows back-
ground traders and the exploitation agent to strategically respond to each other under
a certain level of information cloaking.
Our findings are presented in Figure 2.9.4 We compare market outcomes with and
without cloaking on two metrics: the probability of spoofing and total background-
trader surplus in equilibrium. As shown in Figure 2.9(a), the cloaking mechanism
effectively decreases the probability of spoofing under most environment settings—
completely eliminating spoofing in some cases. Moreover, we find moderate cloaking
can preserve the prevalence of HBL at equilibrium, which otherwise would be de-
creased by spoofing as we saw in Section 2.5.
This weakened spoofing effect is further confirmed by Figure 2.9(b), which com-
pares the total background-trader surplus achieved in equilibrium under mechanisms
with and without cloaking. Without cloaking (i.e., K0 columns), background surplus
achieved in equilibrium where the exploiter strategically chooses to spoof (orange
triangles) is much lower than the surplus attained when the exploiter is prohibited
from spoofing (blue diamonds). We find the decrease in surplus due to spoofing can
4Due to the welfare benefits of HBL, equilibria with pure ZIs usually achieve much lower surplus
than those with HBLs. For presentation simplicity, we omit all-ZI equilibria from Figure 2.9(b).
Environments with such cases are marked with asterisks.
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be considerably mitigated by order book cloaking. As shown in Figure 2.9(b), the
vertical distances between the blue diamonds and orange triangles get smaller with
K > 0. Moreover, we find the benefit of this improved robustness to spoofing can
outweigh its associated efficiency costs in markets with moderate fundamental shocks
(e.g., LSHN and MSMN ). In those environments, background traders in mechanisms
that cloak one or two price levels achieve higher surplus than those without cloak-
ing. However, in a market with high shocks (e.g., HSLN ), hiding or delaying even
a little market information degrades learning to such a degree as to render cloaking
counter-productive.
2.6.4 Probing the Cloaking Mechanism to Spoof
To this point, we have considered only spoofers who are unwilling to risk execution
of their spoof orders. A more sophisticated manipulator could probe the market,
submitting a series of orders at slightly higher prices, in an attempt to reveal the
cloaked bids and spoof at a visible price higher than BIDK+1t − 1. In this section, we
study the feasibility of such probing to the spoofing agent.
We design and evaluate parameterized versions of the spoofing strategy combined
with probing. The strategy is governed by two parameters: the step size δ, which
controls probing aggressiveness, and the maximum attempts allowed per time step l,
which limits the probing effort.
The spoofer probes by submitting a unit buy order at BIDK+1t +δ, a price inside the
visible quotes, in the hopes of exposing BIDKt . If the probe succeeds, it immediately
cancels the probe order, and places a new spoof order at BIDKt − 1, right behind the
lowest hidden bid level. If probing fails because the price is too conservative, the
spoofer re-probes by raising the price at a decreasing rate (as a function of δ and the
attempt number), until a higher price is revealed or the number of probing attempts
reaches l. If probing causes a transaction, the spoofer halves the price increment and
re-probes. Algorithm 1 describes the detailed probing procedure.
Table 2.3 reports, for cloaking-beneficial environments, the minimum l required for
step sizes δ ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8} to achieve higher payoffs than the equilibrium performance
we found for the exploiter in Section 2.6.3. Multiple rows for the same cloaking
parameter correspond to the multiple equilibria found in that market setting. Dashes
in the table indicate that an exploiter cannot beat the equilibrium performance with
the corresponding δ. We find in order to achieve higher payoffs, the spoofer has
to probe with multiple attempts per time step, and conservative probing strategy
with smaller δ usually requires more effort. In practice, such frequent cancellation
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Algorithm 1 Spoofing with probing in a cloaking market with K > 0.
Input: The probing step size δ and the attempt limit l.
The spoofer’s time to place spoof orders Tspoof, and its current holding H.
1: while t ≥ Tspoof and H > 0 do
2: if no active spoof orders then
3: c← 1, ∆← δ . track probing attempts and the price increment
4: submit a single-unit probe buy order at price BIDK+1t + ∆
5: while the visible BIDK+1t remains unchanged and c < l do
6: c← c+ 1
7: if the probe buy order gets transacted then
8: ∆← ∆/2
9: submit a single-unit probe buy order at price BIDK+1t + ∆
10: else
11: ∆← ∆ + max{0.9c−1δ, 1}
12: substitute the probe order with a new one at price BIDK+1t + ∆
13: submit spoof orders at price BIDK+1t − 1
14: cancel the probe order
15: else
16: if spoof orders become hidden then
17: substitute spoof orders with new ones at price BIDK+1t − 1
18: else if spoof orders are no longer one tick behind BIDK+1t then
19: withdraw spoof orders
and placement of orders may not be feasible, and can largely increase the risk of
associated probing and spoofing intent being identified.
Figure 2.10 further quantifies the change in exploitation payoff and transaction
risk (measured as the number of transactions caused by probing), as we vary the
probing step δ and the attempt limit l. As we see from Figure 2.10(a), relaxing the
maximum number of probing attempts steadily increases the transaction risk, but
does not necessarily improve payoff. Moreover, the spikiness of the exploiter’s payoff
indicates optimizing (δ, l) to maximize profit is a challenging task. Figure 2.10(b)
further demonstrates that an exploiter can probe aggressively with larger step sizes
to reduce effort, but usually at the cost of a higher transaction risk, and consequently
a lower payoff. In highly dynamic markets with frequently updated quotes, finding an
appropriate δ to successfully probe a cloaking mechanism within a reasonable number
of attempts would be challenging.
We have explored other more aggressive probing strategies, where the spoofer
probes to expose multiple hidden levels and spoofs at even higher prices. To accom-




K1 (1, 16) (2, 9) – –
K2 (1, 8) (2, 5) (4, 3) (8, 3)
K4 (1, 19) (2, 3) – –
K4 (1, 10) (2, 5) (4, 3) –
MSMN
K1 (1, 7) (2, 5) (4, 4) (8, 3)
K1 (1, 7) (2, 4) (4, 2) (8, 1)
K1 (1, 5) (2, 3) (4, 2) –
K1 (1, 9) (2, 4) (4, 2) –
K2 (1, 11) (2, 3) (4, 4) (8, 3)
K4 (1, 5) (2, 3) (4, 3) (8, 3)
























Probing Attempts Limit ℓ
Probing payoff Eq payoff #Transactions




















Probing payoff Eq payoff #Transactions
(b) Fix l = 2.
Figure 2.10: Exploitation payoff and transaction risk as we vary price increment δ
and probing limit l.
guarantee that its spoof orders are visible. However, according to our experiments,
such aggressive probing strategies fail to beat the equilibrium performance, as orders
kept in hidden levels are often accepted by background traders due to adverse selec-
tion. Those transactions tend to accumulate the spoofer’s position, and consequently
impose losses at the end of the trading period.
2.7 Learning-Based Trading Strategies under the Presence
of Market Manipulation
We next consider how individual traders may construct strategies that are more
robust to manipulation. In realistic market scenarios, traders are aware of potential
manipulation, but unable to reliably detect spoofing behavior in real time. In the
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absence of manipulation, traders submit orders that reflect their private observations
and preferences, and so learning from others’ actions enables more informed decisions.
Indeed as shown above, learning as implemented by HBL agents is effective in a
realistic market model, and provides benefits to the learning agent as well as to market
efficiency. HBL is vulnerable to spoofing, however, and agents adopting such learning
are harmed by spoofing compared to non-learning strategies that are oblivious to
spoofers and thus non-manipulable. The question we investigate in this section is
whether learning-based strategies can be designed to be similarly robust to spoofing.
We seek strategies by which individual traders can learn from market information,
but in less vulnerable ways.
We treat the original HBL described in Section 2.3.3.3 as a baseline strategy,
and propose two variations that aim to reasonably trade off learning effectiveness in
non-manipulated markets for robustness against manipulation. The first variation
works by selectively ignoring orders at certain price levels, particularly where spoof
orders are likely to be placed. The second variation considers the full order book,
but has the flexibility to adjust the offer price by a stochastic offset. The adjustment
serves to correct biases in learned price beliefs either caused by manipulation or the
intrinsic limitation built in the belief function. We formally define the two variations
in Section 2.7.1, and then evaluate the proposed strategies in terms of the effectiveness
in non-manipulated markets and robustness against manipulation in Section 2.7.2.
We adopt the standard CDA market mechanism as described in Section 2.3.1.
The market is populated with 64 background traders and one profitable exploiter.
Background traders can choose from a select set of strategies that covers ZI, original
HBL, and the two proposed variations of HBL. The exploiter follows the three-stage
exploitation strategy specified in Section 2.6.1, and executes spoofing in selected
treatments. As in our study of cloaking mechanisms, we consider three representative
market settings for our experiments, namely LSHN, MSMN, and HSLN. Details of
all found equilibria in this section are provided in Appendix A.3.
2.7.1 Two Variations of HBL
2.7.1.1 HBL with Selective Price Level Blocking
Our first HBL variation is inspired by the success of our cloaking mechanism. It
takes advantage of the common placement of spoof orders closely behind the market
best quotes. Instead of including all observed trading activities in its memory to con-
struct the belief function just as the standard HBL, the idea is to neglect limit orders
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at a specified price level when assembling the dataset D to learn from. We extend
standard HBL with a blocking parameter χ, which specifies the index of a single price
level to ignore symmetrically from inside of the limit order book. For example, when
χ = 1, the trading agent constructs a dataset, D \ Oχ=1, by considering only orders
strictly outside the best bid and ask. The goal of this additional strategic parameter
is to exclude price levels where spoof orders are likely to appear. However, ignoring
orders may come at the cost of less effective learning, especially when information
that conveys true insight is blocked from the belief function.
2.7.1.2 HBL with Price Offsets
Our second HBL variation considers all orders in its memory, but translates the
target price P∗i (t) derived by surplus maximization in Eq. (2.5) with an offset uni-
formly drawn from [Rmin, Rmax]. Specifically, a background trader i who arrives the
market at time t with the optimized price P∗i (t), submits a limit order for a single
unit of the security at price
pi(t) ∼
U [P∗i (t)−Rmax,P∗i (t)−Rmin] if buying,U [P∗i (t) +Rmin,P∗i (t) +Rmax] if selling. (2.6)
A positive offset can be viewed as a hedge against misleading information, ef-
fectively shading the bid to compensate for manipulation risk. A negative offset
increases the probability of near-term transaction, which may have benefits in re-
ducing exposure to future spoofing. Offsets (positive or negative) may also serve a
useful correction function even when manipulation is absent. In particular, negative
offsets may compensate for the myopic nature of HBL optimization Eq. (2.5), which
considers only the current bid, ignoring subsequent market arrivals and opportunities
to trade additional units. Our design here is in line with prior literature (Tesauro and




We start with our baseline market environments where background traders are
restricted to choose from the standard HBL strategies and five parametrically dif-
ferent ZI strategies in Table 2.4(a). Figure 2.15 (dark grey columns) verifies what
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Strategy ZI1 ZI2 ZI3 ZI4 ZI5 HBL1 HBL2
L - - - - - 2 5
Rmin 0 0 0 0 0 - -
Rmax 1000 1000 1000 500 250 - -
η 0.4 0.8 1 0.8 0.8 - -
(a) A set of basic background trading strategies.
Strategy HBL3 HBL4 HBL5 HBL6
L 2 2 5 5
χ 1 2 1 2
(b) A set of first HBL variations with price level blocking.
Strategy HBL7 HBL8 HBL9 HBL10 HBL11 HBL12 HBL13 HBL14
L 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5
Rmin -10 -20 -40 -80 -10 -20 -40 -80
Rmax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(c) A set of second HBL variations with price offsets.
Table 2.4: Background trading strategies included to evaluate the two HBL variations.
we observed in Section 2.5 within this restrictive set of background-trading strate-
gies: (1) the learning-based trading strategy is more widely preferred in environments
where fundamental shock is low and observation noise is high (e.g., LSHN is the
most learning-friendly environment); (2) the presence of spoofing generally hurts the
learning-based strategy and reduces background-trader surplus. We next evaluate the
two HBL variations.
2.7.2.2 HBL with Selective Price Level Blocking
Learning traders who choose to ignore certain orders face a natural tradeoff be-
tween losing useful information and correctly blocking spoof orders to avoid manip-
ulation. We first examine, under non-spoofing environments, how learning effective-
ness may be compromised by excluding orders at each price level. Starting with the
equilibrium strategy profile of each non-spoofing market environment found in Sec-
tion 2.7.2.1,5 we perform controlled experiments by letting background traders who
adopt the standard HBL strategy ignore orders from a selected price level throughout
the trading period. Table 2.5 compares the payoffs obtained by HBL in its standard
form and variations that respectively block orders at the first, second, and third price
5We arbitrarily select one if there are multiple equilibria found in a certain environment.
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Env HBL HBLχ=1 HBLχ=2 HBLχ=3 SPψ=1 SPψ=2 SPψ=3 EXP
LSHN 658 650∗ 658 658 525 494∗,∗∗ 488∗ 483∗
MSMN 655 645∗ 655 655 356 312∗ 299∗ 295∗
HSLN 649 641∗ 649 649 295 264∗ 268∗,∗∗ 253∗
Table 2.5: Average payoffs of learning-based background traders and the exploiter,
as they deviate from the equilibrium strategy profiles found in Section 2.7.2.1. We
deviate either background traders or the exploiter to its corresponding strategy vari-
ation. We refer to the exploiter who spoofs as SP, and the one who only executes
trades as EXP. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level for the paired
t-test in payoffs compared to the standard HBL(∗), SPK=1(
∗), and EXP(∗∗).
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Figure 2.11: Price deviations caused by
spoof orders placed behind different price




























Figure 2.12: Correctly blocking spoof or-
ders increases background-trader surplus
and decreases manipulation profits.
level in the order book. We find that consistently across market settings, HBL agents
benefit the most by learning from market best bids and asks, and can achieve fairly
similar performance even when orders at a selected level beyond the market best
quotes are ignored.
In response to the HBL variation that ignores price levels, we extend the exploiter
to be able to place spoof orders behind a chosen price level, denoted by ψ. For
example, when ψ = 2, the exploiter injects spoof orders at one tick behind the
second-best bid. We start with the same set of equilibrium strategy profiles, and
conduct controlled experiments to evaluate how injecting spoof orders at different
levels can change the manipulation effect, even when learning traders are considering
the full order book (i.e., adopting standard HBL). We measure the effectiveness of
each spoofing strategy by profits from trade as well as the price deviation caused by
spoof orders. Experimental results (Table 2.5) show that the exploiter benefits the
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most by placing spoof orders behind the best bid (i.e., ψ = 1), and moving spoof
orders to less competitive levels reduces exploitation profit. We further confirm this
weakened manipulation effect in Figure 2.11, which showcases market price deviations
caused by different spoofing strategies in the MSMN environment. We find the price
rise diminishes as spoof orders are placed further away from the best bid.
Though our exploration of possible spoofing strategies here is limited, the results
suggest that spoof orders near the market quotes tend to maximize manipulation
effect. In response, HBL traders who adapt to the presence of spoofing may naturally
block orders around such levels. Figure 2.12 shows that when blocking the correct
level, HBL traders can significantly increase their payoffs, and reduce the amount the
exploiter could profit via manipulation. This mitigated manipulation effect is verified
by the dashed blue line in Figure 2.11, which shows price deviations close to zero.6
Given these beneficial payoff deviations, in the final set of experiments, we conduct
EGTA to find approximate Nash equilibria in games where background traders may
choose trading strategies from the ZI family and HBLs that block a selected price
level (any strategy from Table 2.4(a) or 2.4(b)). As shown in Figure 2.15 (light grey
columns), we find that (1) adding the blocking strategic parameter does not affect the
competitiveness of learning-based strategies with respect to ZI (HBL adoption rates
in equilibrium remain in similar ranges as those of markets where only the standard
HBL strategy is provided); and (2) the extended order blocking ability improves
the learning robustness of HBL traders (compared to surplus decreases caused by
manipulation in markets where background agents are restricted to the standard
HBL, background-trader surpluses are no longer significantly reduced when agents can
strategically block orders in the face of manipulation). In other words, background
traders who learn from market information but also strategically ignore orders can
achieve robustness against manipulation and retain comparable effectiveness in non-
manipulated markets.
2.7.2.3 HBL with Price Offsets
Our second HBL variation relies on a price adjustment rather than information
selection to adapt to different market conditions. We start by exploring a set of
price offset intervals [Rmin, Rmax], ranging from positive values that understate the
learned offer prices (e.g., similar to price shading) to negative values that adjust
prices to become more competitive. As in Section 2.7.2.2, we conduct controlled
6Price differences are not strictly zero before spoofing (time 1000), as traders who adopt HBLχ=2
consistently block orders throughout the trading period.
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Figure 2.13: Average HBL surplus differ-
ences and total number of transactions in non-
spoofing markets where HBL traders use differ-
ent price offsets.
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Figure 2.14: Market price devia-
tions caused by spoofing in mar-
kets where HBL traders use differ-
ent price offsets.
experiments starting from equilibrium profiles found in Section 2.7.2.1, then deviating
from standard HBL to allow price offsets. Figure 2.13 shows for the MSMN non-
spoofing environment how HBL surplus and number of transactions vary in markets
where HBL traders adopt different offset intervals.7 We find adjusting learned prices
with a range of negative offsets can be generally beneficial in our setting where agents
have reentry opportunities. It increases HBL payoff and facilitates transactions, thus
improving overall price convergence in markets.
To test the effectiveness of spoofing against the new HBL variation, we further have
the SPψ=1 spoof in markets where the learning background traders respectively adopt
the standard HBL, HBL[−10,0], HBL[−20,0], HBL[−40,0]. Figure 2.14 compares market
price deviations caused by spoof orders in those markets. We find that though all
markets experience initial price rise as a result of misled pricing beliefs, the spoofing
effect tends to wear off faster in markets where HBL traders adopt negative price
offsets. This may be because negative offsets promote near-term transaction: as more
transactions happen, HBL traders can glean true information from the transaction
prices to construct more accurate belief functions, and the SPψ=1 places spoof orders
at lower prices due to the widened bid-ask spreads. Indeed, we find that markets
populated with the standard HBL, HBL[−10,0], HBL[−20,0], and HBL[−40,0] respectively
have average spoof-order prices of 99972, 99951, 99945, and 99950.
Finally, we conduct EGTA in games with and without spoofing to find Nash equi-
libria where background traders can choose from ZI strategies and HBL variations
that adjust learned prices with certain offsets (Table 2.4(a) and 2.4(c)). Equilib-
7HBL with positive offset usually generates much lower payoff. For presentation simplicity, we











































(b) Background-trader surpluses achieved in equilibrium.
Figure 2.15: Total background-trader surpluses and HBL strategy adoption rates
achieved at equilibria across different market settings. For each market environment,
we compare four settings where background traders are respectively provided with the
standard HBL strategy (dark grey), HBL with selective price blocking (light grey),
HBL with price offsets (white), and HBL that combines the two variations (striped).
Each marker specifies one equilibrium outcome in markets with spoofing (orange)
and without spoofing (blue). Filled markers represent that some proportion of HBL
with price blocking exists in the equilibrium strategy profiles, whereas hollow ones
represent equilibrium strategy profiles without HBL price blocking.
rium results (Figure 2.15 white columns) show that the extended price offsets tend to
largely improve HBL’s profitability and background-trader surpluses, in both markets
with and without manipulation. Such price adjustments can especially help learning
traders to better adapt to high shock environments where prices are less predictable
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from past observations. However, the extended offsets may not directly address ma-
nipulation and improve learning robustness against spoofing.
2.7.3 Combine Order Blocking and Price Offsets
We observe that HBL with price offsets is overall competitive across different
market settings, but its performance still degrades in markets with spoofing (refer to
Figure 2.15 white columns). Since the second HBL variation demonstrates a general
improvement in both settings with and without manipulation, we augment this vari-
ation with price level blocking to reduce vulnerability to spoofing. Specifically, we
extend the background trading strategy set in Table 2.4 with six strategies: HBLχ=2[−10,0],
HBLχ=2[−20,0], and HBL
χ=2
[−40,0] for the respective two memory lengths L = 2 and L = 5.
We conduct EGTA in a similar manner across market environments with and
without spoofing. Equilibrium outcomes (Figure 2.15 striped columns) show that
(1) compared to markets where only the standard and the price-blocking HBL are
provided, HBL that combines the two variations is more widely preferred and can
help to increase overall background-trader surplus in equilibrium; and (2) across all
environments, background-trader surpluses in markets with and without spoofing fall
roughly into the same ranges. These suggest that by combining the two proposed
variations, HBL traders can enjoy both improved competitiveness and robustness
against manipulation.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we construct a computational model of spoofing: the tactic of
manipulating market prices by targeting the order book. To do so, we designed an
HBL strategy that uses order book information to make pricing decisions. Since HBL
traders use the order book, they are potentially spoofable, which we confirmed in
simulation analysis. We demonstrate that in the absence of spoofing, HBL is gener-
ally adopted in equilibrium and benefits price discovery and social welfare. Though
the presence of spoofing decreases the HBL proportion in background traders, HBL’s
persistence in equilibrium indicates a robustly spoofable market. By comparing equi-
librium outcomes with and without spoofing, we find spoofing tends to decrease mar-
ket surplus. Comparisons across parametrically different environments reveal factors
that may influence the adoption of HBL and the impact of spoofing.
We further propose a cloaking mechanism to deter spoofing. The mechanism
discloses a partially cloaked order book by symmetrically concealing a deterministic
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number of price levels from the inside. Our results demonstrate the proposed cloak-
ing mechanism can significantly diminish the efficacy of spoofing, but at the cost of
a reduced HBL proportion and surplus in equilibrium. With the goal of maximizing
background-trader surplus, we perform EGTA across parametrically different mech-
anisms and environments, and find in markets with moderate shocks, the benefit of
cloaking in mitigating spoofing outweighs its efficiency cost. By further exploring
sophisticated spoofing strategies that probe to reveal cloaked information, we demon-
strate the associated effort and risk exceed the gains, and verified that the proposed
cloaking mechanism cannot be circumvented.
Two strategy variations based on the standard HBL strategy are explored. The
first variation considers common characteristics of spoofing activities, and works by
offering agents the flexibility to neglect limit orders at a specified price level when
assembling a dataset to learn from. The second variation learns from full order book
information, and later adjusts the target price derived from surplus maximization
with a random offset to correct any biases in the learning process. Our analysis show
that the first HBL variation offers learning traders a way to strategically block or-
ders to improve robustness against spoofing, while achieving similar competitiveness
in non-manipulated markets. Our second HBL variation exhibits a general improve-
ment over baseline HBL, in both markets with and without manipulation. Further
explorations suggest that traders can enjoy both improved profitability and robust-
ness by combining the two HBL variations.
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CHAPTER 3
Modeling the Evasion of Manipulation Detection:
An Adversarial Learning Framework
This chapter proposes an adversarial learning framework to capture the evolving
game between a regulator who develops tools to detect market manipulation and a
manipulator who obfuscates actions to evade detection. The model includes three
main parts: (1) a generator that learns to adapt original manipulation order streams
to resemble trading patterns of a normal trader while preserving the manipulation
intent; (2) a discriminator that differentiates the adversarially adapted manipula-
tion order streams from normal trading activities; and (3) the agent-based model of
spoofing described in Chapter 2 that evaluates the manipulation effect of adapted
outputs.
Experiments are conducted on simulated order streams associated with a manip-
ulator and a market-making agent respectively. The specific goal is to adapt ma-
nipulation order streams to resemble market-making, a legitimate trading role with
generally positive influence on market efficiency. We show examples of adapted ma-
nipulation order streams that mimic a specified market maker’s quoting patterns and
appear qualitatively different from the original manipulation strategy implemented in
the simulator. These results demonstrate the possibility of automatically generating
a diverse set of (unseen) manipulation strategies that can serve as a training course
for more robust detection algorithms.
3.1 Introduction
The work in Chapter 2 has proposed several deterrent mechanisms and trading
strategies that aim to render manipulation strategies uneconomical. A more direct
approach is to detect any manipulation activity. Rule-based methods that look for
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certain trading activities known as manipulation signatures (e.g., frequent order can-
cellations and modifications), however, may not be enough. They often result in
high false positive rates, as these activities can also be legitimate actions for many
non-manipulative participants, such as market makers and other liquidity providers
(Foucault, Röell, and Sand̊as 2003; Hautsch and Huang 2012). Therefore, develop-
ing a reliable detector requires identifying or learning the manipulation intent from
series of observed actions associated with individual trading agents across time, as
they reveal agents’ interactions with different market states and subsequent market
outcomes.
Along this line of efforts, Nasdaq launched an AI-based surveillance system trained
with historical trading data and existing patterns of market-abuse techniques to de-
tect suspect equities trading practices (Rundle 2019). Despite promising advances,
developing high-fidelity systems to detect manipulation even ex post faces two ma-
jor challenges. First, the amount of labeled data identifying manipulation is quite
small and may not be diverse enough to reflect all manipulation strategies. Second,
given any launched detector, agents who seek to manipulate the market may obfus-
cate their strategies adversarially to evade detection (e.g., manipulating in a way that
appears as normal trading activity). This causes regulators to play a costly game of
cat-and-mouse with manipulators who constantly innovate to escape.
This chapter proposes using an adversarial learning framework to address these
challenges; it reasons about how a manipulator might mask its behavior to evade
the detection of a given discriminative model. Traders interact with the market
by submitting orders to buy or sell, and throughout this chapter, we refer to the
sequence of such actions taken by an individual trader over a period of time as the
trader’s order stream. It is a realization of its associated strategy, which reflects an
agent’s trading intent. The idea is to let a generative model learn to adapt existing
manipulation strategies (represented as order streams) to resemble characteristics of
normal trading, while preserving a comparable manipulation effect. A history of
adapted order streams that effectively manipulate are further used to improve the
robustness of the detector. We apply such adversarial reasoning recursively, updating
the generator and the discriminator level-by-level, and characterize the evolution of
adapted manipulation strategies.
The generative model adopts a sequence-to-sequence paradigm (Sutskever, Vinyals,
and Le 2014), and takes a manipulation order stream as source and a paired benign
trader’s order stream as target. It learns to adapt the source by minimizing the
combination of an adversarial loss and a self-regularization loss. The adversarial
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loss is calculated by a discriminator that classifies an order stream as adapted from
manipulation or target, minimized as the output becomes indistinguishable from a
benign trader’s order stream. The self-regularization loss is a feature-wise distance
between the source and the adapted stream, penalizing large changes between the
two to preserve the manipulation effect.
We conduct experiments and evaluate the proposed approach using order streams
generated by the agent-based market simulator described in Chapter 2.1 The simula-
tor models simple manipulation strategies (i.e., spoofing), and can practically produce
a large set of order streams associated with each agent across a variety of market con-
ditions (e.g., different market shock and observation noise parameters). Controlled
simulations are conducted to acquire (1) source order streams (SP) associated with
a manipulation agent who deploys a variant of the spoofing strategy and (2) tar-
get order streams (MM) that a market-making agent would have placed under the
corresponding market conditions. To help quantify the manipulation effect, we de-
compose the SP behavior into manipulation and exploitation components, and define
baseline order streams (EXP) as those that only include a series of transacted ex-
ploitation orders. The goal here is to adapt manipulation order streams to resemble
market-making, a legitimate trading role with generally positive influence on market
efficiency (Schwartz and Peng 2013; Wah, Wright, and Wellman 2017). Figure 3.1
gives an overview of the approach.
Experimental results show that the proposed framework can generate adapted
manipulation order streams that resemble quoting patterns of a market maker and
appear qualitatively different from the original spoofing strategy prescribed in the
simulator. This adaptation evades detection, but at the cost of compromising effec-
tiveness in manipulation. After a few iterations of evolving and evading the detector,
the strategy has sacrificed almost all of its manipulation capability. Though it is
likely impossible to develop a detector immune from adversarial attacks, modeling
the evasion can be a useful step toward more robust detection of market manipula-
tion.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides background
and discuss related work. We describe the trading strategies, data representations,
and adversarial learning model in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 evaluates the proposed
method and presents experiment findings. Section 3.5 concludes with discussions.
1Learning from real market data is infeasible, as actual order streams identified as manipulation
do not exist in any substantial quantity.
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(a) Update the generator and the discriminator level-by-level.
(b) Given a fixed detector Dl−1, train Gl to generate SPl.
Figure 3.1: Overview of the proposed adversarial learning framework that reasons
about evading a manipulation detector. The process starts with a classifier D0 that
discriminates between SP and MM order streams. In response, a generator G1 learns
to adapt SP order streams, producing SP1 that can evade detection by D0. SP1 order
streams are then incorporated to train the next-level discriminator D1. Such adver-
sarial reasoning is applied recursively, producing a sequence of adapted manipulators
and corresponding increasingly robust detectors.
3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 Agent-Based Modeling of Trading Roles
To study the effects of particular trading practices, researchers classify market
participants into different roles based on their trading intent and activity patterns
(e.g., trading volume, frequency, position). An agent-based market model designs
agents around such roles, and reproduces “stylized facts” observed in real financial
markets through simulating the strategic interactions of these agents (Kirilenko, Kyle,
Samadi, and Tuzun 2017; Lebaron 2006).
This chapter builds on the developed agent-based model of spoofing, in which a
manipulation agent can effectively deceive approximately rational background traders.
Specifically, in markets populated with background learning traders who bid based
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on beliefs induced from market observations including the malicious activities, the
manipulator is able to push prices significantly higher than they would be otherwise,
and profit from this manipulation. Since background trading agents react to different
market conditions according to their codified strategies, the model can be used to ver-
ify manipulation intent and quantify its impact by conducting controlled experiments
of markets with and without a spoofing agent.
3.2.2 Learning via Adversarial Training
There is a substantial body of work on adversarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2015; Sinha, Namkoong, and Duchi 2018; Tzeng, Hoffman, Saenko,
and Darrell 2017; Volpi et al. 2018), investigating a variety of training procedures
designed to learn models robust to (adversarial) perturbations in the input. Many
of these approaches involve augmenting training dataset with examples from a target
domain that is considered “hard” under the current model. A key issue addressed in
some but not all of this work is to preserve specified properties of the source domain
while generating adversarial examples to improve robustness.
Our proposed approach draws particular inspiration from Shrivastava et al. (2017),
who proposed Simulated + Unsupervised (S+U) learning. The idea is to train a gen-
erative model to improve the realism of simulated images using unlabeled real ones,
while preserving the annotation information from the simulator. A pixel-level loss
is further imposed between the simulated input and the generated image to enforce
annotation. Experimental results show that S+U learning enables the generation of
highly realistic images with reliable labels and helps to improve learning models’ per-
formance on classification tasks, including gaze estimation and hand pose estimation.
A similar idea was also employed by Bousmalis et al. (2018) for a robotics grasping
problem. They extended pixel-level domain adaptation to improve the realism of
synthetic data generated by the off-the-shelf grasp simulators. This chapter extends
the approach to adapt simulated order streams while preserving the intent behind the
original sequence of actions.
3.3 Problem Formulation
3.3.1 Trading Strategies and Representations
We follow prior work (Wah, Wright, and Wellman 2017; Wang and Wellman 2017)
in the design of manipulation and market-making strategies, extending each with a
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bit of flexibility to reduce overfitting to artifacts. We describe the trading strategies
and their representations as order streams below. Since an order stream is a sequence
of actions incurred by a strategy, in this chapter, we refer to a strategy and order
streams associated with that strategy interchangeably.
Manipulation Strategy (SP) During each simulation run, the manipulator ma-
neuvers prices either up or down as instructed by the system with equal probability.
We elaborate the case of manipulating prices up, and the other applies vice versa. The
strategy includes three stages, similar to the one described in Section 2.6.1.3. During
the first execution stage, the agent buys by accepting any sell order at price lower
than the fundamental mean r̄ (as formulated in Eq. 2.1). In the next manipulation
stage, it stops buying and instead maintains large manipulation buy limit orders at
price one tick below the best bid. The goal is to falsely signal demand to push price
up so that the units bought earlier can be sold at higher prices later. During the last
stage, the manipulator starts to sell the units by accepting any buy orders at a price
higher than r̄. The agent continues to manipulate until the trading period ends or
all the bought units are sold.
Market-making Strategy (MM) Upon each arrival, the market maker submits
a quote ladder centered around an estimate of the terminal fundamental value of the
underlying security, denoted by r̂t. Specifically, the quote ladder is decided by three
strategic parameters ω,K, ζ that respectively control the quote spread, number of
price levels, and the number of ticks between two adjacent prices:[Bt −Kζ, . . . , Bt − (K − β)ζ] for buy orders[St + (K − α)ζ, . . . , St +Kζ] for sell orders, (3.1)
where Bt = r̂t − ω/2, St = r̂t + ω/2, and α and β truncate the price ladder such
that limit orders do not immediately transact with the market’s current best bid and
ask. To mitigate certain artifacts (e.g., prices separated by an equal distance), we
add Gaussian noise around each price in Eq. (3.1) and its associated quantity. Since
quote ladders are symmetrically centered around unbiased estimations of the terminal
fundamental value, the MM orders in expectation do not distort learning traders’
pricing beliefs. The MM agent follows the same arrival schedule as the manipulator
to produce a paired target order stream, which records orders that would have placed
under market conditions encountered by the manipulator.
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Exploitation Strategy (EXP) The exploitation order streams serve as the control
group to measure the effect of manipulation orders. The strategy executes the same
buy and sell scheme as the SP strategy during the first and last stage without placing
any manipulation order.
Order Stream Representation An order stream records a sequence of (hypo-
thetical) actions associated with an agent. It is represented by a variable-length
sequence with an element corresponding to each time an agent arrives and submits a
bid schedule. A bid schedule comprises a set of limit orders, each specifying a price
(expressed by distance to the market best bid or ask) and a quantity. Figure 3.2 shows
order streams respectively associated with EXP, SP, and MM in a set of controlled
simulations where we set r̄ = 105.
3.3.2 An Adversarial Learning Framework
We use the market simulator to generate a dataset of labeled order streams D =
{(wi,EXP), (xi, SP), (yi,MM)}Ni=1, where wi, xi, and yi denote order streams incurred
by their respective strategies under one set of controlled simulations (like those in
Figure 3.2). The goal here is to adapt the simulated SP order streams to become
indistinguishable from the MM ones while preserving some manipulation effect.
The generator adopts the sequence-to-sequence paradigm (Sutskever, Vinyals, and
Le 2014), which considers the interconnection between bid schedules within a sequence
(e.g., a manipulator who buys first is more likely to manipulate price up and later sell).
It has an encoder-decoder structure Gθ = (Genc, Gdec), where θ denotes the function
parameters. This encoder-decoder model has been widely used in tasks that require
sequence-to-sequence learning, such as the statistical machine translation (Cho et al.
2014; Sutskever, Vinyals, and Le 2014) and sentence generation (Logeswaran, Lee, and
Bengio 2018). The encoder adopts a recurrent neural network (RNN) that takes an
order stream x as input and produces a fixed-length latent representation vector zx :=
Genc(x). The vector contains compressed information of the input (e.g., manipulate
prices up or down), and is decoded by Gdec, a second RNN that generates x
′ ∼
pGdec(·|zx) to resemble characteristics of the target domain y. The discriminator Dφ
also uses an RNN component followed by a linear layer, and outputs the probability
of an input being an adapted order stream.
We propose a recursive training procedure of the generator and the detector (de-
picted in Figure 3.1(a)), designed to mimic the adversarial reasoning between a ma-
nipulator and a regulator. The manipulator starts by playing the SP strategy that is
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Figure 3.2: Order streams associated with EXP, SP, and MM in a set of controlled
simulations. During the execution stage (time before 1000), both EXP and SP bought
one share of the security at price r̄−92. Then, SP maintained manipulation buy orders
at a tick behind the best bid to push the price up. As a result, SP managed to sell
the share at price r̄ + 102, whereas EXP sold the share at r̄ + 44.
codified in the market simulator, and the regulator develops detector D0 to distinguish
manipulation order streams from MM streams. The manipulator then constructs its
next-level strategy SP1 by learning a generator G1 to adapt SP, such that the adapted
order streams can evade the detection of D0 and preserve a comparable manipulation
effect. To achieve both aims, the generator is trained to minimize a combination of
adversarial loss and regularization loss (depicted in Figure 3.1(b)), which we describe
in detail below. In response, a new detector D1 is trained to identify both the original
manipulation strategy SP and the evolved one SP1. We apply such reasoning recur-
sively to generate adversarial manipulation activities, so as to improve the robustness
of a detector.
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Adversarial Loss The generator works to bridge the gap between the source (i.e.,
SP) and the target (i.e., MM) by minimizing the adversarial loss. We follow the GAN
setup (Goodfellow et al. 2014) which models the generator and the discriminator as
a two-player minimax game. During training, the level-l discriminator network Dl








where x′i represents some learned (or identity) transformation of xi, and D(·) denotes
the probability of the input order stream either associated with or adapted from SP.
We fix the discriminator Dl−1 and train the level-l generator Gl to maximize the
probability of Dl−1 making a mistake. Specifically, it learns θl by minimizing the
adversarial loss:




Self-Regularization Loss To preserve the manipulation effect, we combine the
adversarial loss with a self-regularization loss that penalizes any difference between
the adapted and original order stream. This can be interpreted as a manipulator
preference to adapt its original manipulation strategy as little as possible to evade
detection. We define regularization loss as the mean squared error between the input






‖G(xi; θl)− xi‖22 , (3.4)
where ‖·‖2 is the L2 norm. The overall loss for G is LG = LadvG + λL
reg
G , where λ is a
hyperparameter.
Measuring Manipulation Effects We evaluate the manipulation effects of the
adapted order stream x′i := Gl(xi) by feeding it back to the market simulator under
the same set of experimental controls. That is, we compare the effects under scenarios
where background traders are guaranteed to arrive at the same time, receive identi-
cal private values, and observe the same fundamental values as in simulations that
generate wi, xi, and yi. Any change in background bidding behavior can therefore be
attributed to the adapted order stream.
We compare market outcomes incurred by the adapted order stream to those of
markets with SP and EXP, and measure the manipulation intensity and transaction
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risk. The manipulation intensity of x′i, denoted by δx′i , is defined as the fraction of


























where Pwi , Pxi , and Px′i
denote the average transaction price in respective markets
since the start of the manipulation stage. The higher the manipulation intensity
is, the better x′i preserves the manipulation effect. Transaction risk is defined as
the ratio between the number of transactions and the number of arrivals during the
manipulation phase. By definition, SP and EXP have manipulation intensity one and
zero, respectively, and both exhibit transaction risk zero. Algorithm 2 describes the
detailed procedure of training G and D in one specific level.
3.4 Experimental Results
We follow the proposed framework and generate adversarial order streams by
adapting the simulated SP order streams to look like quoting patterns of a market
maker. We visualize examples of adapted manipulation activities, and demonstrate
the competing improvement between the adapted manipulation strategies and the
detectors.
3.4.1 Dataset and Implementation Details
We conduct simulations using the agent-based market simulator, and generate
10,944 groups of labeled order streams {(wi,EXP), (xi, SP), (yi,MM)}.2 The order
streams respectively record (hypothetical) trading activities of a manipulator, a mar-
ket maker, and an exploitation agent. Each trading session lasts 5000 time steps, and
the generated order streams have lengths varying from 4 to 91. The first execution
stage is from time 200 to 1000, after which the manipulation agent starts to spoof. At
time 2000, it begins to liquidate previously accumulated positions. The underlying
security has a fundamental mean r̄ = 105. Based on estimations of the final funda-
2We first conducted 30,000 controlled simulation runs, yielding 30,000 groups of labeled order
streams. We kept those groups in which the manipulator successfully trades during the first stage
(so that there is an incentive to spoof later), and pushes prices to its desired direction by at least ten
ticks. This gives us 10,944 groups of labeled order streams, which meet the described filter standard.
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Algorithm 2 Adversarial Training Procedure of Glθ and D
l
φ
Input: D{(xi, SP), (yi,MM), (wi,EXP), si}Ni=1. Data buffer B{x∗i }Ni=1 with a mix-
ture of x, x1, ..., xl−1. Dl−1φ .
Output: Glθ and D
l
φ.
1: for t = 1, ..., epoch do
2: for j = 1, ..., batch do
3: Generate x′j = Gθ(xj)
4: Update θ on the batch loss LG(θ)
5: Get optimal Glθ
6: for i = 1, ..., N do
7: Feed x′i := G
l
θ(xi) back to simulator with seed si
8: Replace x∗i with x
′
i with probability 0.9 if Px′i ≥ δPxi
9: for t = 1, ..., epoch do
10: for j = 1, ..., batch do
11: Sample x∗j ∈ B and yj ∈ D
12: Update φ on the batch loss LD(φ)
13: Get optimal Dlφ
mental value, the MM submits a quote ladder with ω = 256, K = 8, ζ ∼ N(128, 10),
and quantity q ∼ N(5, 2). We use 8896 groups of order streams for training (with a
80/20 train-validation split) and the rest 2048 groups for testing.
We use a bi-directional Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) RNN (Cho et al. 2014)
with a hidden state size of 64, followed by a linear layer for both Genc, Gdec, and
D in the experiments. Since order streams are of variable lengths, we pad them to
the maximum length for forward passes, and cut them back to original lengths for
loss calculations and evaluations. Model parameters are initialized with the uniform
distribution between –0.08 and 0.08. We use batches of 64 order streams to train the
discriminator and the generator, and pick weight of the self-regularization loss λ = 1
based on the validation performance.
3.4.2 Generating Adapted Manipulation Examples
We evaluate the adversarially adapted order streams from three main aspects:
(1) similarity to the MM quoting patterns, (2) preservation of manipulation effect,
and (3) effectiveness in evading the detection of an existing discriminator. Table 3.1
presents summary statistics of order streams associated with their corresponding trad-






Dl−1 (%) Dl (%)
SP 411∗,∗∗ 1 0 - 100
SP1 362
∗,∗∗ 0.50 0.14 0.59 100
SP2 310
∗ 0.30 0.26 0 100
SP3 303
∗ 0.22 0.59 0 100
MM 121 0.15 0.85 100 100
EXP 324∗ 0 0 - -
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of the respective trading strategy on test dataset.
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 5% level of the paired t-test for payoffs
compared to MM(∗) and EXP(∗∗).
Comparing to MM We follow prior work (Li et al. 2020) in using price and
quantity distributions to measure how well the generated order streams resemble
the target MM streams. We further propose a domain-specific measure, the order
imbalance distribution, defined as the ratio between the numbers of buy and sell
orders submitted over a trading period (whichever value is larger on the numerator).
This captures a trader’s imbalance in preference between long and short positions.
Figure 3.3 presents comparisons of the respective distributions. Results show that
the adapted manipulation order streams produce distributions similar to that of the
MM, and are able to overcome certain artifacts codified in the SP strategy (e.g., large-
quantity orders always at one tick behind the best quotes and severe order imbalance
to deceive the market). Specifically, orders are gradually adapted to cover a wider
range of prices with relative small quantities, and order balance is roughly maintained
throughout the trading period.
Preserving Manipulation Effect In the final step, we feed adapted order streams
back to the market simulator under the same set of experimental controls, and mea-
sure their manipulation effect by the manipulation intensity and transaction risk.
Figure 3.4 shows the two-dimensional cumulative density over the 2,048 adapted out-
puts with respect to the two proposed metrics. We find that SP1 can preserve a
comparable manipulation intensity under a reasonable transaction risk; however, as
the generator adapts in response to a more robust discriminator, the adapted streams
begin to suffer a large degradation in manipulation intensity and an increase in trans-
action risk (e.g., SP3 has a similar performance to MM). This weakened manipulation
effect is further confirmed in Table 3.1.
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(c) Order imbalance distri-
bution.
Figure 3.3: Comparisons of the respective statistics on the SP order streams, adapted
outputs, and MM order streams.




























































































Figure 3.4: The manipulation effect of order streams associated with the correspond-
ing level of SP strategy. Each color of a cell encodes the cumulative density of order
streams that achieve a certain manipulation intensity and transaction risk. The closer
dark blue is to the bottom right, the better adapted order streams are able to preserve























































































































































Evading the Detection Table 3.1 shows that a generator can easily fool an existing
detector with adversarially generated order streams. By learning from a history of
adapted order streams, the discriminator is able to detect manipulation streams from
all previous levels, and in the meantime ensures the training stability of the next-level
generator.
Qualitative Evaluation Figure 3.5 demonstrates examples of the original and its
corresponding adapted manipulation order streams. These examples demonstrate
that the adapted streams become qualitatively similar to the trading patterns of
a MM, and such simultaneous quoting behavior on both sides of the market has
indeed been suggested as a good strategy for high frequency traders to mask their
manipulative intent (Levens 2015). We note several other findings from the evolution
of adapted manipulation strategies. First, SP1 remains to place large orders close
to the market best quote, whereas SP2 and SP3 choose to either largely decrease
the order quantity or place large orders behind smaller ones to avoid being detected.
Second, SP2 and SP3 tend to submit orders at more aggressive prices across market
quotes, and this may cause unintended transactions during the manipulation phase.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter employs an adversarial learning framework to model the evolving
game between a regulator and a manipulator, in which the regulator deploys algo-
rithms to detect manipulation and the manipulator masks actions to evade detection.
Evasion is represented by a generative model, trained by augmenting manipulation
order streams with examples of market making activity traces. The intent is to pro-
duce adapted streams that are hard to distinguish from a market maker’s behavior.
We visualize examples of adapted manipulation order streams, and show they resem-
ble quoting patterns of a market maker and appear qualitatively different from the
original manipulation strategy we implemented in the simulator. This adaptation
evades detection, but only at the cost of compromising effectiveness in market ma-
nipulation. After a few iterations of evolving and evading the detector, the strategy
has sacrificed almost all of its manipulation capability.
Results presented here reflect the specific simulation choices adopted, and thus
it remains to be seen whether a more clever form of adaptation can evade detection
while retaining more effectiveness in manipulation. Whether or not it is possible
to ultimately craft successful adversarial attacks, the generation and evasion process
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modeled here provides a way to anticipate the evolution of evasive adversaries. Such
anticipation capacity provides a way to develop more robust detection methods, for
market manipulation as well as other fraudulent behaviors.
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CHAPTER 4
Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options
Market
This chapter studies expressive mechanisms for financial options market. Options
are contracts that specify the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a strike price
by an expiration date. Standard exchanges offer options of predetermined strike val-
ues and trade options of different strikes independently, even for those written on
the same underlying asset. Such independent market design can introduce arbitrage
opportunities, and lead to the thin market problem. This chapter proposes a mech-
anism that consolidates and matches orders on standard options related to the same
underlying asset, while providing the flexibility of specifying any custom strike value.
The mechanism runs in time polynomial to the number of orders, and poses no risk to
the exchange, regardless of the value of the underlying asset at expiration. Empirical
analysis on real-market options data shows that the mechanism can find new matches
for options of different strike prices and reduce bid-ask spreads.
Extending standard options written on a single asset, this chapter proposes com-
binatorial financial options that offer contract holders the right to buy or sell any
linear combination of multiple underlying assets. We generalize the proposed mech-
anism to match options written on different combinations of assets, and prove that
optimal clearing of combinatorial financial options is coNP-hard. To facilitate mar-
ket operations, we propose a heuristic algorithm that finds the exact optimal match
through iterative constraint generation, and evaluate its performance on synthetically
generated combinatorial options markets of different scales. As option prices reveal
the market’s collective belief of an underlying asset’s future value, a combinatorial




Financial options are securities that provide the holder with rights to conduct
specific trades in the future. For example, a S&P 500 call option with strike price
3500 and expiration date December 31, 2020 provides the right to buy one share of
S&P 500 at $3500 on that day.1 A standard financial option is a derivative instrument
of a single underlying asset or index, and its payoff is a function of the underlying
variable. The example contract pays max{S − 3500, 0}, where S is the value of the
S&P 500 index on the expiration date.2 Investors trade options to hedge risks and
achieve certain return patterns, or to speculate about the movement of the underlying
asset price, buying an option when its price falls below their estimate of its expected
value. Thus, option prices reveal the collective risk-neutral belief distribution of the
underlying asset’s future value.
Despite the significant volume of trade and interest in financial options, the stan-
dard options market has two limitations that compromise its expressiveness and effi-
ciency. First, markets for options of a specific underlying asset only feature a selective
set of predetermined strike prices and expiration dates, thus limiting the ability to
elicit and recover a full and continuous distribution of the underlying variable. As of
this writing, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) offers 276 distinct strike
prices, ranging from 700 to 5000, for S&P 500 options expiring by the end of 2020.
Second, each market independently aggregates and matches orders in regard to a
single contract with a specified option type, strike price, and expiration date, despite
its interconnectedness to other options and their common dependency on the under-
lying asset. Such independent market design fails to match options with different
strike prices, and may introduce arbitrage opportunities. Moreover, investments get
diluted across independent markets even when participants are interested in the same
underlying asset, and this can lead to the problem of thin markets, where few trades
happen and bid-ask spreads become wide. Even for some of the most actively traded
option families, empirical evidence has shown that liquidity can vary much across
option types and strikes. Cao and Wei (2010) studied eight years of options trading
data and find consistently lower liquidity in puts and deep in-the-money options.
1Throughout this study, I restrict to European options which can be exercised only at expiration.
For simplicity, examples are given without the typical 100x contract multiplier.
2The settlement value is calculated as the opening value of the index on the expiration date or
the last business day (usually a Friday) before the expiration date. In cash-settled markets, instead
of actual physical delivery of the underlying asset, the option holder gets a cash payment that is
equivalent to the value of the asset.
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We propose a linear program that computationally efficiently matches orders
across markets that are logically related to the same underlying asset, while en-
abling traders to specify any custom option contract (e.g., a S&P call option with
a strike price of 3502 that expires a week from today). It runs in time polynomial
to the number of orders and poses no risk to the exchange regardless of the value of
the underlying security at expiration. Empirical analysis conducted on real-market
options data shows that our mechanism, by consolidating independently-traded op-
tions markets, can indeed find arbitrage and substantially reduce bid-ask spreads.
The improved efficiency and expressiveness may help to aggregate more fine-grained
information and recover a complete and fully general probability distribution of the
underlying asset’s future value.
In the second part of this chapter, we further generalize standard financial options
to design a combinatorial financial options market in which agents can bid or offer
options written on any linear combination of underlying assets, thus enabling the
elicitation and recovery of future correlations among assets—in general, their full
joint distribution. For example, a call option written on “1AAPL +1MSFT” with strike
price 300 specifies the right to buy one share of Apple and one share of Microsoft at
$300 total price on the expiration date, whereas a call on “1AAPL −1MSFT” with strike
price 50 confers the ability to buy one share of Apple and sell one share of Microsoft
at expiration for a net cost of $50.
Combinatorial options offer traders to conveniently and precisely hedge their exact
portfolio, replicating any payoff functions that standard options can achieve. Stan-
dard options on mutual funds and stock indices like the S&P 500 and Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJI) operate on one specific predefined portfolio. The CBOE
has recently launched options on eleven Select Sector Indices,3 each of which can be
considered as a pre-specified linear combination of stocks. The goal of this work is to
support products like these and generalizes to any custom combinations.
As traders are offered the expressiveness to specify shares (or weights) for each un-
derlying asset, new challenges arise and the thin market problem exacerbates. Open-
ing a separate exchange for each combination of stocks and weights would rapidly
grow intractable. Naively matching only buy and sell orders for the exact same port-
folio may yield few or no trades at all, despite plenty of acceptable trades among
orders.




curity, we propose an optimization formulation that can match combinatorial options
written on different linear combinations of underlying assets. It works by maximizing
net profit subject to no risk to the exchange, regardless of the values of all assets
at expiration. We show that the proposed mechanism with increased expressiveness,
however, comes at the cost of a higher computational complexity: determining the
optimal clearing of a combinatorial options market is coNP-hard.
We demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can be equivalently formulated as a
bilevel mixed-integer linear program; it finds the exact optimal-matching solution by
satisfying an increasing set of constraints generated from different future values of the
underlying assets. In experiments on synthetic combinatorial orders generated from
real-market standard options prices, we show that in practice the bilevel optimization
terminates quickly, with its running time growing linearly with the number of orders
and the size of underlying assets.
4.2 Related Work
4.2.1 Rational Option Pricing
The proposed matching mechanisms are closely related to and built on arbitrage
conditions that have been studied extensively in financial economics (Modigliani
and Miller 1958; Varian 1987). In short, an arbitrage describes the scenario of “free
lunches”—configurations of prices such that an individual can get something for noth-
ing. The matching operation of the exchange (i.e., the auctioneer function) can be
considered as arbitrage elimination: matching orders in effect works by identifying
combinations of orders that reflect a risk-free surplus (i.e., gains from trade).
Merton (1973a) first investigated the no-arbitrage pricing for options, stating the
necessity of convexity in option prices. Other relevant works examine no-arbitrage
conditions for options under different scenarios, such as modeling the stochastic be-
havior of the underlying asset (e.g., the Black-Scholes model), and considering the
presence of other types of securities (e.g., bonds and futures). The most relevant
work to our proposed approach is by Herzel (2005), who makes little assumption on
the underlying process and other financial instruments. The paper proposes a lin-
ear program to check the convexity between every strike-price pair; it finds arbitrage
opportunities that yield positive cash flows now and no liabilities in the future on
European options written on the same underlying security. Our contribution on con-
solidating standard options generalizes Herzel’s, by also allowing a temporary deficit
(i.e., a negative cash flow) now, if it is guaranteed to earn it back at the time of op-
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tion expiration. To our knowledge, no prior work has defined general combinatorial
options or investigated the matching mechanism design and complexity for such a
market.
4.2.2 Combinatorial Market Design
Much prior work examines the design of combinatorial markets, both exchanges
and market makers (Chen et al. 2008; Hanson 2003), for different applications in-
cluding prediction markets with Boolean combinations (Fortnow, Kilian, Pennock,
and Wellman 2005), permutations (Chen, Fortnow, Nikolova, and Pennock 2007),
hierarchical structures (Guo and Pennock 2009), tournaments (Chen, Goel, and Pen-
nock 2008), and electronic sourcing (Sandholm 2007). Dud́ık, Lahaie, Pennock, and
Rothschild (2013) show how to employ constraint generation in linear programming
to keep complex related prices consistent. Kroer, Dud́ık, Lahaie, and Balakrishnan
(2016) generalize this approach using integer programming. Designing combinato-
rial markets faces the tradeoff between expressiveness and computational complexity:
giving participants greater flexibility to express preferences can help to elicit better
information and increase economic efficiency, but leads to a more intricate mechanism
that is computationally harder. Several works have formally described and quanti-
fied such tradeoff (Benisch, Sadeh, and Sandholm 2008; Golovin 2007), and studied
how to balance it by exploiting the outcome space structure and limiting expressivity
(Chen et al. 2008; Dud́ık, Wang, Pennock, and Rothschild 2020; Laskey et al. 2018;
Xia and Pennock 2011). This chapter contributes to the rich literature by extending
to the popular financial options market and designing mechanisms to operate such
markets.
4.3 Background and Notations
There are two types of options, referred to as call and put options. We denote a
call option as C(S,K, T ) and a put option as P (S,K, T ), which respectively gives the
option buyer the right to buy and sell an underlying asset S at a specified strike price
K on the expiration date T . In the rest of this chapter, we omit T from the tuples
for simplicity, as the mechanism aggregates options within the same expiration.
The option buyer decides whether to exercise an option. Suppose that a buyer
spends $8 and purchases a call option, C(S&P 500, 3500, 20201231). If the S&P 500
index is $3700 at expiration, the buyer will pay the agreed strike $3500, receive the
index, and get a payoff of $200 and a net profit of $192 (assuming no time value). If
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the S&P 500 price is $3200, the buyer will walk away without exercising the option.
Therefore, the payoff of a purchased option is
Ψ := max{χ(S −K), 0},
where S is the value of underlying asset at expiration and χ ∈ {−1, 1} equals 1 for
calls and −1 for puts. As the payoff for a buyer is always non-negative, the seller
receives a premium now (e.g., $8) to compensate for future obligations.
Option contracts written on the same underlying asset, type, strike, and expiration
are referred to as an option series. Consider options of a single security offering both
calls and puts, ten expiration dates and fifty strike prices. All option series render a
total of a thousand markets, with each maintaining a separate limit order book. In
such a market, deciding the existence of a transaction takes O(1) time by comparing
the best bid and ask prices, and matching an incoming order can take up to O(N)
time depending on its quantity, where N is the number of orders on the opposite side
of the order book.
4.4 Consolidating Standard Financial Options
A linear program is proposed to consolidate and match options written on the
same underlying asset across different types and strike prices. The model is simple
without making any assumptions on the option’s pricing model or the stochastic
behavior of the underlying security.
4.4.1 Match Orders on Standard Options
Let us consider an options market in regard to a single underlying asset S with
an expiration date T . It has a set of buy orders indexed m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} and a set
of sell orders indexed n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Buy orders are represented by a type vector
φ ∈ {−1, 1}M , a strike price vector p ∈ RM+ , and bid prices b ∈ RM+ . Sell orders are
denoted by a separate type vector ψ ∈ {−1, 1}N , a strike vector q ∈ RN+ , and ask
prices a ∈ RN+ .
The exchange aims to match buy and sell orders submitted by traders. Specifically,
it decides the fraction γ ∈ [0, 1]M to sell to buy orders and the fraction δ ∈ [0, 1]N to
buy from sell orders. The objective is to maximize the net profit, taking into account
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the potential deficit or gain in the future, denoted by a decision variable L ∈ R:
max
γ,δ,L









δn max{ψn(S − qn), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ∆
≤ L, ∀S ∈ [0,∞)
(4.1)
Here, the first term
∑
m γm max{φm(S− pm), 0} in the constraint (4.1) calculates the
total payoff of sold options as a function of S, which is the obligation or liability of the
exchange at the time of option expiration. The second term
∑
n δn max{ψn(S−qn), 0}
computes the total payoff of bought options, by which the exchange has the right to
exercise. The constraint guarantees that the difference between the liability and
the payoff of the exchange will be bounded by L, regardless of the value of S on
the expiration date. We denote options bought by the exchange as Portfolio ∆ and
options sold as Portfolio Γ, and describe their relationship below.
Definition 4.1 (Payoff Dominance. Adapted from Merton (1973b)). Portfolio ∆
(weakly) dominates Portfolio Γ with an offset L, if the payoff of portfolio ∆ plus a
constant L is greater than or equal to that of Portfolio Γ for all possible states of the
underlying variable at expiration. Portfolio Γ is said to be (weakly) dominated by
portfolio ∆ with an offset L.
We analyze the complexity of running Mechanism M.1. The left-hand side of
constraint (4.1) is a linear combination of max functions, and thus is a piecewise
linear function of S. Therefore, it suffices to solve M.1 by satisfying constraints
defined by S at each breakpoint. In our case, breakpoints of the constraint (4.1) are
the defined strike values in the market, plus two endpoints: p ∪ q ∪ {0,∞}. Let nK
denotes the number of distinct strike values in the market, which is bounded above
by norders = M + N , the total number of orders in the market. Therefore, M.1 is
a linear program that has nK + 2 payoff constraints, and requires time polynomial
in the size of the problem instance to solve. Complete proofs from this chapter are
deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1. Mechanism M.1 matches options written on the same underlying asset
and expiration date across all types and strike prices in time polynomial in the number
of orders.
We give two motivating examples based on real-market options data below to
illustrate the economic meaning and the usefulness of a flexible L. In short, the
73
decision variable L allows the exchange to take a (worst-case) deficit at the future
time of option expiration if it is preemptively covered by a surplus (i.e., revenue) at
the time of contract transaction (Example 4.1) or to take a temporary deficit (i.e.,
expense) at the time of contract transaction if it is guaranteed to earn it back later at
the time of option expiration (Example 4.2). Therefore, the mechanism guarantees
no loss (as L is incorporated in the objective) for each match, and has an extra degree
of freedom to match orders.
Example 4.1 (A match with a positive L). We use the proposed Mechanism M.1
to consolidate options of Walt Disney Co. (DIS) that are priced on January 23, 2019
and expire on June 21, 2019. We find the following match, where each order would
not transact in its corresponding independent market. The exchange can
• sell to the buy order on C(DIS, 110) at bid $7.2,
• sell to the buy order on P (DIS, 150) at bid $38.75,
• buy from the sell order on C(DIS, 150) at ask $0.05,
• buy from the sell order on P (DIS, 110) at ask $5.1,
and get an immediate gain of $40.8 (7.2 + 38.75− 5.1− 0.05). Figure 4.1(a) plots the
payoffs of bought and sold options as a function of DIS, showing that the exchange
will have a net liability of $40 (i.e., L = 40) regardless of the DIS value at expiration.
The exchange makes a net profit of $0.80 from the match at no risk.
Example 4.2 (A match with a negative L). We consolidate options of Apple Inc.
(AAPL) that are priced on January 23, 2019 and expire on January 17, 2020. We find
the following match, where the exchange can
• sell to the buy order on C(AAPL, 160) at bid $14.1,
• sell to the buy order on P (AAPL, 80) at bid $0.62,
• buy from the sell order on C(AAPL, 80) at ask $74.2,
• buy from the sell order on P (AAPL, 160) at ask $19.1.
The match incurs an expense of $78.58 (14.1 + 0.62 − 74.2 − 19.1) and yields a
guaranteed payoff of $80 (i.e., L = −80) at expiration. Figure 4.1(b) depicts the
respective payoffs of bought and sold options. From the match, we can infer an
interest rate of 1.82%, calculated by 78.58er∆t = 80.
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(a) Payoffs of options bought and sold in
Example 4.1 as a function of DIS value.












(b) Payoffs of options bought and sold in
Example 4.2 as a function of AAPL value.
Figure 4.1: Payoffs of the matched options as a function of the value of the underlying
asset at expiration. Fig. 4.1(a) shows the case of L > 0, and Fig. 4.1(b) the case of
L < 0.
Remarks. Several extensions can be directly applied to the mechanism:
(1) The time value of investments can be incorporated by multiplying L by a (dis-
count) rate in the objective of Mechanism M.1.
(2) We can adapt constraints on decision variables γ and δ to reflect different quan-
tities specified in orders.
(3) By restricting L equal to 0, Mechanism M.1 matches orders by finding a common
form of arbitrage where the exchange may profit at the time of order transaction
subject to zero loss in the future.
4.4.2 Quote Prices for Standard Options
A standard exchange maintains the best quotes (i.e., the highest bid and lowest
ask) for each independent options market. This section extends Mechanism M.1 to
quote the most competitive prices for a custom option of any type and strike by
considering other options related to the same underlying security. We describe the
price quote procedure in an arbitrage-free market (φ,p, b,ψ, q,a) below, and defer
the proof of correctness to the Appendix B.1.2.
(1) The best bid b∗ for a custom option (χ, S,K, T ) is the maximum gain of selling
a portfolio of options that is weakly dominated by (χ, S,K, T ) for some L.
We derive b∗ by adding (χ, S,K, T ) to the sell side of the market indexed N+1 (as
the exchange buys from sell orders), initializing its price aN+1 to 0, and solving
for M.1. The best bid b∗ is then the returned objective.
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(2) The best ask a∗ for a custom option (χ, S,K, T ) is the minimum cost of buying
a portfolio of options that weakly dominates (χ, S,K, T ) for some L.
We derive a∗ by adding (χ, S,K, T ) to the buy side of the market indexed M + 1,
initializing its price bM+1 to a large number (i.e., 10
6), and solving for M.1. The
best ask a∗ is then bM+1 minus the returned objective.
In the case of matching orders with multiple units, it is necessary to consider all orders
in the market. For quoting prices and deciding the existence of a match, however,
we only need to consider a set of orders that have the most competitive prices. We
define these orders as a frontier set F .
Definition 4.2 (A Frontier Set of Options Orders). An option order is in the frontier
set F if its bid or ask cannot be improved by any other orders in the market. That
is, the bid price of a buy order is no less than the maximum gain of selling a weakly
dominated portfolio of options for some offset L; the ask price of a sell order is no
larger than the minimum cost of buying a weakly dominant portfolio of options for
some offset L.
Corollary 4.1.1. Mechanism M.1 determines price quotes and the existence of a
match in time polynomial in |F|.
The complete proof for Corollary 4.1.1 is deferred to Appendix B.1.3, which shows
that in order to quote the most competitive prices (i.e., the highest bid and the lowest
ask) for any target option (χ, S,K, T ), it suffices to consider options orders in F . The
runtime complexity follows immediately from Theorem 4.1.
4.5 Combinatorial Financial Options
This section proposes combinatorial financial options, which extend standard fi-
nancial options to more general derivative contracts that can be written on any linear
combination of U underlying assets. We formally define a combinatorial option and
its specifications.
Definition 4.3 (Combinatorial Financial Options). Combinatorial financial options
are contracts that specify the right to buy or sell a linear combination of underlying
assets at a strike price by an expiration date. Each contract specifies a call or put
type χ ∈ {1,−1}, a weight vector ω ∈ RU , a strike price K ≥ 0, and an expiration
date T . It has a payoff of max{χ(ω>S − K), 0}, where S ∈ RU≥0 is a vector of the
underlying assets’ values at T .
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Consider a combinatorial option C(MSFT − AAPL, 0) that has weight 1 for MSFT,
weight−1 for AAPL, and a strike price of zero. An investor who buys the option bets on
the event that Microsoft outperforms Apple Inc., and will exercise it if SMSFT > SAAPL.
Thus, unlike standard options that will pay off due to price changes of a single security,
combinatorial options bet on relative movements between assets or groups of assets,
thus enabling the expression of future correlations among different underlying assets.
We note that the distinction between a call and a put for combinatorial options
depends on the strike price and coefficients that one specifies a contract. For instance,
in the above example, C(MSFT−AAPL, 0) is identical to P (AAPL−MSFT, 0), as they have
the same payoff function max{SMSFT − SAAPL, 0}. Despite the different interpretations
and expressions, we follow the convention of standard options and have the strike
price always be non-negative.
The increased expressiveness in combinatorial options brings new challenges in
market design: only matching buy and sell orders on options related to the same assets
and weights may yield few or no trades, despite plenty of profitable trades among
options written on different portfolios. We start by giving the following motivating
examples to illustrate such scenarios.
Example 4.3 (Matching combinatorial option orders). Consider a combinatorial
options market with four orders
• o1: buy one C(1AAPL + 2MSFT, 300) at bid $110;
• o2: buy one C(1AAPL + 1MSFT, 300) at bid $70;
• o3: sell one C(1AAPL + 3MSFT, 300) at ask $160;
• o4: sell one C(1AAPL, 250) at ask $5.
The exchange returns no match if it only considers options related to the same com-
bination of assets. However, a profitable match does exist. The exchange can sell to
o1 and o2 and simultaneously buy from o3 and o4 to get an immediate gain of $15
(110+70-160-5). Figure 4.2 plots the overall payoff
Ψ := max{SAAPL + 3SMSFT − 300, 0}+ max{SAAPL − 250, 0}−
max{SAAPL + 2SMSFT − 300, 0} −max{SAAPL + SMSFT − 300, 0},
as a function of SAAPL and SMSFT. The trade cannot subtract from the $15 immediate
gain, but could add to it, depending on the future prices of the two stocks.
77
AAPL














Figure 4.2: Payoff of combinatorial options matched in Example 4.3 as a function of
SAAPL and SMSFT. The example demonstrates the case of L = 0.
In the above example, the exchange can consider matching each individual buy













Both are profitable trades, leading to the same match as in the example. The next
example shows that matching individual buy order to multiple sell orders may fail to
find valid trades.
Example 4.4 (Matching combinatorial option orders). Consider the following four
combinatorial options orders
• o1: buy one C(A + B, 10) at bid $6;
• o2: buy one C(B + C, 7) at bid $6;
• o3: sell one C(A + B + C, 7) at ask $10;
• o4: sell one C(B, 3) at ask $2.
No match will be found if we consider each buy order individually: covering a sold o1
or o2 requires buying the same fraction of o3, which is at a higher price and will incur
a net loss. However, a valid match does exist by selling to o1 and o2 and buying from
o3 and o4. It costs the exchange $0, and can yield a positive payoff in the future: the
exchange has
max{SA + SB − 10, 0}+ max{SB + SC − 7, 0}
≤ max{SA + SB + SC − 7, 0}+ max{SB − 3, 0},
meaning the liability will always be no larger than the payoffs of bought options, for
all non-negative SA, SB, SC .
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We extend the proposed matching mechanism M.1 for standard options to facili-
tate matching combinatorial options written on different combinations of underlying
assets.
4.5.1 Match Orders on Combinatorial Options.
A combinatorial financial options market is a two-sided market with a set of
buy orders indexed by m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} and a set of sell orders indexed by n ∈
{1, 2, ..., N}. Buy orders are represented by a type vector φ ∈ {1,−1}M , a weight
matrix α ∈ RU×M , a strike vector p ∈ RM≥0, and a bid price vector b ∈ RM+ . Sell orders
are defined by a separate type vector ψ ∈ {1,−1}N , a weight matrix β ∈ RU×N , a
strike vector q ∈ RN≥0, and an ask price vector a ∈ RN+ . Similar to a standard options
market, the exchange decides the fraction γ ∈ [0, 1]M to sell to buy orders and the
fraction δ ∈ [0, 1]N to buy from sell orders to maximize net profit.
max
γ,δ,L




γm max{φm(α>mS − pm), 0} −
∑
n
δn max{ψn(β>nS − qn), 0} ≤ L ∀S ∈ RU≥0
(4.2)
However, unlike M.1, due to the combinatorial nature, it is no longer feasible to solve
the optimization problem M.2 by iterating every combination of breakpoint values,
and the number of constraints can grow exponentially as O(2M+N). We analyze the
complexity of finding the optimal match in a combinatorial options market, showing
that given a market instance, it is NP-complete to decide if a certain matching as-
signment, γ and δ, violates the constraint (4.2) for a fixed L. We defer the detailed
proof to the Appendix B.2.1, which shows a reduction from the Vertex Cover prob-
lem. Using a slightly stronger version of Theorem 4.2, we show that optimal clearing
of a combinatorial options market is coNP-hard.
Theorem 4.2. Consider all combinatorial options in the market (φ,α,p,ψ,β, q).
For any fixed L, it is NP-complete to decide
• Yes: γ = δ = 1 violates the constraint in M.2 for some S,
• No: γ = δ = 1 satisfies the constraint in M.2 for all S,
even assuming that each combinatorial option is written on at most two underlying
assets.
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Theorem 4.3. Optimal clearing of a combinatorial options market (φ,α,p, b,ψ,β, q,a)
is coNP-hard, even assuming that each combinatorial option is written on at most two
underlying assets.
Since it is no longer practical to solve M.2 by identifying all constraints defined
by different combinations of underlying asset values, we propose Algorithm 3 that
finds the exact optimal match through iterative constraint generation. At the core
of Algorithm 3 is a bilevel optimation formulation: the upper level M.3U is a linear
program that computes the optimal solution that satisfies all generated constraints
(i.e., realized payoffs w.r.t. different S), and the lower level M.3L is a mixed-integer
linear program which in each iteration, generates an S that violates the upper-level
constraint (i.e., constraint 4.2) the most. The generated S is then included in the
constraint set.
The exact optimal match is returned when the lower level M.3L gives an objective
value of zero, meaning there exists no S that violates the upper-level constraint. The
algorithm trivially terminates finitely, but similar to the simplex method, it has no
guarantee on the rate of convergence. We later demonstrate in experiments that
Algorithm 3 converges quickly and the number of iterations grows linearly in the size
of a problem instance for synthetic options data.
We prove that Algorithm 3 returns the same optimal clearing as M.2, by first
claiming in the following Lemma that M.3L finds the S which violates the constraint
(4.2) of M.2 the most.
Lemma 4.4. Given fixed γ, δ, and L for a combinatorial options market (φ,α,p, b,ψ,β, q,a),
M.3L returns the value of underlying assets S that violates the constraint of M.2 the
most.
Proof. First, it is easy to see that the formulation below returns the S that vio-
lates constraint (4.2) the most, since we will have the largest feasible f and the
smallest feasible g at the optimum. That is, fm = max{φm(α>mS − pm), 0} and
gn = max{ψn(β>nS − qn), 0}.
max
S,f ,g
γ>f − δ>g − L
s.t. fm ≤ max{φm(α>mS − pm), 0} ∀m ∈ {1, ...,M}
gn ≥ ψn(β>n S − qn)
gn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N}
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Algorithm 3 Match orders in a combinatorial options market.
Input: A combinatorial options market defined by
(φ,α,p, b,ψ,β, q,a).
Output: An optimal clearing that matches γ∗ buy orders to δ∗
sell orders.
1: Initialize z ←∞, S ← 0, f ← max{φ(α>S − p),0},
g ← max{ψ(β>S − q),0}, C ← {(f , g)}.
2: while z > 0 do
3: Solve the following upper level optimization problem and
get an optimal solution (γ∗, δ∗, L∗)
max
γ,δ,L
b>γ − a>δ − L (M.3U)
s.t. γ>f − δ>g ≤ L ∀(f , g) ∈ C
4: Given (γ∗, δ∗, L∗), solve the following lower level MILP
and get an optimal solution (S∗,f ∗, g∗, z∗)
max
S,f ,g,I
z := γ>f − δ>g − L (M.3L)
s.t. φm(α
>
mS − pm) ≥M(Im − 1)
φm(α
>
mS − pm) ≤MIm
fm ≤ φm(α>mS − pm)−M(Im − 1)
fm ≤MIm
Im ∈ {0, 1} ∀m ∈ {1, ...,M}
gn ≥ ψn(β>nS − qn)
gn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N}
5: C ← C ∪ (f ∗, g∗), z ← z∗
6: return γ∗ and δ∗
It remains to show the set of constraints related to any buy order m in M.3L is
equivalent to fm ≤ max{φm(α>mS − pm), 0}. This set of constraints implements the
big-M trick (where M is a large constant, say 106) on a binary decision variable
Im to linearize the max function. Consider each case of Im ∈ {0, 1}. We have
φm(α
>
mS − pm) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Im = 1 and fm = φm(α>mS − pm) ⇐⇒ Im = 1.
Therefore, when M.3L returns an objective value of zero, the constraint 4.2 is
satisfied for all S, and Algorithm 3 returns a valid match that optimizes for overall
profit.
Theorem 4.5. Given a combinatorial options market instance (φ,α,p, b,ψ,β, q,a),
Algorithm 3 returns the optimal clearing defined in M.2.
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4.6 Experiments: OptionMetrics Data
We first show on real options data that our mechanism finds matches that the
current independent-market design cannot and provides more competitive bid and
ask prices.
We conduct empirical analyses on the OptionMetrics dataset provided by the
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), which contains real-market option prices
(i.e., the best bid and ask) for each options market defined by an underlying asset,
an option type, a strike price, and an expiration date.4 We choose options data on 30
stocks that compose the DJI, as these stocks have actively traded options that cover
a wide range of strike values. There are a total of 25,502 distinct options markets for
stocks in DJI on January 23, 2019, yielding an average of 850 separate markets for
each security. The offered options cover around 12 expiration dates for each stock, and
thus about 70 markets that have different combinations of types and strikes within
the same security and expiration date.
We use the proposed mechanism M.1 to consolidate options markets, reducing the
original 25,502 markets to a total of 366 markets, each associated with one underlying
security and expiration. We are interested in matching orders (i.e., finding arbitrage
opportunities) that fail to transact under the independent market design, computing
new option quotes implied by our consolidated arbitrage-free markets, and comparing
the case of restricting L to 0 to the case of having L as a decision variable. Detailed
statistics for options of each stock are available in the Appendix B.3.
Out of the 366 consolidated options markets, we spot arbitrage opportunities
in 150 markets, among which 94 cases make profits at contract transaction (e.g.,
Example 4.1) and the remaining 56 incur expenses for higher payoffs upon option
expiration (e.g., Example 4.2). Matches with non-negative L make an average profit
of $1.03, with a maximum of $9.64, and matches with negative L imply an average
interest rate of 0.7%, with a maximum at 2.02%. When restrict L to 0, we are able
to find arbitrage in 74 markets.
The remaining 216 markets are arbitrage-free (for the flexible L case), which
capture a total of 16,088 option series and 32,176 orders. We find that approximately
49% of the orders belong to the frontier set. Using these orders to derive the most
competitive bids and asks, we find that the bid-ask spreads can be reduced by 73%,
from an average of 80 cents for each option series in the independent markets to 21
4Our data includes American options that allow exercise before expiration. In practice, American
options are almost always more profitable to sell than to exercise early (Singh 2019). In experiments,
we ignore early exercise and treat them as European options.
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cents in consolidated options markets. For the case of L set to 0, the bid-ask spreads
can be reduced by 52%. These results show that aggregating independently-traded
options leads to a more efficient market, with tightened bid-ask spreads and matches
of options across types and strikes.
4.7 Experiments: Synthetic Combinatorial Options Market
Since there is no combinatorial option traded in financial markets, we evaluate the
proposed algorithm on synthetic combinatorial options, with prices calibrated using
real-market standard options written on each related underlying security.5 We are
interested in quantifying the performance of Algorithm 3 in parametrically different
markets that vary in the likelihood of matching, the number of orders, and the number
of underlying assets.
4.7.1 Generate Synthetic Orders
We generate combinatorial options markets of U underlying assets. Each combina-
torial option is written on a combination of two stocks, Si and Sj, randomly selected





asset pairs. Weights for
the selected assets, wi and wj, are picked uniformly randomly from {±1,±2, . . . ,±9}
and are processed to be relatively prime.
We generate strikes and premium prices using real-market standard options data
related to each individual asset to realistically capture the value of the synthetic
portfolio. Let Ki and Kj respectively denote the set of strike prices offered by standard
options on each selected asset. We generate the strike K by first sampling two strike
values, ki ∼ Ki and kj ∼ Kj, and scaling them by the associated weights to get
K = wiki + wjkj. If K is positive, we have a call option. Instead, if K is negative,
we generate a put option and update the strike to −K and weights to −wi and −wj
to comply with the representation and facilitate payoff computations.
We randomly assign each option to the buy or sell side of the market, and generate
a bid or an ask price accordingly. Similar to the price quote procedure in Section 4.4,
we derive the bid b by calculating the maximum gain of selling a set of standard
options whose payoff is dominated by the combinatorial option of interest and the ask
a by calculating the minimum cost of buying a set of standard options whose payoff
dominates the generated option. We add noises to the derived prices to control the
5We adopt the same dataset as Section 4.6, and use standard options that expire on Febuary 1,
2019, to calibrate order prices for generated combinatorial options.
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(a) Vary noise η added to order prices in
markets with U = 4 and norders = 150.






















(b) Vary number of orders norders in
markets with U = 4 and η = 2−4.






















(c) Vary size of underlying assets U in
markets with norders = 150 and η = 2
−4.
Figure 4.3: Results of using Mechanism M.2 to match orders in synthetic combinato-
rial options markets. The number of generated constraints (solid lines) and the net
profits (dashed line), as the markets vary in price noise, the number of orders, and
the size of underlying assets. Red lines represent markets that offer a restrictive set
of asset pairs, which covers all U underlying assets.
likelihood of matching in a market, and set final prices to b(1 + ζ) or a(1− ζ), where
ζ ∼ [0, η] and η is a noise parameter.
4.7.2 Evaluation
We explore a range of markets that vary in price noise, the number of orders,
and the number of underlying assets. For each market, we measure the number of
iterations (i.e., the number of constraints generated) that Algorithm 3 runs to find an
exact optimal clearing and the net profit made from the trade. For all experiments,
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we show results averaged over 40 simulated markets, with the error bars denoted one
standard error around the means.
We first validate that as noises added to the derived bids and asks increase, the
likelihood of matching in our simulated combinatorial options market becomes higher.
We generate markets with four underlying assets (arbitrarily selected from the 30
stocks in DJI) and 150 synthetic combinatorial options orders, and vary the noise
η ∈ {2−7, 2−6, 2−5, 2−4, 2−3}. Figure 4.3(a) plots the averaged results. As expected,
the net profit made from the optimal match increases, as η increases. Moreover,
we find that as the matching probability increases, the number of iterations that
Algorithm 3 takes to find the optimal solution consistently decreases. This makes
sense as intuitively, in thin markets where few trades are likely to occur, the lower-
level MILP will keep coming up with S values to refute a large number of matching
proposals until convergence.
Figure 4.3(b) further quantifies the change in iteration numbers and net profits,
as we vary the number of combinatorial options orders. We fix these markets to
have four underlying assets with a price noise of 2−4. As we see from Figure 4.3(b),
as a market aggregates more orders, transactions are more likely to happen, leading
to larger net profits. We also find that the number of generated constraints grows
(sub)linear in the number of orders. Since different S values are generated to define
payoffs of distinct options and the number of distinct options increases sublinear in
the number of total orders, the rate of increase in the number of iterations tends to
decrease as a market aggregates more orders.
Finally, we evaluate how Algorithm 3 scales to markets with increasingly larger
numbers of underlying assets. In this case, as the dimension of S becomes large, the
number of asset-value combinations grows exponentially. Figure 4.3(c) (black lines)
demonstrates a much faster increase in the number of iterations and a steady decrease
in the net profit.6 It suggests that as the market provides a large set of underlying as-
sets (e.g., all 30 stocks in DJI), the thin market problem may still arise even when the
mechanism facilitates matching options written on different combinations of underly-






likely to be traded. In real markets, investors may be more interested in certain asset
pairs, trading them more frequently than the others. Based on such observations, a
market can specify a prescriptive set of asset pairs, P , which covers the U assets, for
6We report average runtimes to quantify the impact of increasing constraints. The average times
(in seconds) that Algorithm 3 computes the optimal match are 20, 153, 233, 297, 344, and 358 for
the respective markets with U ∈ {2, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20}.
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traders to choose from and specify custom weights. For the experiments, we choose
|P| = U . Figure 4.3(c) (red lines) shows that such prescriptive design may indeed
attenuate the thin market problem.
4.8 Discussion
When related financial markets run independently, traders remove arbitrage and
close bid-ask spreads themselves. Our OptionMetrics experiments show that they
do so suboptimally. Profits can flow to agents with computational power and no
information. Our design instead rewards informed agents only and reduces the arms
race among traders, by putting computational power into the exchange.
This chapter has examined a fully expressive combinatorial options market that
allows all linear combinations of assets. One next step is to explore naturally struc-
tured markets where combinations are limited to components in a graph of underlying
assets. One special case is a hierarchical graph (Guo and Pennock 2009), for example,




Log-time Prediction Markets for Interval
Securities
This chapter studies the design of a prediction market to recover a complete
and fully general probability distribution over a random variable. Traders bet on
outcomes by buying and selling interval securities that pay $1 if the outcome falls
into an interval and $0 otherwise. The market takes the form of a central automated
market maker and allows traders to express interval endpoints of arbitrary precision.
This chapter presents two designs in both of which market operations take time
logarithmic in the number of intervals (that traders distinguish), providing the first
computationally efficient market for a continuous variable. The first design repli-
cates the popular logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), but operates exponentially
faster than a standard LMSR by exploiting its modularity properties to construct a
balanced binary tree and decompose computations along the tree nodes. The second
design features two or more parallel LMSR market makers that mediate submarkets
of increasingly fine-grained outcome partitions. This design remains computationally
efficient for all operations, including arbitrage removal across submarkets. It adds
two additional benefits for the market designer : (1) the ability to express utility for
information at various resolutions by assigning different liquidity values, and (2) the
ability to guarantee a true constant bounded loss by geometrically decreasing the
liquidity in each submarket.
5.1 Introduction
Consider a one-dimensional random variable, such as the opening value of the
S&P 500 index on December 17, 2021. We design a market for trading interval se-
curities corresponding to predictions that the outcome will fall into some specified
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interval, say between 2957.60 and 3804.59, implemented as binary contracts that pay
out $1 if the outcome falls in the interval and $0 otherwise. We are interested in
designing automated market makers to facilitate a fully expressive market computa-
tionally efficiently. Traders can select custom interval endpoints of arbitrary precision
corresponding to a continuous outcome space, whereas the market maker will always
offer to buy or sell any interval security at some price.
A form of interval security called the condor spread is common in financial options
markets, with significant volume of trade. Each condor spread involves trading four
different options,1 and financial options offered by the market may only support a
limited subset of approximate intervals. For example, as of this writing, S&P 500
options expiring on December 17, 2021, distinguish 56 strike prices, allowing the pur-
chase of around 1500 distinct intervals of minimum width 25. Moreover, as discussed
in Chapter 4, each strike price trades independently despite the logical constraints
on their relative values, and thus it will require time linear in the number of offered
strike prices to remove arbitrage.
Outside traditional financial markets, the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR)
market maker (Hanson 2003, 2007) has been used to elicit information through the
trade of interval securities. The Gates Hillman Prediction Market at Carnegie Mellon
University operated LMSR on 365 outcomes, representing 365 days of one year, to
forecast the opening time of the new computer science building (Othman and Sand-
holm 2010). Traders could bet on different intervals by choosing a start and an end
date. A similar market2 was later launched at the University of Texas at Austin, us-
ing a liquidity-sensitive variation of LMSR (Othman, Pennock, Reeves, and Sandholm
2013). Moreover, LMSR has been deployed to predict product-sales levels (Plott and
Chen 2002), instructor ratings (Chakraborty et al. 2013), and political events (Hanson
1999).
LMSR has two limitations that prevent its scaling to markets with a continuous
outcome space. First, LMSR’s worst-case loss can grow unbounded if traders select
intervals with prior probability approaching zero (Gao, Chen, and Pennock 2009).
Second, standard implementations of LMSR operations run in time linear in the
number of outcomes or distinct future values traders define—in our case, arbitrarily
many. The constant-log-utility and other barrier-function-based market makers (Chen
and Pennock 2007; Othman and Sandholm 2012) feature constant bounded loss,
1A call option written on an underlying stock with strike price K and expiration date T pays
max{S −K, 0}, where S is the opening value of the stock on T . For example, 25 shares of “$1 iff
[2650,2775]” ≈ max{S − 2650, 0} −max{S − 2675, 0} −max{S − 2750, 0}+ max{S − 2775, 0}.
2www.cs.utexas.edu/news/2012/research-corner-gates-building-prediction-market
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but still suffer the second limitation regarding computational intractability. Thus,
previous markets feature a relatively small set of predetermined intervals and run in
time linear in the number of supported outcomes, limiting the ability to aggregate
high-precision trades and elicit the full distribution of a continuous random variable.
In this chapter, we propose two automated market makers that perform exponen-
tially faster than the standard LMSR and previous designs. Market operations (i.e.,
price, cost, and buy) can be executed in time logarithmic in the number of distinct
intervals traded, or linear in the number of bits describing the outcome space. The
first market maker calculates LMSR exactly, but employs a balanced binary tree to
implement interval queries and trades. We show that the normalization constant of
LMSR—a key quantity in its price and cost function—can be calculated recursively
via local computations on the balanced tree. The work here contributes to the rich lit-
erature that aims to overcome the worst-case #P-hardness of LMSR pricing (Chen et
al. 2008) by exploiting the outcome space structure and limiting expressivity (Chen,
Fortnow, Nikolova, and Pennock 2007; Chen, Goel, and Pennock 2008; Guo and
Pennock 2009; Laskey et al. 2018; Xia and Pennock 2011).
The second market maker works by maintaining parallel LMSR submarkets that
adopt different liquidity parameters and offer interval securities at various resolutions.
We show that liquidity parameters can be chosen to guarantee a constant bounded
loss independent of market precision, and prices can be kept coherent efficiently by
removing arbitrages across submarkets. We demonstrate through agent-based simu-
lation that our second design enjoys more flexible liquidity choices to facilitate the
information-gathering objective: it can get close to the “best of both worlds” displayed
by coarse and fine LMSR markets, with prices converging fast at both resolutions re-
gardless of the traders’ information structure.
The two proposed designs, to our knowledge, are the first to simultaneously achieve
expressiveness and computational efficiency. As both market makers facilitate trading
intervals at arbitrary precision, they can elicit any probability distribution over a con-
tinuous random variable that can be practically encoded by a machine. Throughout
this chapter, we use the S&P 500 index value as a running example, but the frame-
work is generic and can handle any one-dimensional discrete or continuous variable,
for example, the number of coronavirus infections by the end of the year, the date
when a vaccine will be released, the landfall point of a hurricane along a coastline, or
the number of tickets sold in the first week of a new movie release.
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5.2 Formal Setting
This section first reviews cost-function-based market making (Abernethy, Chen,
and Vaughan 2011; Chen and Pennock 2007), and then introduces interval markets.
5.2.1 Cost-Function-Based Market Making
Let Ω denote a finite set of outcomes, corresponding to mutually exclusive and
exhaustive states of the world. We are interested in eliciting expectations of binary
random variables φi : Ω → {0, 1}, indexed by i ∈ I, which model the occurrence of
various events, such as “S&P 500 will open between 2957.60 and 3804.59 on December
17, 2021 ”. Each variable φi is associated with a security that pays out φi(ω) when
the outcome ω ∈ Ω occurs, and thus φi is also called the payoff function. Binary
securities pay out $1 if the specified event occurs and $0 otherwise. The vector
(φi)i∈I is denoted φ. Traders trade bundles δ ∈ R|I| of security with a central market
maker, where positive entries in δ correspond to purchases and negative entries short
sales. A trader holding a bundle δ receives a payoff of δ · φ(ω), when ω occurs.
Following Abernethy, Chen, and Vaughan (2011) and Chen and Pennock (2007),
we assume that the market maker determines security prices using a convex and
differentiable potential function C : R|I| → R, called a cost function. The state of the
market is specified by a vector θ ∈ R|I|, listing the number of shares of each security
sold by the market maker so far. A trader who wants to buy a bundle δ in the market
state θ must pay C(θ + δ) − C(θ) to the market maker, after which the new state
becomes θ + δ.
The vector of instantaneous prices in the corresponding state θ is p(θ) := ∇C(θ).
Its entries can be interpreted as the market’s collective estimates of E[φi]: a trader
can make an expected profit by buying (at least a small amount of) the security i
if she believes that E[φi] is larger than the instantaneous price pi(θ) = ∂C(θ)/∂θi,
and by selling if she believes the opposite. Therefore, risk neutral traders with suf-
ficient budgets maximize their expected profits by moving the price vector to match
their expectation of φ. Any expected payoff must lie in the convex hull of the set
{φ(ω)}ω∈Ω, which we denote M and call a coherent price space with its elements
referred to as coherent price vectors.
We assume that the cost function satisfies two standard properties: no arbitrage
and bounded loss. The no-arbitrage property requires that as long as all outcomes ω
are possible, there be no market transaction with a guaranteed profit for a trader.
In this study, we use the fact that C is arbitrage-free if and only if it yields price
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vectors p(θ) that are always coherent (Abernethy, Chen, and Vaughan 2011). The







− C(θ) + C(0)
)
, meaning the largest difference, across
all possible trading sequences and outcomes, between the amount that the market
maker has to pay the traders (once the outcome is realized) and the amount that
the market maker has collected (when securities were traded). The property requires
that this worst-case loss be a priori bounded by a constant.
5.2.2 Complete Markets and LMSR
In a complete market, we have I = Ω. Securities are indicators of individual
outcomes, φi(ω) = 1{ω = i}, where 1{·} denotes the binary indicator. We denote
each market security as φω. A risk-neutral trader is incentivized to move the price of
each security φω to her estimate of E[φω] = P[ω], which is her subjective probability
of ω occurring. Thus, traders can express arbitrary probability distributions over Ω.
This chapter considers variants of LMSR (Hanson 2003) for a complete market.
It has the cost function and prices of the form










where b is the liquidity parameter, controlling how fast the price moves in response to
trading and the worst-case loss of the market maker, which equals b log |Ω| (Hanson
2003).
The securities in a complete market can be used to express bets on any event
E. Specifically, one share of a security for the event E can be represented by the
indicator bundle 1E ∈ RΩ with entries 1E,ω = 1{ω ∈ E}. We refer to this bundle as
the bundle security for event E. The immediate price of the bundle 1E in the state
θ is










The cost of buying the bundle s1E, or sometimes referred to as “the cost of s shares
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of 1E”, is a function of pE(θ) and s





















1− pE(θ) + es/bpE(θ)
)
.
We write Ec for the complementary eventEc = Ω\E, and use the fact pE(θ) + pEc(θ) = 1,
which follows from Eq. (5.2).
5.2.3 Interval Securities over [0, 1)
This chapter considers betting on outcomes within an interval [0, 1). Our approach
generalizes to outcomes that are in any [α, β) ⊆ [−∞,∞) by applying any increasing
transformation F : [α, β)→ [0, 1). We assume that the outcome ω is specified with K
bits, meaning that there areN = 2K outcomes with Ω = {j/N : j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N−1}}.
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will discuss how the assumption of pre-specified bit precision can
be removed.
Example 5.1 (Complete market for S&P 500). Consider a complete market for the
S&P 500 opening price on December 17, 2021, by setting N = 219 = 524,288. The
resulting complete market is I = {0, 0.01, . . . , 5242.86, 5242.87}, where we cap prices
at $5242.87 (i.e., larger prices are treated as $5242.87). The transformed outcome is
then ω = ω′/N , where ω′ is the S&P 500 price in cents.
In the outcome space Ω, we would like to enable price and cost queries as well
as buying and selling of bundle securities for the interval events I = [α, β) for any
α, β ∈ Ω ∪ {1}.3 For cost-based markets, sell transactions are equivalent to buying
a negative amount of shares, so we design algorithms for three operations: price(I),
cost(I, s), and buy(I, s), where I is the interval event and s the number of shares.
A naive implementation of price and cost following Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3) would be
linear in N . In this chapter, we propose to implement these operations in time that
is logarithmic in N .
3Throughout this study, we operate in the outcome space discretized to events ω ∈ Ω specified
with K bits, but would like to indeed discuss interval events [a, b) that include reals of arbitrary
precisions. Since, in measure theory, events are subsets of the outcome space, what we mean here
are events of form [a, b) ∩ Ω.
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5.3 A Log-time LMSR Market Maker
This section designs a data structure, referred to as an LMSR tree, which resembles
an interval tree (Cormen, Leiserson, and Rivest 1999, Section 15.3), but includes
additional annotations to support LMSR calculations. We first define the LMSR
tree, and show that it can facilitate market operations in time logarithmic in the
number of distinct intervals that traders define.
5.3.1 An LMSR Tree for [0, 1)
An LMSR tree T is represented by a full binary tree, where each node z has either
no children (when z is a leaf) or exactly two children, denoted left(z) and right(z)
(when z is an inner node).
Definition 5.1 (LMSR Tree). An LMSR tree is a full binary tree, where each node
z is annotated with an interval Iz = [αz, βz) with αz, βz ∈ Ω ∪ {1}, a height hz ≥ 0,
a quantity sz ∈ R that records the number of bundle securities sold associated with
Iz, and a partial normalization constant Sz ≥ 0. An LMSR tree satisfies
• Binary-search property : Iroot = [0, 1), and for inner node z,
αz = αleft(z) < βleft(z) = αright(z) < βright(z) = βz.
• Height balance: hz = 0 for leaves, and for inner node z,
hz = 1 + max{hleft(z), hright(z)}, |hleft(z) − hright(z)| ≤ 1.








The binary-search property helps to find the unique leaf that contains any ω ∈ Ω
by descending from root and choosing left or right in each node based on whether
ω < βleft(z) or ω ≥ βleft(z). The node heights serve to maintain the height-balance
property, ensuring that the path length from root to any leaf is at most O(log n) where
n is the number of leaves of the tree (Knuth 1998). We adopt an AVL tree (Adel′son-
Vel′skĭı and Landis 1962) at the basis of our LMSR tree, but other balanced binary-
search trees (e.g., red-black trees or splay trees) could also be used.
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To facilitate LMSR computations, we maintain a scalar quantity sz ∈ R for each
node z, which records the number of bundle securities associated with Iz sold by the
market maker. Therefore, the market state and its components for each individual
























We decompose the computation of the above normalization constant along the nodes










It enables the following recursive relationship, which we refer to as partial-normalization
correctness—a key property that is at the core of implementing price and buy:
Sz =
esz/b · (βz − αz) if z is a leaf,esz/b · (Sleft(z) + Sright(z)) otherwise. (5.7)
Based on the LMSR tree construction, we implement the following operations for
any interval I = [α, β):
• price(I, T ) returns the price of bundle security for I;
• cost(I, s, T ) returns the cost of s shares of bundle security for I;
• buy(I, s, T ) updates T to reflect the purchase of s shares of bundle security for I.
In order to implement cost, it suffices to implement price by Eq. (5.3). Since the price
of [α, β) can be obtained from prices for [α, 1) and [β, 1), i.e., p[α,β)(θ) = p[α,1)(θ) −
p[β,1)(θ), we implement price for intervals of the form [α, 1). Similarly, buying s
shares of [α, β) is equivalent to first buying s shares of [α, 1) and then buying (−s)
shares of [β, 1), as the market ends up in the same state θ + s1[α,β). We implement
4For simplicity, we write ω ∈ z to mean ω ∈ Iz and z′ ⊆ z to mean Iz′ ⊆ Iz. Thus, z′ ⊆ z
corresponds to z′ being a descendant of z in T .
5The 1/N scale in Eq. (5.6) leads to a natural interpretation of Sz, when z is a leaf.
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price and buy for one-sided intervals I = [α, 1), and the remaining operations will
follow.
5.3.2 Price Queries
Consider price queries for I = [α, 1). Let vals(T ) = {αz : z ∈ T} denote the set of
distinct left endpoints in the tree nodes. We start by assuming that α ∈ vals(T ), and
later relax this assumption. We proceed to calculate pI(θ) in two steps. First, we
construct a set of nodes Z whose associated intervals Iz are disjoint and cover I. To
achieve this, we conduct a binary search for α, putting in Z all of the right children
of the visited nodes that have αz > α, as well as the final node with αz = α. Recall
that n is the number of leaves of the LMSR tree, and the height balance implies that
Z has a cardinality of O(log n). The resulting set Z satisfies pI(θ) =
∑
z∈Z pIz(θ).
Second, we determine pIz(θ) for each node z ∈ Z. Starting from the LMSR price










































In Eq. (5.8), we expand θω using Eq. (5.4). In Eq. (5.9), we use the fact that any
node z′ with a non-empty intersection with z (i.e., Iz ∩ Iz′ 6= ∅) must be either a
descendant or an ancestor of z as a direct consequence of the binary-search property.
The product Pz in Eq. (5.10) iterates over z
′ on the path from root to z, and thus
can be calculated along the binary-search path.
We now handle the case when α 6∈ vals(T ). After the leaf z on the search path is
reached, we have αz < α < βz. Instead of expanding the tree, we conceptually create
two children of z: z′ and z′′ with Iz′ = [αz, α) and Iz′′ = [α, βz), and add z
′′ in Z.
Since θω is constant across ω ∈ Iz, we obtain pIz′′ (θ) =
βz−α
βz−αz · pIz(θ) by Eq. (5.2).
Summarizing the foregoing procedures yields Algorithm 4, which simultaneously
constructs the set Z and calculates the prices pIz(θ). Since it suffices to go down a
single path and only perform constant-time computation in each node, the resulting
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algorithm runs in time O(log nvals), where nvals denotes the number of distinct values
appeared as endpoints of intervals in all the executed transactions. We defer complete
proofs from this chapter to Appendix C.1.
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 4 implements price(I, T ) in time O(log nvals).
Algorithm 4 Query price of an interval I = [α, 1).
Input: Interval I = [α, 1) with α ∈ Ω. LMSR tree T , with nodes z annotated
with Iz = [αz, βz), hz, sz and Sz.
Output: Price of bundle security for I.
1: Initialize z ← root, P ← 1, price← 0
2: while αz 6= α and z is not a leaf do
3: P ← Pesz/b
4: if α < αright(z) then
5: price← price + PSright(z)/Sroot
6: z ← left(z)
7: else
8: z ← right(z)
9: return price + βz−α
βz−αz · PSz/Sroot
5.3.3 Buy Transactions
We next implement buy([α, 1), s, T ) while maintaining the LMSR tree proper-
ties. The main challenge here is to simultaneously maintain partial-normalization
correctness and height balance. We address this by adapting AVL-tree rebalancing.
We begin by considering the case α ∈ vals(T ). Similar to price queries, we conduct
binary search for α to obtain the set of nodes Z that covers I = [α, 1). We update
the values of sz across z ∈ Z by adding s, and obtain T ′ that has the same structure
as T with the updated share quantities
s′z =
sz + s if z ∈ Zsz otherwise.










s1Iz = θ(T ) + s1I .
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We then rely on the recursive relationship defined in Eq. (5.7) to update the partial
normalization constants Sz. It suffices to update the ancestors of the nodes z ∈ Z,
all of which lie along the search path to α, and each update requires constant time.
When α 6∈ vals(T ), we split the leaf z that contains α ∈ [αz, βz) before adding
shares to right(z). However, this may violate the height-balance property. Similar to
the AVL insertion algorithm (Knuth 1998, Section 6.2.3), we fix any imbalance by
means of rotations, as we go back along the search path. Rotations are operations that
modify small portions of the tree, and at most two rotations are needed to rebalance
the tree (Adel′son-Vel′skĭı and Landis 1962).
We next show that in each rotation, only a constant number of nodes will require
updates to preserve the partial-normalization correctness. There are two kinds of
rotations, depicted in Figure 5.1. The left rotation takes as input a node z, with
children denoted z1 and z23, and children of z23 denoted z2 and z3, and rearranges
these relationships by removing the node z23 and creating a node z12, such that z
now has children z12 and z3, and z12 has children z1 and z2. The right rotation is the
symmetric operation.
Figure 5.1: Left and right rotations with node z as an input. Depicted update
corresponds to the left rotation.
When performing rotations, we need to ensure that the node removal (i.e., removal
of z23 in left rotation and of z12 in right rotation) does not impact the market state.
We achieve this by moving the shares from the removed node into its children, so
at the time of removal it holds zero shares. The full procedure of RotateLeft is
described in Appendix Algorithm 8.
Lemma 5.2. A rotation operation preserves partial-normalization correctness.
Algorithm 5 describes the buy operation, which takes time O(log nvals) thanks to
the height balance.
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm 5 implements buy(I, s, T ) in time O(log nvals).
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Algorithm 5 Buy s shares of bundle security for an interval I = [α, 1).
Input: Quantity s ∈ R and an interval I = [α, 1) with α ∈ Ω. LMSR tree T ,
with nodes z annotated with Iz = [αz, βz), hz, sz and Sz.
Output: Tree T updated to reflect the purchase of s shares of bundle security
for I.
1: Define subroutines:
NewLeaf(α0, β0): return a new leaf node z with
Iz = [α0, β0), hz = 0, sz = 0, Sz = (β0 − α0)
ResetInnerNode(z): reset hz and Sz based on the children of z
hz ← 1 + max{hleft(z), hright(z)}, Sz ← esz/b(Sleft(z) + Sright(z))
AddShares(z, s): increase the number of shares held in z by s
sz ← sz + s, Sz ← es/bSz
2: Initialize z ← root
3: while αz 6= α and z is not a leaf do . add s shares to z ∈ Z
4: if α < αright(z) then
5: AddShares(right(z), s)
6: z ← left(z)
7: else
8: z ← right(z)
9: if αz < α then . split the leaf z
10: left(z)← NewLeaf(αz, α), right(z)← NewLeaf(α, βz)
11: z ← right(z)
12: AddShares(z, s)
13: while z is not a root do . trace the binary-search path back
14: z ← par(z)
15: if |hleft(z) − hright(z)| ≥ 2 then . restore height balance
16: Rotate z and possibly one of its children
(details in Appendix C.1.2 Algorithms 8)
17: ResetInnerNode(z) . update hz and Sz
Remarks. We have shown that price, cost and buy operations can all be imple-
mented in time O(log nvals), which is bounded above by the log of the number of buy
transactionsO(log nbuy) as well as the bit precision of the outcomeO(logN) = O(K).6
We note that none of the operations require the knowledge of K, so the market in fact
supports queries with arbitrary precision. However, the market precision does affect
the worst-case loss bound for the market maker, which is O(logN) = O(K). The
next section presents a different construction, which achieves a constant worst-case
loss independent of the market precision.
6Clearly, nvals ≤ 2nbuy with each buy transaction introducing at most two new endpoint values.
The value of nvals is also bounded above by N + 1 since the interval endpoints are always in Ω∪{1}.
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5.4 A Multi-Resolution Linearly Constrained Market Maker
This section introduces the second design, referred to as the multi-resolution lin-
early constrained market maker (multi-resolution LCMM). The design is based on
the LMSR, but it enables more flexibility by assigning two or more parallel LMSRs
with different liquidity parameters to orchestrate submarkets that offer interval secu-
rities at different resolutions. However, running submarkets independently can create
arbitrage opportunities, as any interval expressible in a coarser market can also be
expressed in a finer one. To maintain coherent prices, we design a matrix that im-
poses linear constraints to tie market prices among different submarkets to support
the efficient removal of any arbitrage opportunity. We first define the multi-resolution
LCMM and its properties, and show that price, cost and buy can be implemented
in time O(logN).
5.4.1 A Multi-Resolution LCMM for [0, 1)
5.4.1.1 A Multi-Resolution Market
A binary search tree remains at the core construction of our multi-resolution mar-
ket. Unlike a log-time LMSR that uses a self-balancing tree, it builds upon a static
one, where each level of the tree represents a submarket of intervals, forming a finer
and finer partition of [0, 1). We start with an example of a market that offers interval
securities at two resolutions.
Example 5.2 (Two-level market for [0, 1)). Consider a market composed of two
submarkets, indexed by Z1 = {11, 12} and Z2 = {21, 22, 23, 24}, which partition
[0, 1) into interval events at two levels of coarseness:






































The market provides six interval securities associated with the corresponding interval
events (i.e., I = I1
⊎
I2 and |I| = 6). We index the securities by z ∈ Z, where
Z = Z1
⊎
Z2 = {11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24}.
We extend Example 5.2 to multiple resolutions. We represent the initial indepen-
dent submarkets with a complete binary tree T ∗ of depth K, which corresponds to
the bit precision of the outcome ω. Let Z∗ denote the set of nodes of T ∗ and Zk for
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} the set of nodes at each level. Z0 contains the root associated with
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Iroot = [0, 1), and each consecutive level contains the children of nodes from the previ-
ous level, which split their corresponding parent intervals in half. Thus, level k parti-
tions [0, 1) into 2k intervals of size 2−k and the final level ZK contains N = 2K leaves.
We index interval securities by nodes, with their payoffs defined by φz(ω) = 1{ω ∈
Iz}. We partition securities into submarkets corresponding to levels, i.e., Ik = Zk for
k ≤ K, where |Ik| = 2k and I =
⊎
k≤K Ik. For each submarket, we define the LMSR
cost function Ck with a separate liquidity parameter bk > 0:






5.4.1.2 A Linearly Constrained Market Maker
Following the above multi-resolution construction, the overall market has a direct-
sum cost C̃(θ) =
∑
k≤K Ck(θk), which corresponds to pricing securities in each block
Ik independently using Ck. However, as there are logical dependencies between se-
curities in different levels, independent pricing may lead to incoherent prices among
submarkets and create arbitrage opportunities.
Example 5.3 (Arbitrage in a two-level market). Continuing Example 5.2, we define





; C2(θ2) = log
(
eθ21 + eθ22 + eθ23 + eθ24
)
.
The direct-sum market C̃(θ) = C1(θ1) + C2(θ2) gives rise to incoherent prices. For


























This violates the no-arbitrage property that requires P[I11] = P[I21] + P[I22] and
P[I12] = P[I23] + P[I24] under any probability distribution over Ω. We specify the
linear price constraints µ11 − µ21 − µ22 = 0 and µ12 − µ23 − µ24 = 0 by the following
vectors
a1 = (1, 0,−1,−1, 0, 0)> and a2 = (0, 1, 0, 0,−1,−1)>,
and refer A = (a1 a2) ∈ R|I|×|J | as the constraint matrix of the two-level market,
where J denotes the set of interval events associated with inner nodes, i.e., J = I\IK .
We extend Example 5.3 to specify price constraints in a multi-resolution market
100
to achieve no arbitrage. Recall that M denotes a coherent price space, where any
expected payoff lies in the convex hull of {φ(ω)}ω∈Ω. It is always polyhedral and
can be described by a set of linear inequalities (Dud́ık, Lahaie, and Pennock 2012).
Arbitrage opportunities arise whenever prices fall outside the set of coherent prices
M (Abernethy, Chen, and Vaughan 2011). For the multi-resolution market, we
specify a set of homogeneous linear equalities describing a superset of M. Equalities
are indexed by j ∈ J and are described by a matrix A ∈ R|I|×|J |, such that
M⊆ {µ ∈ R|I| : A>µ = 0}. (5.12)
We design the constraint matrix A to ensure that any pair of submarkets is price
coherent, meaning that any interval event I ⊆ Ω gets the same price on all levels that




µz for any l < k ≤ K.
To facilitate the implementation in a binary tree, we further tie the price of y to the
















This design turns out to be more algorithmically convenient to restore price consis-
tency (as we will see in Section 5.4.3).
Now we can formally define the constraint matrix A. Let Y∗ = Z∗\ZK be the
set of inner nodes of T ∗ and let level(z) denote the level of a node z. The matrix
A ∈ R|Z∗|×|Y∗| contains the constraints from Eq. (5.13) across all y ∈ Y∗:
Azy =

Blevel(z) if z = y,
−blevel(z) if z ⊂ y,
0 otherwise.
(5.14)
We refer to the linearly constrained market maker with the matrix A as the multi-
resolution LCMM. The derivation above shows that the constraints in the matrix A
are necessary to assure no arbitrage. The next theorem shows that they are also
sufficient. The proof shows that consecutive levels are coherent, which by transitivity
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implies that the overall price vector is coherent (see Appendix C.1.3).
Theorem 5.4. A multi-resolution LCMM is arbitrage-free.
We next show that the multi-resolution LCMM also enjoys the bounded-loss prop-
erty. For a suitable choice of liquidities, such as bk = O(1/k2.01), it can achieve a con-
stant worst-case loss bound. The proof uses the fact that the overall loss is bounded
by the sum of losses of level markets, which are at most bk log |Zk| = kbk log 2.
Theorem 5.5. Let {bk}∞k=1 be a sequence of positive numbers such that
∑∞
k=1 kbk =
B∗ for some finite B∗. Then the multi-resolution LCMM with liquidity parameters
bk for k ≤ K guarantees the worst-case loss of the market maker of at most B∗ log 2,
regardless of the outcome precision K.
Arbitrage opportunities appear if the price of bundle aj differs from zero, where
aj denotes the jth column of A. Traders profit by buying a positive quantity of aj
if its price is negative, and selling otherwise. Thus, the constraint matrix A gives a
recipe on arbitrage removals. We provide some intuition via the example below.
Example 5.4 (Arbitrage removal by a two-level LCMM). Continue Example 5.3. we
have prices p̃(θ) violate the constraint matrix A, i.e., a>1 p̃(θ) = p̃11(θ) − p̃21(θ) −
p̃22(θ) = 0.5 − 0.6 6= 0. The constraint vector a1 reveals a profitable arbitrage
opportunity: buy the security φ11 (at the initial price 0.5) and simultaneously sell
securities φ21 and φ22 (at the initial price 0.6). This will increase the price of φ11 and
decrease the prices of φ21 and φ22. After a sufficiently large quantity s shares of φ11
is bought (and the same quantities of φ21 and φ22 are sold), a
>
1 p̃(θ̃) = 0 is achieved
in a new state θ̃ = θ + sa1 = θ + Aη, where η := (s, 0)
>.
Therefore, after each update of θ, an LCMM who follows the matrix A can auto-
matically find a new state θ̃ = θ+ sa1 + ta2 = θ+ Aη where η := (s, t)
>, such that
a>1 p̃(θ̃) = 0 and a
>
2 p̃(θ̃) = 0 hold.
We generalize Example 5.4 to the multi-resolution market. Formally, an LCMM
is described by the cost function
C(θ) = inf
η∈R|J |
C̃(θ + Aη). (5.15)
It relies on the direct-sum cost C̃, but with each trader purchase δ that causes in-
consistent prices, an LCMM automatically seeks the most advantageous cost for the
trader by buying bundles Aδarb on the trader’s behalf to remove arbitrage. Trader
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purchases are accumulated as the state θ, and automatic purchases made by the
LCMM are accumulated as Aη.
We note that the purchase of bundle Aδarb has no effect on the trader’s pay-
off, since (Aδarb)
>φ(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω thanks to Eq. (5.12) and the fact that
φ(ω) ∈ M. However, the purchase of Aδarb can lower the cost, so optimizing
over δarb benefits the traders, while maintaining the same worst-case loss guaran-
tee for the market maker as C̃ (Dud́ık, Lahaie, and Pennock 2012). Consider a
fixed θ and the corresponding η? minimizing Eq. (5.15). We calculate prices as
p(θ) = ∇C(θ) = ∇C̃(θ+Aη?). By the first order optimality, η? minimizes Eq. (5.15)




= 0. This means that A>p(θ) = 0, and thus ar-
bitrage opportunities expressed by A are completely removed by the LCMM cost
function C.
To implement an LCMM, we maintain the state θ̃ = θ + Aη in the direct-sum
market C̃. After updating θ to a new value θ′ = θ+ δ, we seek to find η′ = η + δarb
that removes all the arbitrage opportunities expressed by A. The resulting cost for
the trader is
C̃(θ′ + Aη′)− C̃(θ + Aη) = C̃(θ̃ + δ + Aδarb)− C̃(θ̃).
5.4.1.3 A Multi-Resolution LCMM Tree
We can now formally define the multi-resolution LCMM tree. The market state
of a multi-resolution LCMM is represented by vectors θ ∈ R|Z∗| and η ∈ R|Y∗|, whose
dimensions can be intractably large (e.g., on the order of 2K = N). However, since
each LCMM operation involves only a small set of coordinates of θ and η, we keep
track of these coordinates accessed so far by organizing an annotated subtree T of
T ∗, referred to as an LCMM tree.
Definition 5.2 (LCMM Tree). An LCMM tree T is a full binary tree, where each
node z is annotated with Iz = [αz, βz), θz ∈ R, ηz ∈ R, such that Iroot = [0, 1), and
for every inner node z:
αz = αleft(z), βleft(z) = αright(z) =
αz + βz
2
, βright(z) = βz.
The tree T contains the coordinates of θ and η accessed so far. Since θ and η
are initialized to zero, their remaining entries are zero. We write θ(T ) ∈ R|Z∗| and
η(T ) ∈ R|Y∗| for the vectors represented by T . To calculate prices, we maintain η(T )
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that minimizes Eq. (5.15), or equivalently η(T ) that satisfies A>p̃
(
θ(T ) + Aη(T )
)
=
0. If this property holds, we say that an LCMM tree T is coherent.
5.4.2 Price Queries
There are many ways to decompose an interval I in a multi-resolution market,
but they all yield the same price thanks to coherence. The no-arbitrage property also
guarantees that the price of [α, β) can be obtained by subtracting the price of [β, 1)
from [α, 1). Therefore, we focus on pricing one-sided intervals of the form I = [α, 1).
Let T be a coherent LCMM tree and θ := θ(T ) and η := η(T ) the vectors
represented by T . Let θ̃ = θ + Aη be the corresponding state in C̃, so the current
security prices are µ := p̃(θ̃). As before, we identify a set of nodes Z that covers I,
and then rely on price coherence to calculate each µz along the search path.
Assume that z is not a root node and we know the price of its parent. Let sib(z)













Eq. (5.16) follows by price coherence and Eq. (5.17) follows by the price calculation
in Eq. (5.1). Thus, we descend the search path to calculate each price µz, beginning
with µroot = 1. It remains to obtain θ̃z, which we follow the construction of A in
Eq. (5.14) to compute
θ̃z = θz +
∑
y∈Y∗

















} · µpar(z). (5.19)
Combining the described procedure yields Algorithm 6. The final line of the
algorithm addresses the case when the search ends in the leaf z with αz < α < βz.
7The factor exp{−
∑
y⊃z ηy} = exp{−
∑
y⊃sib(z) ηy} appears in both the numerator and the
denominator after plugging Eq. (5.18) to Eq. (5.17), so it cancels out.
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Rather than expanding the tree to its lowest level K, we use price coherence again:
since any strict descendant z′ ⊂ z on the path from z to a leaf node u ∈ ZK has
θz′ = ηz′ = 0 by market initialization, all leaf nodes have the same price. Therefore,
the price of [α, βz) equals
βz−α
βz−αz · µz.
The length of search path for α is prec(α), which denotes the bit precision of α,
defined as the smallest integer k such that α is an integer multiple of 2−k. As the
computation at each node only requires constant time, the time to price I = [α, 1) is
O(prec(α)), which is bounded above by O(K).
0 Let I = [α, 1), α ∈ Ω. Algorithm 6 implements price(I, T ) in time O(prec(α)).
Algorithm 6 Query price of an interval I = [α, 1).
Input: Interval I = [α, 1) with α ∈ Ω. Coherent LCMM tree T , with nodes z
annotated with Iz = [αz, βz), θz, ηz.
Output: Price of bundle security for I.
1: Initialize z ← root, µz ← 1, price← 0
2: while αz 6= α and z is not a leaf do
3: zl ← left(z), zr ← right(z), k ← level(zl)




µz, µzr ← erel+erµz . calculate prices by Eq. (5.19)
5: if α < αright(z) then
6: z ← zl, price← price + µzr
7: else
8: z ← zr
9: return price + βz−α
βz−αz · µz
5.4.3 Buy and Cost Operations
Different from LMSR, the cost query for a multi-resolution LCMM cannot be di-
rectly derived from prices. We instead augment buy to implement cost by executing
buy and then reverting all the changes. We focus on buy(I, s, T ) for I = [α, 1). By
buying s shares of [α, 1) and then (−s) shares of [β, 1), we obtain buying [α, β).
We summarize the procedure in Algorithm 7, which performs buy(I, s, T ) and
keeps track of cost(I, s, T ). Similar to price queries, we start with a set of nodes Z
that partition I, by searching for α and simultaneously calculating prices µz along
the way (lines 3–6).
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Algorithm 7 Buy s shares of bundle security for an interval I = [α, 1).
Input: Quantity s ∈ R and an interval I = [α, 1) with α ∈ Ω. Coherent LCMM
tree T , with nodes z annotated with Iz = [αz, βz), θz, ηz.
Output: Cost of s shares bundle security for I and the updated tree T .
1: Define subroutines:
NewLeaf(α0, β0): return a new leaf node z with
Iz = [α0, β0), θz = 0, ηz = 0
RemoveArbitrage(y, µother): restore price coherence among
submarkets k ≥ level(y) following Eq. (5.20) and update cost










tB`/b` + 1− µy, Sother = µothere−t + 1− µother
ηy ← ηy + t, µy ← µyetB`/b`/S, µy′ ← µy′/S
cost← cost + (b` logS) + (B` logSother)
AddShares(z, s): increase shares held in z by s, update cost, and
restore price coherence among submarkets k ≥ level(z)
Let ` = level(z), z′ = sib(z), µother = µz, S = µze
s/b` + 1− µz
θz ← θz + s
cost← cost + (b` logS)
µz ← µzes/b`/S, µz′ ← µz′/S
RemoveArbitrage(z, µother)
2: Initialize z ← root, µz ← 1, a global variable cost← 0
3: while αz 6= α do
4: if z is a leaf then
5: left(z)← NewLeaf(αz, 12(αz + βz)),
right(z)← NewLeaf(1
2
(αz + βz), βz)
6: Search for α and calculate µz (same as Algorithm 6 lines 3-8)
7: AddShares(z, s)
8: while z is not a root do . remove arbitrage up the search path
9: z′ ← sib(z), y ← par(z)
10: if z′ = right(y) then
11: AddShares(z′, s) . add shares to z ∈ Z
12: RemoveArbitrage(y, µz + µz′)
13: z ← y
14: return cost
We then proceed back up the search path, adding s shares to nodes within the
cover Z (lines 7–13). Consider one of such nodes y ∈ Z at level ` := level(y).
Increasing θy by s creates price incoherence between the submarket at level ` and
submarkets at all the other levels. We design RemoveArbitrage to remove any
arbitrage opportunity appeared between level ` and all lower levels with k > `. We
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show in Appendix C.1.6 Lemma C.2 that in order to restore coherence, it suffices to












where µother = µleft(y) +µright(y) records the price of y in all the lower levels. Similar to
Example 5.4, this key algorithmic step is enabled by the arbitrage bundle ay, which
corresponds to buying φy on the level ` while selling securities associated with all
descendants of y, with their shares appropriately weighted by the respective liquidity
values as specified in the constraint matrix A.
The market remains incoherent between ` and all upper levels k < `. Since the
updates have been localized to the subtree rooted at y, we use Lemma C.2 again to
update ηpar(y) and restore coherence among all levels k ≥ `− 1 (line 12). We continue
in this manner back along the path to root to restore a coherent market.
The algorithm also tracks the total cost of the buy transaction by evaluating
Eq. (5.3) in the component submarkets. Note that costs in all submarkets with k > `
can be evaluated simultaneously thanks to the restored coherence. As the design of
the constraint matrix A enables a gradual bottom-up removal of arbitrage (and a
closed-form solution for t), Algorithm 7 runs in time O(prec(α)).
Theorem 5.6. Let I = [α, 1), α ∈ Ω. Algorithm 7 implements a simultaneous
buy(I, s, T ) and cost(I, s, T ) in time O(prec(α)).
Remarks. In Algorithms 6 and 7, we assume that each node z can store a scalar µz,
which can be modified during the run to support price calculations but is disposed
afterwards. The only part of the proposed algorithms that depends on K are the
cumulative liquidities B` =
∑K
k=`+1 bk.
To remove such dependence, we can use B′` =
∑∞






k=1 bk. This has no impact on the correctness of our algorithms: if at a given
time the largest level in the tree T is L, we can simply view T as a multi-resolution
LCMM with K = L + 1 and liquidities b1, b2, . . . , bL, B
′
L. The last level K = L + 1
then corresponds to infinitely many mutually coherent markets {Ck}∞k=L+1. Thus,
a multi-resolution LCMM can achieve a constant loss bound regardless of K and
support market operations for I = [α, β) in time O(prec(α) + prec(β)).
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5.5 Discussion
This chapter has proposed two cost-function-based market makers that support
trading interval securities of arbitrary precision and execute market operations expo-
nentially faster than previous designs. This section discusses when we expect each
market maker to be empirically appropriate.
In short, the log-time LMSR enjoys better storage and runtime efficiency, whereas
the multi-resolution LCMM has more flexibility in its pricing strategies. While both
market makers gradually grow the trees upon each interval trade, the LMSR tree
enables a shorter search path thanks to its height-balance property. Thus, the log-
time LMSR would be more preferable especially when the designer expects betting
interest to be concentrated on a small set of intervals (i.e., the number of distinct
intervals traded would be much smaller than the size of nodes in an LCMM tree).
Despite its advantage in storage and runtime efficiency, the log-time LMSR faces
similar challenges as a standard LMSR in making design choices, such as setting a
suitable liquidity value or choosing a proper market resolution. Correctly setting
these parameters often requires a good estimate of trader interest even before trading
in the market starts.
The multi-resolution LCMM, on the other hand, grants more pricing flexibility and
liquidity attenuation to facilitate the designer’s information-gathering objective. For
example, an LMSR that operates at precision k = 4 with liquidity b can be represented
by an LCMM with the level liquidity values b = (0, 0, 0, b, 0, 0, . . . ). Moreover, if the
market expects most of the information at precision 4 but also wants to support bets
up to precision 8, one could run an LCMM with the liquidity placed at two levels as
b = (0, 0, 0, b4, 0, 0, 0, b8). By choosing different values b4 and b8, the market designer
can express utility for information at different precision levels.
We next empirically highlight such flexibility by showing how LCMM can inter-
polate between LMSRs at different resolutions, allowing the market to match the
coarseness of traders’ information.
We conduct agent-based simulation using the trader model with exponential utility
and exponential-family beliefs (Abernethy, Kutty, Lahaie, and Sami 2014). Agents
trade with a market maker (either a LMSR or a multi-resolution LCMM) to bet
on intervals within [0, 1), following the dynamics described below. We note that
while our market makers support agents with any beliefs and utility functions, the
exponential trader model is convenient, because it allows a closed-form derivation
of market-clearing price, meaning the clearing price reached when agents only trade
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among themselves, without a market maker (Abernethy, Kutty, Lahaie, and Sami
2014; Dud́ık, Lahaie, Rogers, and Wortman Vaughan 2017). This can be viewed
as a “ground truth” for the information elicitation. We evaluate market makers in
terms of their price convergence error, calculated as the relative entropy between the
market-clearing price and the price maintained by the market maker.
Trading Dynamics We simulate a market consisting of ten traders. The outcome
space is [0, 1), discretized at the precisionK = 10. Traders, indexed as i ∈ {1, . . . , 10},
have noisy access to the underlying true signal p = 0.4. Trader i’s belief takes form of
a beta distribution Beta(ai, bi) with ai ∼ Binomial(p, ni), bi = ni − ai, and ni = 16i
representing the quality of the agent’s observation of the signal p. Each trader i has
an exponential utility ui(W ) = −e−W , where W is the trader’s wealth. We consider
budget-limited cost-based market makers, whose worst-case loss may not exceed a
budget constraint B. For LMSR at precision k, this means setting the liquidity
parameter to b = B/ log(2k). In our experiments, we consider two LMSR markets
at precision levels 4 and 8, denoted as LMSRk=4 and LMSRk=8. On the other hand,
a multi-resolution LCMM has an infinite number of choices for its liquidity at each
precision level. To showcase its interpolation ability, we consider LCMM that evenly
splits its budget to precision levels 4 and 8, and denote it as LCMM50/50.
Each market starts with the uniform prior, i.e., the initial market prices for all
outcomes are equal. In each time step, a uniformly random agent is picked to trade.
The selected agent considers a set of 50 interval securities, with endpoints randomly
sampled according to the agent’s belief. The candidate intervals are rounded to the
precision of the corresponding market. The agent considers trading the expected-
utility-optimizing number of shares for each interval, and ultimately picks the best
interval and executes the trade.
Figure 5.2 shows the price convergence as a function of the number of trades,
averaged over 40 simulated markets mediated by LMSRk=4, LMSRk=8, and LCMM50/50
respectively under the budget constraint B = 1 (see Appendix C.2 for results at dif-
ferent budget levels). As one may expect, LMSRk=4 achieves a faster price convergence
at the coarser precision level k = 4 compared to LMSRk=8 (Fig. 5.2a), but fails to elicit
information at any finer granularity by design.8 The proposed LCMM50/50, by equally
splitting the budget between k = 4 and k = 8, is able to interpolate between the
8In Figure 5.2b, to facilitate comparisons, we assume that LMSRk=4 equally splits the price of a
coarse interval into finer intervals.
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(a) k = 4.


























(b) k = 8.
Figure 5.2: The price convergence error as a function of the number of trades, mea-
sured at two resolution levels.
performance of LMSRk=4 and LMSRk=8 and achieves the “best of both worlds”: it can
elicit forecasts at the finer level k = 8 similarly to LMSRk=8, but also obtain a fast
convergence at the coarser level k = 4, almost matching the convergence speed of
LMSRk=4.
Two natural questions arise from the two proposed designs. First, do our construc-
tions generalize to two- or higher-dimensional outcomes? One promising avenue is
to combine the ideas from our log-time LMSR market maker with multi-dimensional
segment trees (Mishra 2016) to obtain an efficient multi-dimensional LMSR based
on a static tree. However, it is not clear how to generalize our balanced LMSR tree
construction or the multi-resolution LCMM. Second, does our approach extend to




This dissertation focuses on addressing two categories of problems present in to-
day’s financial markets: the vulnerability to manipulation and the lack of expressive-
ness. The first part examines a form of market manipulation and proposes deterrent
solutions, combining techniques from agent-based modeling, game-theoretic analysis,
and adversarial learning. The second part investigates expressive designs and explores
efficient implementations for such mechanisms, using tools from optimization, data
structure design, and complexity analysis. This chapter concludes with a summary
of contributions and a discussion of limitations and future directions.
Spoofing the Limit Order Book: A Strategic Agent-Based Analysis Chap-
ter 2 models a form of order-based market manipulation, spoofing, and proposes mar-
ket mechanisms and trading strategies to mitigate such manipulation practice. Main
contributions of this chapter include:
(1) A computational agent-based model of spoofing prices in a limit-order market
(Section 2.5);
The model illustrates the strategic interactions between a manipulator and two
groups of background traders, namely heuristic belief learning (HBL) and zero
intelligence (ZI). The former uses market information to trade, whereas the later
does not. We demonstrate through empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA)
that in the absence of spoofing, HBL is generally adopted in equilibrium and
benefits price discovery and social welfare. Their existence, however, renders
a market vulnerable to manipulation: simple spoofing strategies can effectively
mislead traders, distort prices, and reduce market surplus. After re-equilibrating,
we show that learning traders persist even with manipulators, suggesting that
the elimination of spoofing requires active measures.
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(2) A cloaking mechanism that systematically deters spoofing through disclosing a
partially cloaked order book (Section 2.6);
The mechanism works by symmetrically concealing a deterministic number of
price levels from the inside of an order book. The design presents a tradeoff
between preserving order book informativeness and mitigating manipulation. We
perform empirical mechanism design with the goal of maximizing background-
trader surplus, and demonstrate in markets with moderate shocks, the benefit of
cloaking in deterring spoofing outweighs its efficiency cost. We demonstrate the
robustness of cloaking mechanisms by exploring sophisticated spoofing strategies
that probe to reveal cloaked information and showing that their associated costs
exceed the gains.
(3) Two variations of HBL that intend to improve the robustness of learning-based
strategies against spoofing (Section 2.7);
The first variation offers agents the flexibility to exclude limit orders at a certain
price level from the dataset they learn from. We show that this variation can
improve robustness against spoofing, while retain a comparable competitiveness in
non-manipulated markets. The second variation considers the full order book, but
adjusts its learned order price by an offset to correct for bias. It exhibits a general
improvement over the baseline HBL, and when combined with the first proposal,
it enjoys both improved profitability and robustness against manipulation.
The proposed agent-based model aims to capture the complex essence of real-world
financial markets, and EGTA the strategic interactions among agents. However, as
discussed in Chapter 2, these studies have several limitations. First, results pre-
sented reflect the specific modeling and simulation choices we adopt. Second, several
factors can affect our equilibrium analysis, including sampling error, reduced-game
approximation, and restricted bidding strategy coverage.
Despite these limitations that are inherent in any complex modeling effort, we
believe the agent-based model and deterrent proposals can serve as a constructive
basis to study and prevent other forms of manipulation. For instance, a manipulator
who learns to spoof the market by optimizing defined objectives (e.g., profits, price
deviations) under certain constraints (e.g., order sizes, arrival frequencies). The model
can also facilitate identifying practical considerations (e.g., agent strategic responses)
that should be regarded when making regulatory decisions.
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Modeling the Evasion of Manipulation Detection: An Adversarial Learn-
ing Framework Chapter 3 proposes an adversarial learning framework to proac-
tively reason about how a manipulator might mask its behavior to evade a manip-
ulation detector. The framework includes three main components: (1) a generative
model that is trained to adapt encoded manipulation order streams to resemble trad-
ing patterns of a normal trader, while preserving the manipulation intent; (2) a
discriminative model that differentiates the adversarially adapted manipulation order
streams from normal trading activities; and (3) an agent-based simulator that gener-
ates the source (i.e., manipulation) and target (i.e., market making) order streams,
and evaluates the manipulation effect of adapted outputs. The framework is able to
generate adapted manipulation examples that resemble the target distribution and
appear qualitatively different from the original manipulation strategy. We find that
this adaptation evades detection, but at the cost of compromising effectiveness in
market manipulation.
One limitation in the current framework is that the adversary only learns to
evade detection, but does not assess the cost of such adaptations. A smarter form of
adaptation can evade detection, and simultaneously optimizes for trading profits and
effectiveness in manipulation.
Several extensions can be made based on the current framework. First, generated
examples can be classified into two groups—those that preserve certain manipulation
effects and those do not—to support the training of detection algorithms that focus
on intent (or effect) rather than patterns. This is somewhat equivalent to training a
black-box approximator of the agent-based model we developed. Second, the target
distribution can be substituted or removed: substituting with other trading activities
as the target enables to generate a more diverse sets of synthetic manipulation order
streams; substituting with real market order streams enables to calibrate simulated
strategies to real trading practices.
Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market Chapter 4 examines
current design of financial options market, and proposes a new derivative contract,
combinatorial financial options. Main contributions of this chapter include:
(1) A mechanism that consolidates and matches orders on standard options related
to the same underlying asset (Section 4.4);
The mechanism uses a linear program to aggregate options markets of different
strike prices but logically related to the same underlying asset, providing traders
the flexibility to define any custom strike value. It runs in time polynomial to
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the number of orders and poses no risk, regardless of the value of the underlying
asset at expiration. Experiments on real options data show that the proposed
mechanism finds matches that the current independent-market design cannot,
and provides more competitive bid and ask prices.
(2) A combinatorial financial option that offers the contract holder the right to buy
or sell any linear combination of multiple underlying assets (Section 4.5);
Combinatorial options markets enable the expression of aggregate belief about
future correlations among assets. This increased expressiveness comes at the cost
of a higher computational complexity: optimal clearing of a combinatorial finan-
cial options market is coNP-hard. We show that the optimal clearing problem can
be equivalently formulated as a bilevel mixed-integer linear program, which com-
putes the exact solution by satisfying an increasing set of constraints generated
from different future values of the underlying assets. Experiments on synthetic
combinatorial options orders demonstrate its practicability.
An immediate next step is to investigate the use of different clearing rules to run
a combinatorial options market and quantify the tradeoffs among them. Continu-
ous clearing facilitates instantaneous matching and information disclosing, whereas
batch clearing tends to yield efficient matches and higher market surplus, as sug-
gested in our experiments on synthetic markets. Another interesting direction is to
explore structured markets where combinations are limited to components in a graph
of underlying assets: by limiting aspects of expressivity, we may find computationally
tractable mechanisms to clear the market.
Log-time Prediction Markets for Interval Securities Chapter 5 investigates
the design of prediction markets to recover a complete and fully general probabil-
ity distribution over a random variable, through trading interval securities. Main
contributions of this chapter include:
(1) A log-time logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) market maker (Section 5.3);
The log-time LMSR exploits the modularity properties of LMSR to construct
a balanced binary tree data structure and decompose computations along the
tree nodes. It expedites market operations (i.e., buy operations, price and cost
queries) to time logarithmic in the number of distinct intervals that traders define.
(2) A multi-resolution linearly constrained market maker (LCMM) (Section 5.4);
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The multi-resolution LCMM adopts a different binary tree data structure that
assigns two or more parallel LMSRs with different liquidity parameters to orches-
trate submarkets that offer interval securities at different resolutions. It uses a
constraint matrix to tie prices among submarkets, supporting the computationally
efficient removal of any arbitrage opportunity. This design remains log-time mar-
ket operations, and adds two additional benefits for the market designer: (1) the
ability to express utility for information at various resolutions, and (2) the ability
to guarantee a true constant bounded loss. It opens up the possibilities to elicit
arbitrarily fine-grained information (up to the machine precision).
Both proposals restrict to a one-dimensional continuous variable (plus any form of its
discretization). An interesting and useful future direction is to extend either binary
tree data structure to support disjoint exhaustive outcomes that correspond to some





Detailed Equilibrium Results for Chapter 2
































(b) N = 65 without spoofing
Table A.1: Background-trader surplus and HBL proportion in equilibrium of mar-
kets without spoofing. Each row describes one Nash equilibrium found in a game
(rounded to the nearest integer). Surpluses marked with asterisks indicate statisti-
cally significantly higher surpluses than those achieved in their corresponding markets






























(b) N = 65 with spoofing
Table A.2: Background-trader surplus and HBL proportion in equilibrium of markets
with spoofing. Each row describes one Nash equilibrium found in a game (rounded














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Env surplus ZI1 ZI2 ZI3 ZI4 ZI5 ZI6 ZI7
LSLN 16929 0 0 0 0 0 0.98 0.02
LSMN 16914 0 0 0 0 0 0.89 0.11
LSHN 18213 0.22 0.78 0 0 0 0 0
MSLN 16693 0 0 0 0 0 0.74 0.26
MSMN 17192 0 0 0.42 0 0 0 0.58
MSMN 16726 0 0 0 0 0 0.80 0.20
MSHN 16746 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 0.91
MSHN 17516 0.38 0 0 0 0 0.62 0
HSLN 16565 0 0 0 0 0 0.73 0.27
HSLN 17143 0 0 0.53 0 0 0 0.47
HSMN 16667 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
HSHN 17861 0.31 0.39 0 0 0 0.30 0
Table A.7: Equilibria for games where agents are restricted to ZI strategies, N = 28,
calculated from the 4-player DPR approximation. Each row of the table describes
one equilibrium found with its corresponding surplus and the equilibrium mixture
probabilities of strategies included.
Env surplus ZI1 ZI2 ZI3 ZI4 ZI5 ZI6 ZI7
LSLN 42938 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
LSLN 40779 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
LSMN 42972 0 0.97 0 0 0 0 0.03
LSMN 40557 0 0 0 0 0 0.83 0.17
LSHN 43327 0.44 0.56 0 0 0 0 0
LSHN 43173 0.11 0.89 0 0 0 0 0
MSLN 40444 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
MSMN 39622 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
MSHN 43140 0 0.73 0.27 0 0 0 0
HSLN 40523 0 0 0.28 0 0 0 0.72
HSLN 40038 0 0 0 0 0 0.60 0.40
HSMN 40458 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.73 0.19
HSHN 43197 0 0.88 0 0.12 0 0 0
Table A.8: Equilibria for games where agents are restricted to ZI strategies, N = 65,
calculated from the 5-player DPR approximation. Each row of the table describes
one equilibrium found with its corresponding surplus and the equilibrium mixture
probabilities of strategies included.
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A.2 A Cloaking Mechanism to Mitigate Spoofing
Strategy ZI1 ZI2 ZI3 ZI4 ZI5 ZI6 ZI7 ZI8 ZI9 HBL1 HBL2 HBL3 HBL4
L - - - - - - - - - 2 3 5 8
Rmin 0 0 0 0 0 0 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Rmax 1000 1000 1000 2000 2000 2000 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
η 0.4 0.8 1 0.4 0.8 1 0.4 0.8 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.9: Background trading strategies included in EGTA for cloaking mechanisms.
Env K 95% CI background surplus 95% CI total surplus HBL fraction
LSHN K0 [42121, 42329] [42548, 42694] 1.00
LSHN K1 [41848, 42048] [42254, 42396] 0.98
LSHN K1 [41769, 41977] [42264, 42406] 0.92
LSHN K2 [41788, 42000] [42205, 42347] 0.997
LSHN K4 [41572, 41772] [42046, 42188] 0.89
MSMN K0 [41958, 42220] [42274, 42388] 0.67
MSMN K1 [41902, 42164] [42210, 42324] 0.67
MSMN K1 [41849, 42107] [42170, 42284] 0.60
MSMN K1 [41801, 42067] [42167, 42281] 0.68
MSMN K2 [41742, 42000] [42123, 42237] 0.66
MSMN K4 [41693, 41924] [42116, 42230] 0.47
MSMN K4 [38809, 39025] [39367, 39485] 0.012
HSLN K0 [41529, 41871] [41974, 42088] 0.59
HSLN K0 [41698, 42040] [42102, 42216] 0.67
HSLN K0 [41625, 41973] [42021, 42135] 0.67
HSLN K1 [41417, 41769] [41869, 41983] 0.66
HSLN K2 [41377, 41655] [41776, 41890] 0.38
HSLN K2 [39728, 39972] [40484, 40594] 0
HSLN K2 [38691, 38965] [39419, 39537] 0
HSLN K4 [39557, 39803] [40256, 40374] 0
HSLN K4 [39558, 39804] [40290, 40408] 0
Table A.10: Equilibria for games where the exploiter does not spoof. Each row of
the table describes one equilibrium found with its corresponding background surplus,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Additional Proofs and Results for Chapter 4
B.1 Deferred Proofs from Section 4.4
B.1.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
As the left-hand side of the constraint in M.1 is a piecewise linear function of S,
it suffices to solve M.1 by including constraints defined by S at breakpoint values. In
our case, breakpoints of the constraint are the strike values specified in the market,
and the number of distinct strikes nK grows sublinear in the number of orders norders.
Therefore, we can specify the constraint in M.1 as nK + 2 payoff constraints for
each stock value S ∈ p ∪ q ∪ {0,∞}. Moreover, there are at most norders quantity
constraints, if we consider the quantity specified in each order. Thus, M.1 is a linear
program with norders +1 decision variables and O(norders) constraints. Mechanism M.1
matches options written on the same underlying asset and expiration across all types
and strikes in time polynomial in the number of orders.
B.1.2 Proof of Price Quote Procedure
We reiterate the procedure of using mechanism M.1 to price a target options
(χ, S,K, T ) with existing options orders in the market defined by (φ,p, b,ψ, q,a).
(1) The best bid b∗ for an option (χ, S,K, T ) is the maximum gain of selling a portfolio
of options that is weakly dominated by (χ, S,K, T ) for some constant L.
We derive b∗ by adding (χ, S,K, T ) to the sell side of the market indexed N + 1,
initializing its price aN+1 to 0, and solving for M.1. The best bid b
∗ is the returned
objective of M.1.
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Proof. We show that the above procedure finds the best bid, by returning the
maximum gain of selling a weakly dominated portfolio of options. After adding
(χ, S,K, T ) to the market, we have the updated M.1 as the following:
max
γ,δ,L




γm max{φm(S − pm), 0} −
∑
n
δn max{ψn(S − qn), 0}
− δN+1 max{χ(S −K), 0} ≤ L ∀S ∈ [0,∞)
Since we set aN+1 = 0, it is always optimal to buy option (χ, S,K, T ) and have








γm max{φm(S − pm), 0} −
∑
n
δn max{ψn(S − qn), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Portfolio (∗)
≤ max{χ(S −K), 0}+ L ∀S ∈ [0,∞)
Following Definition 4.1, the left-hand side of the above inequality describes the
payoff of a portfolio of existing options that is weakly dominated by the target
options (χ, S,K, T ) with an offset L, and the objective z maximizes the gain of
selling such a portfolio. One is willing to buy (χ, S,K, T ) at the highest price
(i.e., the best bid) b∗ = z, as one can always sell the weakly dominated Portfolio
(∗) and get z back without losing anything in the future.
(2) The best ask a∗ for an option (χ, S,K, T ) is the minimum cost of buying a port-
folio of options that weakly dominates (χ, S,K, T ) for some constant L.
We derive a∗ by adding (χ, S,K, T ) to the buy side of the market indexed M + 1,
initializing its price bM+1 to a large number (i.e., 10
6), and solving for M.1. The
best ask a∗ is then bM+1 minus the returned objective.
Proof. We show that the above procedure finds the best ask, by returning the
minimum cost of buying a weakly dominant portfolio of options. After adding
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(χ, S,K, T ) to the market, we have the updated M.1 as the following:
max
γ,δ,L








δn max{ψn(S − qn), 0} ≤ L ∀S ∈ [0,∞)
We set bM+1 to a sufficiently large number, say bM+1 = 10
6, so that it is always
optimal to sell option (χ, S,K, T ) and thus have γM+1 = 1. Therefore, we have
the following optimization problem:
max
γ,δ,L
z := b>γ + bM+1 − a>δ − L (M.1-ask)




γm max{φm(S − pm), 0}+
∑
n




Following Definition 4.1, the right-hand side of the above inequality describes the
payoff of a portfolio of existing options that weakly dominates the target options
(χ, S,K, T ) with an offset L. Since bM+1 is a fixed constant, the objective that
maximizes for z is equivalent to minimizing for −b>γ + a>δ + L, which is the
net cost of buying Portfolio (∗) plus L. One is willing to sell (χ, S,K, T ) at the
lowest price (i.e., the best ask) a∗ = bM+1 − z, as one can always pay a∗ and buy
back a weakly dominant Portfolio (∗) without losing anything in the future.
B.1.3 Proof of Corollary 4.1.1
We start by showing that in order to quote the most competitive prices (i.e.,
the highest bid and the lowest ask) for any target option (χ, S,K, T ), it suffices to
consider options orders in F . We prove by contradiction and consider the following
two cases:
(1) Suppose that there exists a bid order o /∈ F with γo > 0 in the Portfolio (∗),
which is the optimal portfolio constructed to derive the highest bid or lowest ask
for (χ, S,K, T ).
Since o /∈ F , then by the contrapositive of Definition 4.2, the bid of o can be
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improved by a portfolio of other orders, denoted Portfolio o∗, which is weakly
dominated by o with some constant offset L∗. We denote bo the bid price specified
in order o and Πo∗ the revenue of selling portfolio o
∗. Then, we have
z∗ := Πo∗ − L∗ > bo and Ψo∗ ≤ Ψo + L∗.
This means that we can replace o with Portfolio o∗ and the L∗ without violating
the constraints in M.1-bid and M.1-ask (since γoΨo ≥ γo(Ψo∗−L∗)), and improve
the objective by γo(z
∗−bo) > 0. This contradicts our premises, and thus to derive
the most competitive prices for any option (χ, S,K, T ), we have γo = 0 for all
o /∈ F .
(2) Similarly, suppose that there exists an ask order o /∈ F with δo > 0 in the Port-
folio (∗), which is the optimal portfolio constructed to derive the highest bid or
lowest ask for (χ, S,K, T ).
Since o /∈ F , then by the contrapositive of Definition 4.2, the ask of o can be
improved by a portfolio of other orders, denoted Portfolio o∗, which weakly dom-
inates o with some constant offset L∗. We denote ao the ask price specified in
order o and Πo∗ the cost of buying portfolio o
∗. Then, we have
z∗ := Πo∗ − L∗ < ao and Ψo ≤ Ψo∗ + L∗.
This means that we can replace o with Portfolio o∗ and the L∗ without violating
the constraints in M.1-bid and M.1-ask (since δoΨo ≤ δo(Ψo∗ +L∗)), and improve
the objective by δo(ao−z∗) > 0. This contradicts our premises, and thus to derive
the most competitive prices for any option (χ, S,K, T ), we have δo = 0 for all
o /∈ F .
Therefore, to quote the most competitive prices for any target option (χ, S,K, T ), it
suffices to consider options orders in F . Similar proofs hold for deciding the existence
of matching: if an order o /∈ F appears in the matched portfolio, we can always
improve the objective by substituting o with Portfolio o∗. Thus, to determine the
price quotes and the existence of a match, it suffices to consider options orders in F .
Following Theorem 4.1, our proposed mechanism M.1 determines price quotes and
the existence of a match in time polynomial in the size of the frontier set.
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B.2 Deferred Proofs from Section 4.5
B.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The decision problem described in Theorem 4.2 is in NP. Given a certificate which
is a value vector S ∈ RU+, we plug S into constraint in Mechanism M.2 to compute
the payoff and check whether it is less than L. This takes time O(U(M + N)). For
the NP-hardness, we prove the following stronger statement, which we will later use
directly to prove Theorem 4.3.
Theorem B.1 (Variation of Theorem 4.2). Consider all combinatorial options in the
market (φ,α,p,ψ,β, q). For any fixed L, it is NP-hard to decide
• Yes: γ = δ = 1 violates constraint (4.2) in M.2 for some S. Moreover, there exists





δn max{ψn(β>n S−qn), 0} ≤ L+0.25 ∀S ∈ RU≥0
we have |γ|M < 1− ε(M),
• No: γ = δ = 1 satisfies constraint (4.2) for all S,
even assuming that each combinatorial option is written on at most two underlying
assets.
Proof. We prove by reducing from the Vertex Cover problem: given an undirected
graph G = (V,E) and an integer k, decide if there is a subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V of
size k such that each edge has at least one vertex in V ′. Given a Vertex Cover instance
(G, k), we construct an instance of the combinatorial options matching problem. Let
the set of underlying assets correspond to vertices in G, i.e., U = |V |. For each vertex
indexed i, we associate four options with it (one on the buy side and three on the sell
side), which have payoff functions as follows:
fi = max{2K1Si −K1, 0}, g(1)i = max{K1Si, 0},
g
(2)
i = max{K2Si −K2, 0}, g
(3)
i = max{Si, 0},
where we choose K1 and K2 for some large numbers with K2  K1. For example, we
have K1 = 10|E| and K2 = 100|E|. For each edge e = (i, j), we define two options
(one on the buy side and one on the sell side) that involve its two end-points i and j:
fe = max{Si + Sj, 0}, ge = max{Si + Sj − 1, 0}.
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Finally, we include one sell order on an option with payoff g? = max{|E| − k − L −
0.5, 0}. Since L is fixed in advance, we assume |E| − k − L − 0.5 > 0 without loss
of generality. Thus, we have M = |V | + |E| buy orders and N = 3|V | + |E| + 1
sell orders. The construction takes time polynomial in the size of the Vertex Cover
instance.
Suppose the Vertex Cover instance is a Yes instance, and {v1, v2, ..., vk} is a vertex
cover. We show that assigning S1, S2, ..., Sk to 1 for the selected underlying assets and
0 for the rest unselected gives an S that violates the constraint (4.2). The left-hand
















(fe − ge)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ze
−g?. (B.1)
For Si ∈ {0, 1}, it is easy to see that fi − g(1)i − g
(2)




(3) = −k by our assignment. Since at least one of Si, Sj is 1 for any edge
(i, j) ∈ E, we have fe − ge = 1 and ze = |E|. Therefore, we have
z =− k + |E| − (|E| − k − L− 0.5) = L+ 0.5 > L.
To conclude the proof for the Yes instance case, we find the function ε(·) such that
for any (γ, δ) with |γ| ≥M(1− ε(M)), there exists a S that violates constraint (4.2)
even if the L on the right-hand side is changed to L+ 0.25. We keep the assignment
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(γefe − ge)− g?








≥z −M · 2K1 +
∑
i∈V




(since ∀m : fm ≤ 2K1 and M = |V |+ |E|)
=z −M · 2K1 + |γ| · 2K1 (|γ| =
∑
m γm)
≥z −Mε(M) · 2K1 (since |γ| ≥M(1− ε(M)))
=L+ 0.5−Mε(M) · 2K1
It suffices to choose ε such that Mε(M) ·2K1 < 0.25. Recall that K1 = 10|E| < 10M .
We can choose, say ε = 1
80M2
.
Suppose the Vertex Cover instance is a No instance. We aim to show that for the
given γ, δ, and L, there does not exist an S that violates the constraint. We prove
by maximizing z and demonstrating z ≤ L. We start by proving the following claim.
Claim 1. For an optimal z, we have Si ∈ {0, 1}.
We prove by contradiction, first assuming Sj > 1 for some j. Similarly, we have





















(fe − ge)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ze
−g?.
We first analyze zj and have
zj = max{2K1Sj −K1, 0} −max{K1Sj, 0} −max{K2Sj −K2, 0} −max{Sj, 0}
=2K1Sj −K1 −K1Sj − (K2Sj −K2)− Sj (by assumption of Sj > 1)
=K2 −K1 − (K2 −K1 + 1)Sj.
Recall that we choose K2  K1, K1 = 10|E| and K2 = 100|E|. Thus, we have zj
increase with rate K2 −K1 + 1 as Sj decreases uniformly. Since ze decreases at most
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|E| and the rest two terms, zi and g?, do not depend on Sj, decreasing Sj increases
z. It is sub-optimal to have Sj > 1 for some j.
Next, we assume 0 ≤ Sj ≤ 1, and have
zj =

−K1Sj − Sj 0 ≤ Sj ≤ 0.5,
K1(Sj − 1)− Sj 0.5 < Sj ≤ 1.
As K1 is large, by a similar argument analyzing the growth rate of each term, we
show that zj (and also z) increases by assigning Sj to 0 if 0 ≤ Sj ≤ 0.5, and by
assigning Sj to 1 if 0.5 < Sj ≤ 1.







(fe − ge)− (|E| − k) + L+ 0.5.





|E| − k. We prove by contradiction, assuming
∑
e∈E(fe − ge) −
∑
i∈V Si ≥ |E| − k.
Recall that to have fe − ge = 1 for e = (i, j), we need at least one of Si, Sj to be 1.
We consider the following two possible cases, and aim to refute them:
(a)
∑
e∈E(fe − ge) = |E| and
∑
i∈V Si ≤ k.
This means we cover all edges with at most k vertices assigned to 1.
(b)
∑
e∈E(fe − ge) < |E| and
∑
i∈V Si < k.
For any e with fe − ge = 0, we can assign 1 to one of its end-points, and have∑




i∈V Si. This leads back
to (a).





i∈V Si < |E| − k as desired, and thus z ≤ L for all S.
B.2.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
We reduce this decision problem from the decision problem in Theorem B.1 with
L = 0 and each combinatorial option is written on at most two underlying assets.
The reduction is as follows. The instance of the optimization problem have the
same α,β,p, q as given in the instance for the decision problem. In other words, the
reduction keeps the same for f1, . . . , fM , g1, . . . , gN . Set a1 = · · · = aN = a, and set
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b1 = · · · = bM = b, where a > 0 is sufficiently small and b > 0 is sufficiently large.
We will decide both values later.
If the decision problem instance is a No instance, we know that the constraint (2)
holds for f1, . . . , fM , g1, . . . , gN , γ1 = · · · = γM = δ1 = · · · = δN = 1 and L = 0.
Under this feasible assignment for γ, δ and L, we have b>γ − a>δ − L = Mb−Na.
If the decision problem instance problem is a Yes instance, we aim to show that
b>γ − a>δ −L < Mb−Na for any feasible γ, δ, L. We discuss three different cases:
L > 0.25, 0 ≤ L ≤ 0.25, and L < 0.
For L > 0.25, we have b>γ−a>δ−L < b>γ−0.25. Since each entry of γ is at most
1, the maximum of b>γ is Mb. Putting together, we have b>γ−a>δ−L < Mb−0.25,
which is less than Mb − Na if a is set such that a < 1/4N . We will fix a = 1/8N
from now on.
For 0 ≤ L ≤ 0.25, Theorem B.1 ensures that there exists an ε which depends only
on M such that any feasible γ, δ satisfy |γ| < (1 − ε)M < M . Notice that L is set
to 0 in the instance we are reducing from, and L here is between 0 and 0.25. These
make the statement corresponding to the Yes case of Theorem B.1 apply. Therefore,
the objective b>γ − a>δ − L ≤ b>γ ≤ (1− ε)Mb is strictly less than Mb−Na if b
is set such that b > Na
εM
(notice that ε in Theorem B.1 does not depend on b).
For L < 0, notice that substituting γ = 0, δ = 1,S = 0 to the left-hand side
of (2) gives an upper-bound to −L. Let L∗ be this upper-bound. Notice that L∗
only depends on α,β,p, q and is computable in polynomial time. In the case the
decision problem instance is a Yes instance, we know that any feasible γ, δ satisfy
|γ| < (1−ε)M (this is already the case for L = 0, and the feasible region for (γ, δ) can
only be smaller for negative L). Therefore, we have b>γ−a>δ−L < Mb(1−ε)+L∗,
which is less than Mb − Na if b satisfies b > Na+L∗
εM




theorem concludes. Notice that L∗ and ε only depend on α,β,p, q, so our definition
of b is valid.
B.3 Deferred Experimental Results
We implement Mechanism M.1 and Algorithm 3 using Gurobi and conduct exper-
iments on an AWS m5a.8xlarge instance. For consolidating standard options related
to the same underlying asset and expiration date, we compare the two cases where L
is treated as a decision variable and L is fixed to 0. We attach the detailed statistics
for options of each stock below. For Algorithm 3, we use M = 106 throughout all
experiments.
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AAPL 1452 14 104 1 0.8 3 0.94
AXP 804 11 73 4 0.5 2 0.99
BA 1694 14 121 5 3.35 3 0.66
CAT 968 13 74 6 0.18 2 0.69
CSCO 728 12 61 1 0.02 2 0.44
CVX 742 12 62 7 1.26 2 0.41
DD 778 13 60 1 0.32 3 0.45
DIS 806 13 62 5 0.86 0 0
GS 1110 12 93 1 0.16 3 0.82
HD 908 13 70 1 0.02 2 0.17
IBM 848 12 71 4 3.45 1 0.91
INTC 662 12 55 2 0.54 1 0.86
JNJ 850 12 71 4 0.12 2 0.57
JPM 854 13 66 3 0.4 3 0.7
KO 618 13 48 4 0.2 2 0.34
MCD 692 12 58 1 0.8 3 0.44
MMM 804 12 67 5 2.23 2 0.41
MRK 766 12 64 3 0.18 2 0.42
MSFT 1194 13 92 1 0 0 0
NKE 844 12 70 0 0 2 0.6
PFE 640 12 53 6 0.84 1 0.59
PG 786 12 66 3 0.27 2 0.31
RTX 920 14 66 1 0.01 0 0
TRV 256 6 43 0 0 1 0.4
UNH 964 12 80 1 0.04 2 1.34
V 856 13 66 3 0.03 5 1.47
VZ 508 12 42 6 0.65 1 1.81
WBA 808 11 73 0 0 1 0.14
WMT 810 12 68 3 0.2 3 0.51
XOM 832 12 69 7 2.78 1 0.85
Total 25502 366 69 94 1.03 56 0.70
Table B.1: Summary statistics (matching) of options on each stock in DJI by consol-


















AAPL 1038 787 38 1.46 1.92 0.25 0.29 84
AXP 476 440 46 0.37 0.3 0.15 0.13 58
BA 734 684 47 1.18 0.56 0.34 0.26 65
CAT 482 503 52 0.73 0.41 0.22 0.18 65
CSCO 608 616 51 1.27 0.45 0.1 0.07 90
CVX 254 274 54 0.2 0.2 0.11 0.09 51
DD 564 624 55 0.28 0.17 0.13 0.1 49
DIS 518 515 50 0.91 0.79 0.13 0.12 85
GS 738 631 43 0.91 0.61 0.24 0.16 73
HD 688 675 49 1.69 1.53 0.33 0.32 80
IBM 506 429 42 1.54 0.76 0.31 0.21 77
INTC 462 523 57 1.07 0.62 0.2 0.16 79
JNJ 404 412 51 1.04 1.2 0.14 0.13 88
JPM 524 472 45 0.62 0.57 0.11 0.09 83
KO 370 350 47 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.04 82
MCD 266 285 54 0.48 0.31 0.21 0.16 53
MMM 336 379 56 0.74 0.56 0.22 0.19 68
MRK 488 507 52 0.4 0.34 0.15 0.14 62
MSFT 1120 833 37 2.2 0.96 0.33 0.27 81
NKE 720 766 53 1.78 0.63 0.13 0.08 91
PFE 284 304 54 0.58 0.44 0.05 0.05 90
PG 486 491 51 0.31 0.16 0.15 0.11 44
RTX 822 831 51 1.74 1.5 0.93 0.93 43
TRV 204 216 53 1.18 1.36 0.46 0.49 63
UNH 750 618 41 2.05 1.23 0.54 0.37 72
V 416 413 50 0.51 0.43 0.22 0.2 56
VZ 248 295 59 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.06 43
WBA 744 641 43 1.2 1.46 0.37 0.38 72
WMT 494 475 48 0.47 0.25 0.14 0.11 64
XOM 344 288 42 0.4 0.47 0.1 0.11 75
Total 16088 15277 49 0.93 0.68 0.23 0.2 73
Table B.2: Summary statistics (quoting) of options on each stock in DJI by consoli-
dating options related to the same underlying asset and expiration date.
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AAPL 1452 14 104 3 2.14
AXP 804 11 73 4 1.56
BA 1694 14 121 4 3.72
CAT 968 13 74 5 0.48
CSCO 728 12 61 0 0
CVX 742 12 62 5 0.36
DD 778 13 60 2 0.03
DIS 806 13 62 5 0.58
GS 1110 12 93 3 7.3
HD 908 13 70 1 0.29
IBM 848 12 71 2 4.89
INTC 662 12 55 1 0.01
JNJ 850 12 71 2 0.08
JPM 854 13 66 2 0.28
KO 618 13 48 1 0.13
MCD 692 12 58 2 0.43
MMM 804 12 67 1 1.36
MRK 766 12 64 2 0.04
MSFT 1194 13 92 0 0
NKE 844 12 70 1 0.01
PFE 640 12 53 3 0.15
PG 786 12 66 3 0.48
RTX 920 14 66 1 0.01
TRV 256 6 43 0 0
UNH 964 12 80 2 7.54
V 856 13 66 5 3.5
VZ 508 12 42 4 0.49
WBA 808 11 73 0 0
WMT 810 12 68 4 0.18
XOM 832 12 69 6 1.16
Total 25502 366 69 74 1.54
Table B.3: Summary statistics (matching with L = 0) of options on each stock in DJI


















AAPL 1120 902 40 1.61 2.05 0.69 1.1 51
AXP 616 605 49 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.15 44
BA 1208 1399 58 1.03 0.49 0.65 0.35 34
CAT 678 768 57 0.6 0.42 0.25 0.19 57
CSCO 728 783 54 1.34 0.48 0.28 0.14 77
CVX 456 537 59 0.48 0.58 0.23 0.24 56
DD 666 845 63 0.28 0.2 0.16 0.12 42
DIS 518 569 55 0.91 0.79 0.31 0.24 68
GS 826 848 51 0.92 0.65 0.54 0.3 46
HD 828 887 54 1.68 1.51 0.93 0.83 45
IBM 696 668 48 1.62 0.81 0.73 0.34 56
INTC 568 701 62 1.02 0.61 0.32 0.21 67
JNJ 672 779 58 0.99 1.16 0.39 0.38 64
JPM 724 835 58 0.73 0.75 0.26 0.25 66
KO 572 676 59 0.44 0.18 0.1 0.07 73
MCD 558 710 64 0.63 0.34 0.35 0.22 41
MMM 722 934 65 1.03 0.84 0.52 0.44 49
MRK 672 791 59 0.36 0.28 0.17 0.14 52
MSFT 1194 1003 42 2.19 0.97 1 0.47 53
NKE 788 874 55 1.78 0.63 0.34 0.14 80
PFE 480 612 64 0.51 0.32 0.11 0.09 76
PG 582 665 57 0.34 0.16 0.18 0.12 40
RTX 822 931 57 1.74 1.5 1.33 1.24 21
TRV 256 307 60 1.22 1.47 0.78 0.82 41
UNH 806 722 45 2.02 1.22 1.15 0.61 46
V 580 689 59 0.45 0.38 0.27 0.19 45
VZ 384 511 67 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 35
WBA 808 783 48 1.24 1.47 0.65 0.77 48
WMT 550 605 55 0.45 0.28 0.2 0.14 53
XOM 440 459 52 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.17 64
Total 20518 22398 56 0.95 0.71 0.44 0.35 52
Table B.4: Summary statistics (quoting with L = 0) of options on each stock in DJI
by consolidating options related to the same underlying asset and expiration date.
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APPENDIX C
Deferred Proofs and Additional Experiments for
Chapter 5
C.1 Deferred Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
The binary-search property implies that the nodes z included in the price calcu-
lation (lines 5 and 9) form the cover of I, so the algorithm correctly returns the price
of I. The running time follows thanks to height balance, which implies the depth of
the tree is O(log nvals).
C.1.2 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Algorithm 8 Buy s shares of bundle security for an interval I = [α, 1).
1: Define subroutines:
ResetInnerNode(z): reset hz and Sz based on the children of z and the value sz:
hz ← 1 + max{hleft(z), hright(z)}, Sz ← esz/b(Sleft(z) + Sright(z))
AddShares(z, s): increase the number of shares held in z by s:
sz ← sz + s, Sz ← es/bSz
2: procedure RotateLeft(z):
3: Let z1 = left(z), z23 = right(z), z2 = left(z23), z3 = right(z23)
4: AddShares(z2, sz23), AddShares(z3, sz23), delete node z23
5: Let z12 be a new node with:
left(z12) = z1, right(z12) = z2, Iz12 = Iz1 ∪ Iz2 , sz12 = 0
6: ResetInnerNode(z12)
7: Update node z:
left(z)← z12, right(z)← z3, ResetInnerNode(z)
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Proof of Lemma 5.2. We prove that the original partial normalization value of node
z, Sz, is the same as the updated value, S
′
z, after a left rotation. A right rotation
follows symetrically.
Sz = e


























(since s′z12 = 0)
= esz/b ·
(





Proof of Theorem 5.3. The correctness of the buy operation follows because the
shares are added to the nodes that form the cover of I (lines 5 and 12 in Algo-
rithms 5), and the updates up the search path restore the properties of the LMSR
tree (lines 13–17 in Algorithms 5). The running time follows from height balance,
which implies that the length of the search path is O(log n) = O(log nvals).
C.1.3 Proof of Theorem 5.4
We first show that the constraints A>µ = 0 imply that all levels ` = 0, 1, . . . , K
in µ are mutually coherent. To do this, it suffices to show that all pairs of consecutive
levels ` and `+1 are coherent, i.e., µy = µyl +µy for all y ∈ Z` where we let yl = left(y)
and y = right(y).
We proceed by induction, beginning with ` = K − 1. In this base case, the
constraint a>y µ = 0, expressed in Eq. (5.13), states that bKµy = bKµyl + bKµy,
implying levels K − 1 and K are coherent.
Now assume that all the levels k > ` are mutually coherent. We aim to show
that levels l and l + 1 are coherent. Pick any y ∈ Z`. Then the constraint a>y µ = 0,































Eq. (C.1) follows because yl and y are in level `+ 1, which is coherent with all levels
k ≥ ` + 1 by the inductive assumption. Thus, we obtain that µy = µyl + µy for all
y ∈ Z`, establishing the coherence between levels ` and ` + 1 and completing the
induction.
To finish the proof, we note that the LCMM prices at level K are determined by
CK , so they describe a probability distribution over Ω. Since A
>p(θ) = 0, all the
levels in p(θ) are coherent with level K, which means that they correspond to the
expectation of φ under the probability distribution described by the prices at level
K. Thus, p(θ) is a coherent price vector and the multi-resolution LCMM is therefore
arbitrage-free.
C.1.4 Proof of Theorem 5.5
The worst-case loss of an LCMM is bounded by the sum of the worst-case losses
of the component markets Ck (Dud́ık, Lahaie, and Pennock 2012). In our case, these
are LMSR submarkets with losses bounded by bk log |Zk|, so the worst-case loss of







bk(k log 2) ≤ B∗ log 2,
proving the theorem.
C.1.5 Proof of Theorem 5.4.2
Algorithm 6 returns the correct price of I, because prices are coherent among
submarkets and the nodes included in price calculations form a cover of I.
C.1.6 Proof of Theorem 5.6 and Additional Deferred Material from Sec-
tion 5.4.3
We begin by deriving an identity that will be useful in the following analysis. For
this derivation, let C be an LMSR with the liquidity parameter b, defined over an
outcome space Ω. We will derive a relationship between the price vector in a state
θ and the price vector in a new state θ′ = θ + δ, where δ is any bundle restricted
to securities in E, i.e., δω = 0 for ω 6∈ E. Denoting µ = p(θ), µE = pE(θ), and
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We next establish correctness of the arbitrage removal procedure from Algo-
rithm 7. The following lemma provides a critical step:
Lemma C.1. Fix a level ` < K. Let θ̃ be a market state in C̃ such that the associated
prices, µ = p̃(θ̃), are coherent among all levels k > `. Then, for any t ∈ R and any
node y with level(y) ≤ `, the prices after buying t shares of ay, i.e., µ′ = p̃(θ̃ + tay),
remain coherent among all levels k > `.
To use Lemma C.1 for arbitrage removal, we start with a market state θ̃ where
all levels are coherent. When a trader buys some shares of a security φy, the level
` = level(y) loses coherence with other levels. By buying a certain number of shares
of ay, it is possible to restore coherence between ` and ` + 1, and Lemma C.1 then
implies that coherence with all further levels k > ` + 1 is also restored. The process
of restoring coherence now continues with the parent of y and the bundle apar(y) as
implemented in Algorithm 7.
Proof. Consider two arbitrary levels k and m with ` < k < m. Since prices are






Let πy denote the price of φy according to the securities in Zk and Zm, that is,
πy =
∑
z∈Zk: z⊂y µz =
∑
u∈Zm: u⊂y µu. Note that πy might differ from µy, because
level ` is not necessarily coherent with levels k and m. Let θ̃′ = θ̃ + tay. From the
definition of matrix A, the updated θ̃′z and θ̃
′
u for any z ∈ Zk and u ∈ Zm are
θ̃′z =
θ̃z − tbk if z ⊂ y,θ̃z otherwise, θ̃′u =
θ̃u − tbm if u ⊂ y,θ̃u otherwise.
We calculate the new price µ′z of any node z ∈ Zk and show it equals to the price
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If z 6⊂ y, then we similarly have
µ′z =
µz









Thus, prices remain coherent among all levels m > k > `.
Building upon Lemma C.1, the following lemma provides the precise trade required
to restore coherence after an update.
Lemma C.2. Fix a level ` < K and a node y ∈ Z` and let yl = left(y) and y =
right(y). Let θ̃0 and θ̃ = θ̃0 + δ be market states in C̃, with associated prices µ0 =
p̃(θ̃0) and µ = p̃(θ̃) such that:
• prices µ0 are coherent among all levels k ≥ `;
• δ is a vector, which is zero outside descendants of y, i.e., δz = 0 whenever
z 6⊆ y;
• prices µ are coherent among all levels k > `.








· µyl + µy
1− µyl − µy
)
.
Then the associated prices µ′ = p̃(θ̃′) are coherent among all levels k ≥ `.
Proof. By Lemma C.1, adding tay to θ̃ maintains coherence among levels k > `, so
it suffices to show that levels ` and `+ 1 are mutually coherent in µ′. Thus, we have




right(z) for all z ∈ Z`.
First note that by the assumption on δ and the definition of ay, we have
θ̃0z = θ̃z = θ̃
′
z for all z ∈ Z`\{y}
θ̃0u = θ̃u = θ̃
′
u for all u ∈ Z`+1\{yl, y}.
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1− µ0yl − µ0y
. (C.4)




right(z) for all z ∈ Z`\{y}, Eq. (C.4) implies




right(z) for all z ∈ Z`\{y} as long as µ′y = µ′yl + µ
′
y.
Thus, in order to show that levels ` and ` + 1 are coherent in µ′, it suffices to show




We begin by explicitly calculating θ̃′z and θ̃
′
u for any z ∈ Z` and any u ∈ Z`+1:
θ̃′z =
θ̃z + tB` if z = y,θ̃z otherwise, θ̃′u =







































But this follows from our choice of t and the fact that B`−1 = B` + b`, completing the
proof.
We finish the section with the proof of Theorem 5.6.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. Algorithm 7 correctly updates the tree (and returns the cost),
because the shares are added to the nodes that form a cover of I, and coherence is
then restored by applying Lemma C.2 up the search path. Running times of both
algorithms are proportional to the length of the search path to the first node z with
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αz = α, whose level coincides with the precision of α.
C.2 Trading Dynamics and Additional Results
C.2.1 Detailed Trading Dynamics
We simulate a market consisting of ten traders. The outcome space is [0, 1), dis-
cretized at the precision K = 10. Traders, indexed as i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, have noisy
access to the underlying true signal p = 0.4. Trader i’s belief takes form of a beta
distribution Beta(ai, bi) with ai ∼ Binomial(p, ni), bi = ni − ai, and ni = 16i rep-
resenting the quality of the agent’s observation of the signal p. Each trader i has
an exponential utility ui(W ) = −e−W , where W is the trader’s wealth. We consider
budget-limited cost-based market makers, whose worst-case loss may not exceed a
budget constraint B. For LMSR at precision k, this means setting the liquidity pa-
rameter to b = B/ log(2k). In our experiments, we consider two LMSR markets at
precision levels 4 and 8, denoted as LMSRk=4 and LMSRk=8. On the other hand, a multi-
resolution LCMM has an infinite number of choices for its liquidity at each precision
level. To showcase its interpolation ability, we consider LCMM that evenly splits its
budget to precision levels 4 and 8, and denote it as LCMM50/50.
Each market starts with the uniform prior, i.e., the initial market prices for all
outcomes are equal. In each time step, a uniformly random agent is picked to trade.
The selected agent considers a set of 50 interval securities, with endpoints randomly
sampled according to the agent’s belief. The candidate intervals are rounded to the
precision of the corresponding market.1 The agent considers trading the expected-
utility-optimizing number of shares for each interval, and ultimately picks the best
interval and executes the trade. The market maker updates prices accordingly, until
the market equilibrium is reached (no trader in the market has the incentive to trade).
Following the described protocol, we run markets mediated by the three respective
market makers, LMSRk=4, LMSRk=8, and LCMM50/50, over a range of budget constraints.
To decrease variance, we generate 40 controlled simulation traces (described by a
sequence of agent arrivals and their draws of the candidate intervals) and run the
market makers on those same traces. Therefore, any change in agent behavior and
1As the number of available interval securities grows exponentially as the supported precision
increases, we assume agents have a computational limit and can only consider a (sub)set of available
securities.
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price convergence is caused by the different cost functions that market makers adopt
to aggregate trades.
C.2.2 Additional Experiments
In Section 5.5, we demonstrated that by splitting the budget between submarkets
that offer interval securities at different precisions, the multi-resolution LCMM is able
to interpolate the performance of LMSR market makers. It can aggregate information
at the coarser level efficiently, while achieving accurate belief elicitation at the finer
resolution, given enough trading period. Here we provide numerical results over a
wider range of budget constraints, validating how the multi-resolution LCMM may
balance the price convergence behavior of LMSR markets.
Fig. C.1 shows the price convergence error as a function of budget constraint (thus,
the liquidity parameter) and the number of trades for the three respective market
makers. Results are averaged over forty random but controlled trading sequences.
The solid lines depict the price convergence error at precision level k = 8, and the
dashed ones for precision level k = 4. The minimum point on each curve indicates
the optimal budget, or the optimal value of the liquidity parameter to adopt, for the
particular cost function and a specific number of trades.
Intuitively, when the budget for running a market is sufficient, a market operator
can support interval securities at any fine-grained precision level, or use only a por-
tion of the budget to achieve optimal performance. However, when the budget for
running a market is limited, say B less than 8, the market designer can preferably ag-
gregate information faster at a coarser resolution by limiting the precision of interval
endpoints (e.g., adopting LMSRk=4). However, by design, it can not accurately elicit
beliefs at finer resolutions, even when the market is run for a sufficiently long period
of time. The LMSRk=8, on the other hand, benefits from a larger number of trades to
aggregate more fine-grained information. Running the two LMSR markets indepen-
dently may balance this convergence trade-off, but inevitably results in inconsistent
prices between the markets. Given the different convergence properties of separate
LMSRs, a multi-resolution LCMM can allocate its budget accordingly to achieve a
desired convergence performance, while maintaining coherent prices. For example,
a market designer, who considers information at precision levels k = 4 and k = 8
equally important, may divide the budget between the two levels to enjoy faster price
convergence at the coarser resolution, while accurately aggregating a full probability
distribution of the continuous variable as trading proceeds.
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Figure C.1: The price convergence error as a function of liquidity and the number
of trades (indicated by the color of the line) for the three respective market makers.
Solid lines record price convergence error at the finer precision level k = 8, and dashed
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